Case Summary (G.R. No. 164195)
Key Dates
Per curiam Resolution under review: October 7, 1988.
Motion for Reconsideration filed: October 18, 1988.
Supplemental filings noted: October 25 and October 27, 1988.
Final disposition denying the Motion for Reconsideration: February 1, 1989.
Applicable Law and Constitutional Framework
Primary constitutional backdrop: 1987 Philippine Constitution—specifically the protection of freedom of speech (Bill of Rights) as the touchstone for balancing free expression against preservation of the judiciary’s authority.
Relevant procedural and disciplinary rules: Revised Rules of Court, notably Rule 71 (contempt) and Rule 139 (suspension or removal of attorneys). The Court also referenced established Philippine jurisprudence on limits to freedom of expression and accepted tests (e.g., “clear and present danger,” “balancing-of-interests”) in assessing disciplinary and contempt charges.
Procedural Posture and Opportunity to be Heard
The Court emphasized that respondent was given ample opportunity to explain and defend himself. Although Rule 71 permits summary punishment for contempts in certain circumstances (Section 1), the Court did not invoke summary punishment without hearing; instead it required respondent to explain “why he should not be punished” and allowed him to present defenses, arguments and evidence. The Motion for Reconsideration raised ten legal points; the Court reexamined its earlier conclusions and found no sufficient basis to modify its rulings.
Characterization of Contempt and Distinction Between Direct/Indirect
The Court found respondent guilty of contempt and gross misconduct, but clarified terminology: it did not mechanically equate the phrase “in facie curiae” with the technical concept of direct contempt. Rather, the Court described respondent’s acts and statements—some made in pleadings, others to the media—as conduct flaunted “in the face of the Court,” amounting to a frontal assault on the Court’s integrity. The Court stressed that it could have imposed immediate summary punishment under Section 1 of Rule 71 had it treated the acts as direct contempt, but chose instead to proceed after affording respondent full opportunity to be heard.
Rule 139 Referral: Not Mandatory Where Court Acts Motu Proprio
Respondent urged referral of the case to the Integrated Bar of the Philippines or the Solicitor General under Rule 139(b). The Court explained that referral to those bodies is not mandatory or exclusive where the Supreme Court initiates proceedings on its own motion. Rule 139’s procedural sections (Sections 2 et seq.) delineate steps for proceedings initiated upon complaint of another; by contrast, the Court initiating motu proprio disciplinary action need not refer the matter for investigation to determine probable cause. Referral may be made when further factual investigation is necessary, but was unnecessary here because the factual assertions (that respondent made the statements) were not substantially disputed.
Tests for Limiting Speech: “Visible Tendency,” “Clear and Present Danger,” and Balancing
The Court rejected a categorical requirement to apply only the “clear and present danger” test in disciplinary and contempt contexts. It noted that it paraphrased Rule 71’s language (e.g., improper conduct “tending, directly or indirectly, to impede, obstruct or degrade the administration of justice”) as a “visible tendency” concept without purporting to announce a novel doctrine. The Court observed that the “clear and present danger” test is one accepted method, but not the sole standard; the “balancing-of-interests” test is also recognized in Philippine jurisprudence. Applying those standards here, the Court concluded respondent’s statements exceeded permissible limits of free speech.
Nature of the “Substantive Evil” the Court Sought to Prevent
The Court explained that the “substantive evil” at issue was not necessarily imminent physical disorder or violence, but the obstruction of a free and fair hearing and, more broadly, the degradation of the judicial system and professional standards of the bar. Such erosion of public confidence and professional conduct standards is less overt than riot or disorder but can be equally or more deleterious to society and the rule of law. The Court therefore considered statements that impaired judicial authority and fair adjudication as falling outside protected expression.
Intent, Subjectivity, and Objective Import of Statements
The Court treated respondent’s subjective disclaimer of intent (that he did not intend to attack or denigrate the Court) as legally immaterial to characterization of his conduct. Subjective mental states cannot be directly ascertained; intent must be inferred from words and acts. A respondent cannot nullify the plain and natural import of his statements by asserting a private, contrary intent. The Court also noted respondent offered no apology or demonstration of repentance in his explanations, which was relevant to disposition.
Punishability of Out‑of‑Court Publications
The Court held that contempt can be based on out‑of‑court publications an
...continue readingCase Syllabus (G.R. No. 164195)
Procedural and Factual Background
- The Court received a lengthy Motion for Reconsideration dated October 18, 1988, filed by counsel for respondent Raul M. Gonzalez, which challenged the Court's per curiam Resolution dated October 7, 1988.
- The per curiam Resolution of October 7, 1988 arose from a prior Resolution dated May 2, 1988 that required respondent Gonzalez to explain "why he should not be punished for contempt of court and/or subjected to administrative sanctions."
- Respondent was heard and given ample opportunity to present defenses, arguments, and evidence to the Supreme Court in response to that requirement.
- The Motion for Reconsideration contained extensive quotations and references to foreign texts, including United States authorities, which the Court examined but concluded do not reflect the law in the Philippines.
- The Court reviewed its earlier extended per curiam Resolution in light of the arguments raised in the Motion for Reconsideration but found no sufficient basis to modify its prior conclusions and rulings.
Central Ruling and Disposition
- The Court reaffirmed its conclusion that "respondent Gonzalez is guilty both of contempt of court in facie curiae and of gross misconduct as an officer of the court and member of the bar."
- The Motion for Reconsideration was DENIED for lack of merit, and that denial was declared FINAL.
- The Court also noted the filing of an Ex-Parte Manifestation and Motion dated October 25, 1988, and a Supplemental Manifestation dated October 27, 1988, filed by respondent.
- Justices Fernan, C.J., Narvasa, Melencio-Herrera, Gutierrez, Jr., Cruz, Paras, Feliciano, Gancayco, Padilla, Bidin, Sarmiento, Cortes, Grino-Aquimo, Medialdea, and Regalado concurred in the decision.
Nature of the Contempt and the Court’s Characterization
- The Court clarified it did not use the phrase "in facie curiae" as a technical equivalent of "direct contempt" in the strictest U.S. usage, though acknowledging that U.S. courts sometimes equate "in the face of the court" with "direct contempt."
- The Court described respondent’s contumacious acts or statements — made both in a pleading filed before the Supreme Court and in statements given to the media — as "serious acts flaunted in the face of the Court" constituting a frontal assault upon the integrity of the Court and, through the Court, the entire judicial system.
- The Court emphasized it provided respondent a full opportunity to be heard and did not summarily impose punishment under Section 1 of Rule 71, which would have been an available option had the Court treated the acts as direct contempt warranting immediate sanction.
Rule 71 and Direct vs. Indirect Contempt
- The Court referenced Section 3(d) of Rule 71 of the Revised Rules of Court which penalizes contumacious conduct including "any improper conduct tending, directly or indirectly, to impede, obstruct or degrade the administration of justice."
- The Court rejected the characterization urged by respondent that the Court erred by charging him with indirect contempt and convicting him of direct contempt, explaining the characterization in the Resolution sought to convey the seriousness and brazenness of the acts rather than to adopt a novel technical doctrine.
- The Court made clear it had discretion in how to treat and punish contumacious conduct and that it elected to afford respondent hearing and opportunity to present defenses rather than immediately impose summary punishment.
Rule 139: Referral to Solicitor General or Integrated Bar of the Philippines
- Respondent urged error in that the Court charged him under Rule 139(b) and not under Rule 139 generally; the Court addressed this contention in the per curiam Resolution.
- The Court stated that reference of complaints against attorneys to the Integrated Bar of the Philippines or to the Solicitor General is not mandatory upon the Supreme Court and such reference is not an exclusive procedure under Rule 139(b), especially where the charge includes acts done before the Supreme Court itself.
- The Court recalled Section 1 of Rule 139 ("Motion or complaint") which provides that proceedings for removal or suspension of attorneys may be taken by the Supreme Court either on its own motion or upon complaint under oath of another in writing.
- The Court explained that the procedures set out in Sections 2 and following of Rule 139 apply to suspension or disbarment proceedings initiated upon sworn complaint by another person, and are not the exclusive procedures for proceedings initiated by the Supreme Court motu proprio.
- The Court reasoned it would be inconceivable for the Supreme Court to initiate motu proprio proceedings when it did not itself find probable cause to proceed; therefore, there is no necessity to refer a motu proprio case to the Solicitor General merely to determine whether there is sufficient ground to proceed.
- The Court acknowledged, however, that it may refer a case to the Solicitor General when it deems that further factual investigation is needed in a particular instance.
Need for Further Investigation and the Record
- The Court observed in its per curiam Resolution (page 18) that there was "no need for further investigation of facts in the present case" because it was "not substantially disputed by respondent Gonzalez that he uttered or wrote certain statements attributed to him."
- The Court further noted respondent's defense was not a den