Case Summary (G.R. No. L-51257)
Facts
On December 2, 1964 the alleged slight physical injuries were committed against Ang Cho Ching. The City Fiscal filed an information on February 1, 1965. On September 10, 1965 the petitioner moved to quash the information on the ground that the 60‑day prescriptive period for light offenses (Article 90, RPC) had elapsed. The City Court denied the motion on September 14, 1965, reasoning that the sixtieth day fell on a Sunday and that filing on the next business day was permitted. The Court of First Instance of Rizal dismissed the petition for certiorari and mandamus; this appeal followed.
Legal Issue
Whether the falling of the last day of the prescriptive period on a Sunday or legal holiday constitutes a legally efficient cause that interrupts or delays prescription so that the prosecutor may file the information on the next succeeding business day.
Relevant Statutory Provisions
- Article 90, Revised Penal Code: light offenses prescribe in two months.
- Article 13, Civil Code: months for computation are of thirty days each.
- Article 91, Revised Penal Code: prescriptive period commences from discovery; interrupted by filing of complaint or information; resumes if proceedings terminate without conviction or are unjustifiably stopped for reasons not imputable to the accused; prescription does not run when offender is absent from the Philippine Archipelago.
- Sec. 31, Revised Administrative Code: where the day, or the last day, for doing any act required or permitted by law falls on a holiday, the act may be done on the next succeeding business day.
- Sec. 1, Rule 28 (former Rules of Court): computation rule excluding the first day and including the last day unless the last day is a Sunday or legal holiday, in which case time runs until the end of the next day which is neither Sunday nor holiday.
Arguments of the Petitioner
The petitioner contended, in substance: (a) a Sunday or holiday is not a statutory cause that interrupts prescription; (b) Article 91 expressly provides a single exception (offender’s absence) and by inclusio unius exclusio alterius excludes other exceptions; (c) controlling jurisprudence and authoritative treatises distinguish criminal statutes of limitation from civil ones and disfavor implied exceptions; (d) penal statutes must be strictly construed in favor of the accused; and (e) rules that extend reglementary procedural periods (the “next business day” doctrine) do not apply to extinctionary prescription in criminal law.
Arguments of the Respondents
The respondents relied on Sec. 31 of the Revised Administrative Code and the computation provision in the former Rules of Court. They argued that because the last day to file fell on a holiday (Sunday), the filing could lawfully be made on the next succeeding business day, consistent with ordinary rules of time computation.
Court’s Analysis
The Court distinguished procedural computation rules from substantive statutes of limitation in criminal law. It emphasized that prescription in criminal cases is not merely a procedural deadline for doing an act but a substantive loss or waiver by the State of the power to prosecute — an automatic extinguishment by operation of law. Quoting Wharton and prior Philippine authorities, the Court explained that statutes of limitation in criminal law are akin to grants of amnesty and are to be construed in favor of the accused; they reflect a legislative decision that, after a fixed period, the State relinquishes its right to prosecute. Because of that substantive character and public policy favoring prompt prosecutions, rules allowing extension of procedural deadlines when a last day falls on a Sunday or holiday (such as Sec. 31 of the Revised Administrative Code and Rule 28 computation rules) do not operate to lengthen the prescriptive period fixed by the State for criminal prosecution.
Holding and Disposition
The Court held that when the sixtieth and last day to file an information falls on a S
...continue readingCase Syllabus (G.R. No. L-51257)
Case Citation and Court
- Reported at 207 Phil. 615, First Division, G.R. No. L-28841.
- Decision dated June 24, 1983.
- Opinion authored by Justice Gutierrez, Jr.
- Concurring Justices: Teehankee (Chairman), Melencio-Herrera, Plana, and Vasquez.
- Dissenting Justice: Relova, J.
Procedural History
- On December 2, 1964, the alleged offense (slight physical injuries) was committed against Mr. Ang Cho Ching.
- On February 1, 1965, the City Fiscal of Quezon City filed an information in the City Court charging the petitioner-appellant with slight physical injuries.
- On September 10, 1965, the petitioner-appellant moved to quash the criminal prosecution on the ground that the information was filed on the sixty-first day after the commission of the offense and that the sixty-day prescriptive period had lapsed.
- On September 14, 1965, the City Court of Quezon City denied the motion to quash, reasoning that the 60th day fell on a Sunday and that the rule permitting filing on the next succeeding business day applied; hence, the action had not prescribed.
- After denial of a motion for reconsideration by the City Court, the petitioner filed a petition for certiorari and mandamus with preliminary injunction before the Court of First Instance of Rizal.
- On July 11, 1966, the Court of First Instance of Rizal dismissed the petition; a motion for reconsideration was subsequently denied.
- The petitioner appealed to the court issuing the present decision (G.R. No. L-28841).
Facts
- The alleged commission date of the offense: December 2, 1964.
- Filing date of information: February 1, 1965.
- The prescriptive period for the charged light offense: sixty days from discovery.
- The sixtieth (last) day for filing fell on a Sunday (a dies non), prompting dispute whether filing on the next business day was permissible to interrupt prescription.
- The City Court applied a rule that when the last day for filing a pleading falls on a Sunday, filing on the next succeeding business day is allowed; petitioner contested this application in criminal prescription context.
Issue Presented
- Whether a Sunday or legal holiday is a legally efficient cause that interrupts the prescription of an offense, thereby permitting filing on the next working day when the last day of the prescriptive period falls on a Sunday or holiday.
Relevant Statutes and Rules Quoted in the Decision
- Article 90, Revised Penal Code: Light offenses prescribe in two months.
- Article 13, Civil Code: "When the law speaks of months, it shall be understood that months are of thirty days each."
- Article 91, Revised Penal Code (quoted in full):
- "ART. 91. Computation of prescription of offenses. The period of prescription shall commence to run from the day on which the crime is discovered by the offended party, the authorities or their agents, and shall be interrupted by the filing of the complaint or information, and shall commence to run again when such proceedings terminate without the accused being convicted or acquitted, or are unjustifiably stopped for any reason not imputable to him.
- The term of prescription shall not run when the offender is absent from the Philippine Archipelago."
- Section 31, Revised Administrative Code (quoted by respondents): "Where the day, or the last day, for doing any act required or permitted by law falls on a holiday, the act may be done on the next succeeding business day."
- Section 1, Rule 28 of the former Rules of Court (quoted):
- "How to compute time. In computing any period of time prescribed or allowed by these rules, by order of court, or by any applicable statute, the day of the act, event, or default after which the designated period of time begins to run is not to be included. The last day of the period so computed is to be included, unless it is a Sunday or a legal holiday, in which event the time shall run until the end of the next day which is neither a Sunday nor a holiday."
Assignments of Error Raised by Petitioner-Appellant
- First Assignment: The lower court erred in finding that Sunday is a legal efficient cause to interrupt prescription of an offense.
- Second Assignment: The lower court erred in finding that the period fixed by law within which to commence criminal prosecution may legally be extended with the intervention of a Sunday or legal holiday.
- Third Assignment: The lower court erred in denying the petition for mandamus and preliminary injunction.
Arguments of Petitioner-Appellant (as presented in the source)
- The fact that the 60th day was a Sunday did not interrupt or stop the running of the prescriptive period because:
- (i) Statutorily, a Sunday or holiday is not recognized as a legally efficient cause to interrupt prescription.
- (ii) Under the principle inclusio unius exclusio alterius, the single exception in Article 91 (the offender's absence from the Philippine Archipelago) excludes other causes sufficient to interrupt prescr