Case Summary (G.R. No. L-28841)
Factual Background
On December 2, 1964 the petitioner was alleged to have committed slight physical injuries against Ang Cho Ching. The City Fiscal of Quezon City filed an information for slight physical injuries on February 1, 1965. The petitioner moved to quash on September 10, 1965 on the ground that the information was filed on the sixty-first day following the commission of the offense and that the two-month prescriptive period had lapsed. The City Court denied the motion on September 14, 1965 on the ground that the sixtieth day fell on a Sunday and that, under the rule permitting the filing of a pleading on the next succeeding business day when the last day falls on a Sunday, the action had not prescribed.
Procedural History
After the City Court denied the motion to quash and refused reconsideration, the petitioner filed a petition for certiorari and mandamus with a prayer for preliminary injunction before the Court of First Instance of Rizal, which dismissed the petition on July 11, 1966 and denied reconsideration. The appeal to the Supreme Court followed. The Supreme Court granted the petition for certiorari and mandamus, set aside the questioned order of the respondent court, granted the motion to quash, and dismissed the information. Justice Relova dissented.
Issue Presented
The principal issue was whether a Sunday or legal holiday that falls on the last day of the prescriptive period for a criminal offense constitutes a legal efficient cause that interrupts or tolls prescription so that the information may be filed on the next succeeding business day.
Parties' Contentions
The petitioner argued that a Sunday or holiday does not interrupt prescription because the statutory scheme of prescription in the Revised Penal Code recognizes only prescribed grounds for tolling, notably the offender’s absence under Article 91, Revised Penal Code, and that the rule permitting filing on the next business day applies to procedural or reglementary periods and not to extinction of the State’s right to prosecute. The petitioner invoked inclusio unius exclusio alterius, prior jurisprudence, authority from American legal encyclopedias and treatises, and the rule that criminal statutes of limitation must be strictly construed in favor of the accused. The respondents relied on Section 31, Revised Administrative Code and the old Section 1, Rule 28, Rules of Court to contend that where the last day for doing an act falls on a holiday the act may be done on the next succeeding business day, and that this rule should allow filing of the information on the next business day when the sixtieth day fell on a Sunday.
Applicable Law
Article 90, Revised Penal Code fixes the prescriptive period for light offenses at two months. Article 13, Civil Code provides that when the law speaks of months they shall be understood as of thirty days each. Article 91, Revised Penal Code prescribes that prescription commences from the day the crime is discovered and is interrupted by the filing of the complaint or information; it also states that the term does not run when the offender is absent from the Philippine Archipelago. Section 31, Revised Administrative Code and the former Section 1, Rule 28, Rules of Court supply rules for computation of time and for the pretermission of holidays in computing periods to do acts required or permitted by law.
Court's Analysis and Reasoning
The Court distinguished the computation rules of Section 31, Revised Administrative Code and Section 1, Rule 28, Rules of Court, which govern the time for doing particular acts, from statutes of limitation in criminal law. The Court observed that prescription of criminal actions determines when the State has lost its right to prosecute and is therefore fundamentally different from mere reglementary periods for procedural acts. Relying on established authority, including the text quoted from Wharton as cited in People v. Moran, the Court emphasized that criminal statutes of limitation operate as grants of amnesty by the State and are to be construed liberally in favor of the accused. The Court concluded that the running of prescription in criminal cases is automatic and by operation of law; it is not subject to enlargement by the administrative or procedural rule that extends a deadline falling on a holiday to the next business day. Consequently, when the sixtieth and last day to file an information falls on a Sunday or legal holiday, prescription runs its course and cannot be extended to the next working da
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Case Syllabus (G.R. No. L-28841)
Parties and Procedural Posture
- Rafael Yapdiangco filed a petition for certiorari and mandamus with preliminary injunction after the City Court denied his motion to quash an information for slight physical injuries.
- The Hon. Concepcion B. Buencamino and Hon. Justiniano Cortez were respondents below as presiding judges who ruled against the petitioner in the lower courts.
- The City Fiscal of Quezon City filed the information on February 1, 1965, alleging an offense committed on December 2, 1964.
- The City Court denied the motion to quash on September 14, 1965, and the Court of First Instance of Rizal dismissed the petition on July 11, 1966.
- The petitioner appealed from the dismissal of his petition for certiorari and mandamus to the Supreme Court First Division.
Key Factual Allegations
- The accused allegedly committed slight physical injuries on December 2, 1964.
- The information was filed by the City Fiscal on February 1, 1965, which was the sixty-first day after the alleged commission of the offense.
- The sixtieth day from discovery fell on a Sunday according to the parties' stipulation of dates.
- The petitioner moved to quash on September 10, 1965, on the ground that prosecution had prescribed.
Statutory Framework
- Art. 90, Revised Penal Code provided that light offenses prescribe in two months.
- Art. 13, Civil Code provided that when the law speaks of months, months are of thirty days each.
- Art. 91, Revised Penal Code set forth computation of prescription, interruption by filing of complaint or information, recommencement after termination, and the single exception that the term shall not run when the offender is absent from the Philippine Archipelago.
- Sec. 31, Revised Administrative Code provided that where the day or the last day for doing an act falls on a holiday, the act may be done on the next business day.
- Sec. 1, Rule 28 of the former Rules of Court provided rules for computation of time including extension to the next day when the last day is a Sunday or legal holiday.
Issues Presented
- The principal issue was whether a Sunday or legal holiday operating as dies non legally interrupted the running of prescription for a criminal offense.
- A subsidiary issue was whether the administrative and procedural provisions allowing acts on the next business day apply to extend a statutory prescriptive period fixed by penal law.
Petitioner Contentions
- The petitioner contended that a Sunday or holiday was not a legally efficient cause to interrupt prescription under Art. 91, Revis