G.R. No. 166199 - Secretary of Justice vs. Koruga

The petitioner-appellant, Rafael Yapdiangco, was charged with slight physical injuries allegedly committed on December 2, 1964 against Mr. Ang Cho Ching.
In connection with the charge, the City Fiscal of Quezon City filed an information before the City Court on February 1, 1965.

The petitioner's motion to quash the criminal prosecution was raised on September 10, 1965 on the ground that the information was filed on the sixty-first day following the alleged commission of the offense, thereby allegedly lapsing the prescribed 60-day period.
The City Court of Quezon City denied the motion to quash on September 14, 1965, reasoning that the 60th day fell on a Sunday and, in light of the rule which permits acts falling on Sundays (or legal holidays) to be performed on the next succeeding business day, the filing was acceptable.
After the denial of a motion for reconsideration by the City Court, the petitioner-appellant elevated the matter by filing a petition for certiorari and mandamus with preliminary injunction before the Court of First Instance of Rizal.
The Court of First Instance dismissed the petition on July 11, 1966 and, following another motion for reconsideration which was also denied, the petitioner-appellant elevated the matter on appeal.

The crime in question was categorized as a light offense, which under Article 90 of the Revised Penal Code prescribes a 60-day prescriptive period.
The petitioner-appellant raised arguments based on the interpretation of the Revised Penal Code, particularly under Article 91 which governs the computation of prescription and its interruption, noting that only the offender’s absence is expressly provided as an exception.
He argued that a Sunday or legal holiday is not a legally efficient cause to interrupt or toll the prescriptive period.
The respondents-appellees, however, cited Section 31 of the Revised Administrative Code and Section 1, Rule 28 of the Former Rules of Court which provide that if the last day prescribed for an act falls on a Sunday or holiday, the act may be performed on the next business day.

Whether a Sunday or legal holiday constitutes a “legal efficient cause” capable of interrupting or extending the running of the prescriptive period for the filing of a criminal case.

Does the rule allowing filing on the next working day when the last day falls on a Sunday or legal holiday apply to the computation of the statute of limitations in criminal cases?
Is the statutory construction of the 60-day prescriptive period, as provided under the Revised Penal Code, subject to the discretionary application of the “next business day rule” as is common in civil or administrative proceedings?

Whether the prescriptive period for the filing of the information had lapsed because the 60th day fell on a Sunday, thereby precluding the filing on the next succeeding business day.

Whether the petition for certiorari and mandamus, along with the preliminary injunction, should be granted in light of the above procedural and substantive issues.