Case Summary (G.R. No. 168387)
Legal characterization of the offense and initial sentence
Given the materiality and falsity of his sworn statements, the Court found no doubt that Soliman committed perjury under section 3 of Act No. 1697. The trial judge had imposed a sentence of six months’ imprisonment and a P300 fine under that statute, which the Court acknowledged was correctly imposed under Act No. 1697 as then applied.
Repeal issue: effect of the Administrative Code on the conviction
The conviction was entered prior to the Administrative Code’s effectiveness; however, the judgment postdated the conviction timing insofar as statutes changed after the act. The question was whether the express repeal of section 3 of Act No. 1697 by the Administrative Code extinguished criminal responsibility already incurred under the repealed statute or otherwise affected the penalty to be imposed.
Governing principle on repeal and penalties
The Court applied the territorial rule previously recognized in local jurisprudence (e.g., U.S. v. Cuna): the repeal of a penal statute by a later law does not, by itself, divest courts of jurisdiction to try, convict, and sentence offenders for offenses committed prior to repeal. More specifically, where a repealing statute provides new penalties for the same acts, the generally accepted principle (consistent with Spanish penal doctrine cited) is that the penalty more favorable to the offender should be applied. This approach is tied to the Penal Code provisions cited (Article 1, Article 21 non-retroactivity and Article 22 retroactivity in favor of the accused).
Revival of the Penal Code provisions on perjury
Act No. 1697 had implicitly repealed the earlier Penal Code perjury provisions; with the express repeal of Act No. 1697 by the Administrative Code, the Court concluded that the Penal Code provisions addressing perjury were revived. The Court relied on principles of statutory construction (including common-law and U.S. Supreme Court authorities) and on section 12 of the Administrative Code, which indicates that explicit repeal of a repealing statute does not revive the earlier law unless expressly provided — the Court read this to imply the converse where the repeal was by implication, so that revival of the earlier Penal Code provisions followed.
Application of the rule favoring the accused and adjustment of sentence
Comparing the penalties under the revived Penal Code provisions (and giving Soliman the benefit of Act No. 2142 where appropriate) with those originally imposed under section 3 of Act No. 1697, the Court found the Penal Code penalty to be less onerous. Under the rule that a later penal law that favors the convicted offender applies retroactively, the Court concluded that the original sentence should be reversed and replaced by the lighter penalty provided under the Penal Code/Act No. 2142: specifically, four months and one day of arresto mayor and a fine of P75, with subsidiary imprisonment as prescribed. The conviction itself, however, was affirmed.
Liability of a defendant who testifies in his own criminal trial
The Court addressed whether a defendant in a criminal case who elects to testify under oath in his own defense may be prosecuted for perjury for false testimony so given. Relying on prior precedent (U.S. v. Gutierrez) and on the procedural authorization allowing accused persons to testify (General Orders No. 58), the Court held that an accused who voluntarily takes the witness stand and gives false sworn testimony is subject to the same penalties for false testimony as any other witness. The Court rejected public-policy arguments to the contrary — such as concerns about prosecutorial vindictiveness or chilling defense testimony — emphasizing that the right to testify is intended to elicit truth, not to shield the introduction of falsehoods into the record, and that prosecutorial discretion should ordinarily avoid abusive perjury prosecutions.
Statutory citation of penalty applicable to false testimony in favor of a defendant
The Court cited Article 319 of the Penal Code which prescribes the penalty range for anyone who gives false testimony in favor of a defendant in a criminal case. Applying the revived Penal Code provisions and the benefit-of-the-law rule, the Court concluded that Soliman was properly convicted under the revived provision but entitled to the lighter penalty.
Final disposition by the majority
The Court affirmed the judgment of conviction for perjury but reversed the sentence imposed by the trial court. The Court substituted a lighter penalty — four months and one day of arresto mayor plus a fine of P75 (with subsidiary imprisonment as required by law) — and assessed costs as provided. Justices Torres, Johnson, and Araullo concurred.
Dissent — main thrust: defendant as party should be excluded from perjury statute
Justice Moreland dissented in substance. He agreed that the Penal Code perjury provisions were revived but strongly disagreed that those provisions were intended to cover a defendant in a criminal action testifying in his own defense. Relying on Spanish legal doctrine and commentary (including Viada and Groizard), the dissent emphasized that under the Spanish tradition the concept of a “witness” did not encompass a party to the action; therefore the Penal Code’s language criminalizing false testimony in favor of a defendant should be read as referring to witnesses other than the defendant. The dissent argued that the Spanish framers of the Penal Code would not have intended to punish a defendant who lies in his own defense — a prospect the Spanish law historically avoided — and that mere competency of a party to testify (a procedural change) should not alter substantive criminal liability in that respect.
Dissent — alternative ground: estafa acquittal as a
...continue readingCase Syllabus (G.R. No. 168387)
Case Citation and Panel
- 36 Phil. 5; G.R. No. 11555; January 06, 1917.
- Opinion of the Court delivered by Justice Carson.
- Justices Torres, Johnson, and Araullo concur.
- Justice Moreland dissents.
Procedural Posture
- Defendant Gabino Soliman was prosecuted for perjury after he testified in his own behalf in a prior criminal prosecution for estafa.
- Judgment convicting and sentencing the accused under section 3 of Act No. 1697 was entered on November 23, 1915, imposing six months' imprisonment and a P300 fine.
- Subsequent repeal of section 3 of Act No. 1697 occurred upon enactment of the Administrative Code (Act No. 2657), effective July 1, 1916, raising questions as to the continuing validity of the conviction and the proper penalty.
- The Supreme Court reviews conviction, the effect of statutory repeal, proper statutory authority for punishment, and related procedural issues.
Facts
- Gabino Soliman, testifying on his own behalf in a criminal prosecution for estafa in which he and others were charged, swore falsely to material allegations.
- Specifically, he testified that a sworn statement offered in evidence — essentially an extrajudicial confession of his guilt — had not been executed voluntarily but had been procured from him by the police through force, intimidation, and prolonged torture.
- In the prior estafa trial, the trial judge acquitted the accused, stating there was room for reasonable doubt as to the voluntariness of the extrajudicial confession.
- The false testimony in the estafa case, if accepted as true, would render the extrajudicial confession wholly incompetent and would have the effect of preventing a conviction that otherwise would have been almost conclusive.
Materiality of the False Testimony
- The Court finds the false testimony conclusively material:
- The trial judge’s acquittal in the estafa case on grounds of reasonable doubt as to voluntariness shows the materiality of the testimony.
- Even without relying on that judgment, the false statements, if true, would render the extrajudicial confession incompetent and thus defeat what would otherwise be nearly conclusive evidence of guilt (citing U.S. vs. Estrana, 16 Phil. Rep., 520).
Statutory Framework and Doctrines Considered
- Section 3 of Act No. 1697 had defined and penalized perjury; that statute had been repealed by implication the Penal Code had earlier been affected and then Act No. 1697 had itself been repealed by the Administrative Code (Act No. 2657).
- Article 1 of the Penal Code: crimes and misdemeanors defined as voluntary acts or omissions penalized by law.
- Article 21 of the Penal Code: no crime or misdemeanor shall be punished with a penalty not prescribed by law prior to its commission.
- Article 22 of the Penal Code: penal laws shall have retroactive effect insofar as they favor persons convicted.
- Administrative Code (Act No. 2657), Article III, Chapter I, §12: when a law that expressly repeals a prior law is itself repealed, the first repealed law shall not be revived unless expressly so provided.
Issue(s) Presented
- Was Gabino Soliman guilty of perjury for false statements made while testifying in his own behalf in the estafa prosecution?
- Did the repeal of section 3 of Act No. 1697 by the Administrative Code extinguish criminal responsibility or otherwise affect the conviction or the penalty?
- If the Penal Code provisions on perjury were revived by repeal of Act No. 1697, what penalty should apply to the offense committed prior to the repeal?
- Can an accused in a criminal case be prosecuted for perjury for false testimony given in his own cause?
- Is the defendant’s prior acquittal on the estafa charge a bar (res judicata) to prosecution for perjury with respect to the same subject matter?
Holdings
- The Court holds that:
- The evidence establishes beyond doubt that Soliman committed perjury in testifying falsely to material matters.
- The conviction for perjury under the statutory scheme is proper; the judgment of conviction is affirmed.
- The sentence originally imposed under section 3 of Act No. 1697 (six months' imprisonment and P300 fine) should be revoked because, by the repeal of Act No. 1697 and the revival of the Penal Code provisions, a lesser penalty applicable to the offense at the time of commission must be applied; accordingly, a penalty under the Penal Code, with benefit of Act No. 2142, is substituted.
- The Court imposes, in lieu of the original sentence, a penalty of 4 months and 1 day of arresto mayor and a fine of P75, with subsidiary imprisonment as provided by law, and awards the costs of this instance de officio.
Reasoning — Statute Repeal, Revival, and Selection of Penalty
- The Court declines the proposition that repeal of a penal statute (Act No. 1697, §3) by the Administrative Code extinguishes criminal responsibility incurred under the repealed law before repeal.
- Cites U.S. vs. Cuna (12 Phil. Rep., 241) as controlling: the local rule differs from English and American common law rules; repeal does not deprive courts of jurisdiction to try, convict, and sentence offenders under the old law for acts committed prior to repeal.
- Where the repealing statute provides new and distinct penalties, the penalty more favorable to the convict for acts committed prior to repeal should be applied (per U.S. vs. Cuna).
- Article 1 and Article 21 of the Penal Code dictate that punishment must be prescribed prior to commission; Article 22 allows retroactivity in favor of the accused where a later law is more favorable.
- The Court interprets the legislative scheme and applicable doctrines of revival:
- Section 3 of Act No. 1697 had repealed the Penal Code’s perjury provisions by implication; consequently, when Act No. 1697 was expressly repealed by the Administrative Code, the Court concludes that those Penal Code provisions were revived.
- The Court notes the common-law rule that repeal of a repealing act revives the former act, an