A.C. No. 9831 - Chan Shun Kuen vs. Coloma-Javier

Defendant Gabino Soliman, while testifying in his own behalf during another criminal proceeding charging him with estafa, gave false testimony.
He falsely declared that a sworn statement—a de facto extrajudicial confession offered in support of the estafa charge—was not executed voluntarily but was procured by police through force, intimidation, and prolonged torture.

In the earlier estafa trial, the trial judge acquitted the accused on the ground that the extrajudicial confession’s voluntariness was in serious doubt.
The acquittal underscored the materiality of the false testimony because, if believed, the false statement rendered the evidence regarding the confession wholly incompetent to support a conviction.

Based on his false testimony in the estafa case, Soliman was charged and subsequently convicted of perjury as defined under section 3 of Act No. 1697.
The trial court imposed a sentence of six months’ imprisonment and a fine of P300.

After judgment was entered (November 23, 1915), section 3 of Act No. 1697 was expressly repealed by the Administrative Code (Act No. 2657), effective July 1, 1916.
A legal issue arose as to whether the repeal of the statute would remit the criminal responsibility incurred under it, or whether the repeal had the effect of reviving the former penal provisions on perjury from the Penal Code.
Precedents (e.g., United States vs. Estrana and United States vs. Cuna) were cited concerning the effects of repealing acts and the application of newer penalties compared to those of the repealed law.

Determination of which penalty to impose became central: whether to uphold the penalty imposed under the repealed section 3 of Act No. 1697 or to apply the provisions and the penalty provided in the revived Penal Code.
The case raised issues regarding the applicability of perjury charges when the false testimony is given by a defendant in a criminal action on his own behalf.
Arguments were presented concerning the potential for vexatious prosecutions and the protection afforded to a litigant who testifies for himself, balanced against the need to deter deliberate falsity, especially when implicating third parties in grave offenses.

Does the repeal of section 3 of Act No. 1697 by the Administrative Code result in the remission or extinguishment of the criminal responsibility incurred by Soliman under the repealed law?
Or, does such repeal effectively revive the pertinent provisions of the Penal Code regarding perjury?

Appropriateness of Convicting a Defendant for False Testimony in His Own Cause

Should a defendant who testifies in his own behalf—thereby acting as both party and witness—be held criminally liable for perjury if his testimony is false?
What is the proper interpretation of the statutory language concerning “any person who shall give false testimony” as applied to a litigant in his own case?

In cases where a repealing statute provides a new penalty structure, should the penalty imposed be that of the repealed law or the new, more favorable penalty under the revived Penal Code?
How should the principle of favoring the convict (if the new penalty is lighter) be applied in this context?

How do established rules (from cases such as United States vs. Cuna and decisions of Spanish courts) regarding the revival of repealed acts and the retroactive application of penal laws inform the proper resolution of this case?
Does the prior acquittal in the estafa case bar subsequent perjury charges relating to the same material issue?