G.R. No. 149433 - The Coca-Cola Export Corp. vs. Gacayan

Statutory instruments cited in the decision: General Orders No. 58 (1900) and Act No. 190 (provision cited is section 383, paragraph 3).
(The decision date is not included here per instruction.)

Section 58, General Orders No. 58 (1900): provides that, except with consent of both or in cases of crime committed by one against the other, neither husband nor wife shall be a competent witness for or against the other in a criminal action or proceeding to which one or both shall be parties.
Section 383, paragraph 3, Act No. 190: contains a similar spousal incompetency provision, providing that a husband cannot be examined for or against his wife without her consent, nor a wife for or against her husband without his consent, and that neither may be examined as to communications made during marriage without the other’s consent; with an exception for civil actions between spouses and criminal actions for crimes committed by one against the other.

At trial the defense called Susana Ezpeleta to testify about statements made by her deceased husband concerning the cause of his injuries (dying declarations). The fiscal objected on the ground that, as the widow of the injured party, she was incompetent to testify under the spousal incompetency rule.
The trial court sustained the objection and excluded her testimony. The defense made an offer of proof describing the testimony the witness would have given—material facts tending to show the injuries resulted from a fall rather than from acts of the accused—which, if believed, might have led to acquittal. The exclusion of that testimony is one of the bases for the appeal.

Whether the widow, Susana Ezpeleta, was competent to testify about dying declarations made by her husband prior to his death, notwithstanding the statutory rule disqualifying spouses from testifying for or against each other without consent.

The opinion reviews the rationale of the spousal incompetency rule as protecting confidential communications arising from the marital relation and preserving domestic harmony by relieving a spouse from the obligation to disclose confidential communications made during marriage. The rule at common law is described as intended to place a protective seal on confidential marital communications so they are not divulged even after the relationship ceases.

The court distinguishes dying declarations from confidential marital communications. It reasons that declarations made by a person on the point of death concerning the circumstances of his injuries are not confidential communications made in the marital relation; rather, they are made for the express purpose of being communicated after the declarant’s death to authorities investigating the death.
The statutory phrase “during the marriage or afterwards” in Act No. 190, the court holds, should be read in context: it is intended to cover testimony offered in proceedings to which the other spouse is a party and to cover instances where the marriage has been dissolved by annulment or divorce. It was not intended to extend the marital confidentiality privilege to exclude testimony that is not of a confidential marital character, such as dying declarations. Thus the statutory disqualification does not operate to exclude testimony about dying declarations made by the deceased to his spouse.

The court cites precedent holding that dying declarations are admissible in prosecutions for the killing of the declarant and may be proved for or against the defendant. It also notes that several jurisdictions have expressly permitted the widow to testify regarding dying

Reported at 37 Phil. 726, G.R. No. 13109.
Decision date: March 06, 1918.
Opinion authored by Justice Fisher; Justices Arellano, C.J., Torres, Johnson, Carson, Araullo, Street, Malcolm, and Avancena concur.

One assigned error: trial judge’s refusal to permit Susana Ezpeleta, widow of Fortunato Dinal, to testify for the defense concerning certain alleged dying declarations of the deceased.
The excluded testimony related to dying declarations that, if admitted and believed, could materially affect the verdict by indicating the deceased’s injuries were due to a fall rather than the acts imputed to the accused.

The defense called Susana Ezpeleta; she stated she was the widow of Fortunato Dinal.
The defense asked: “On what occasion did your husband die?”
The fiscal objected to her testimony on the ground that, having just testified she was the widow of the deceased, she was not competent to testify under the rules of procedure in civil or criminal cases unless with the consent of her husband; because the husband was dead and could not give consent, the fiscal maintained she was disqualified from testifying in this case in which her husband was the injured party.
Defense counsel argued she was competent: the disqualification cited by the fiscal pertains to spouses of parties in proceedings; the parties in a criminal prosecution are the Government and the accused; and the marriage was dissolved by the husband’s death so she was no longer his wife and therefore not subject to spousal disqualification.
The trial judge rejected the defense counsel’s propositions and sustained the fiscal’s objection, excluding Ezpeleta’s testimony.
Defense preserved exception and made an offer of proof as to the testimony the witness would give.

The defense’s offer of proof asserted the excluded witness would testify to facts constituting dying declarations of the deceased explaining the cause of his death.
The proffered dying declarations generally asserted that the deceased’s injuries were caused by a fall and not by acts of the accused.
The record indicates some of the proffered facts were both material and relevant and, if believed by the court, might have led to the accused’s acquittal.
The exclusion of this testimony is the core claimed error on appeal.

Section 58 of General Orders No. 58 (1900) is quoted in full in the record:
- “Except with the consent of both, or except in cases of crime committed by one against the other, neither husband nor wife shall be a competent witness for or against the other in a criminal action or proceeding to which one or both shall be parties.”

The opinion quotes authorities to explain the reasons behind the common-law rule of spousal incompetency:
- Under
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