Case Digest (G.R. No. 150629)
Facts:
In The United States vs. Dalmacio Antipolo, G.R. No. 13109, decided March 6, 1918 by the Supreme Court of the Philippines, the Government prosecuted Dalmacio Antipolo in the Court of First Instance of Batangas Province for the murder of Fortunato Dinal. At trial, Antipolo was convicted of homicide. On appeal, defense counsel sought to call Susana Ezpeleta, the widow of the deceased, to testify to her late husband’s alleged dying declarations that his fatal injuries resulted from a fall rather than from any act by the accused. The fiscal objected, invoking Section 58 of General Orders No. 58 (1900), which disqualified a spouse from testifying for or against the other without consent. Trial Judge sustained the objection, excluded Ezpeleta’s testimony, and the court entered judgment on the homicide verdict. Defense counsel duly excepted and offered into evidence the substance of the excluded testimony, contending it bore directly on Antipolo’s guilt or innocence.Issues:
- May th
Case Digest (G.R. No. 150629)
Facts:
- Criminal Proceedings and Conviction
- The appellant, Dalmacio Antipolo, was prosecuted in the Court of First Instance of Batangas for the murder of Fortunato Dinal.
- The trial court found him guilty of homicide; he appealed the conviction.
- Exclusion of Witness Testimony
- Susana Ezpeleta, widow of the deceased, was called by the defense to testify about alleged dying declarations of her husband.
- The fiscal objected on the ground that, under General Orders No. 58, section 58, a widow is incompetent to testify without her husband’s consent; the trial judge sustained the objection.
- Offer of Proof and Nature of Excluded Evidence
- Defense counsel reserved exception and offered to prove that Dinal’s dying statements attributed his fatal injuries to an accidental fall, not to the acts of the appellant.
- The offered testimony was material and relevant, and if admitted could have led to the appellant’s acquittal.
Issues:
- Whether Susana Ezpeleta, as widow of the deceased, was competent to testify about her husband’s dying declarations over the Government’s objection.
- Whether the spousal incompetency rule under General Orders No. 58, section 58 and Act No. 190, section 383(3) extends to dying declarations made by a spouse on the point of death.
- Whether exclusion of such evidence deprived the appellant of a substantial right to present a full defense, warranting a new trial.
Ruling:
- (Subscriber-Only)
Ratio:
- (Subscriber-Only)
Doctrine:
- (Subscriber-Only)