Title
Tan vs. City of Davao
Case
G.R. No. L-44347
Decision Date
Sep 29, 1988
A 1,966-sqm Davao lot owned by Dominga Garcia, who left in 1923, was escheated to the City of Davao after her heirs were presumed dead. Ramon Pizarro's claims of heirship were dismissed due to unreliable evidence. The Supreme Court upheld the escheat, affirming the city's authority and the heirs' presumed death.
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Case Summary (G.R. No. 177743)

Initiation of escheat proceedings and preliminary steps

The City of Davao filed an escheat petition in the Court of First Instance of Davao (Special Civil Case No. 1220) alleging that Dominga and her descendants were presumed dead and that no person entitled to inherit remained in the Philippines. The petition was published as directed. Ramon Pizarro opposed the petition, arguing courts were not empowered to declare a person presumed dead as a basis for escheat and contesting the sufficiency of Dominga’s absence alone to trigger escheat. Several interlocutory matters and procedural delays followed, including motions, orders for accounting and receivership, and appeals from intermediate rulings.

Evidence at trial and contested proof of heirs’ existence

The City established the identity of the land, Dominga’s registration, the family’s emigration in 1923, and Dominga’s alleged death in 1955; these facts were not seriously disputed. The primary controversy concerned whether Dominga’s daughter Vicenta remained alive and available to claim the estate. Ramon Pizarro sought to prove Vicenta’s identity and continued existence by presenting photographs (Exhs. 1–3), an Extrajudicial Settlement and Adjudication (Exh. 19) allegedly signed by Vicenta in Hong Kong, and a Special Power of Attorney (Exh. 20) thumbmarked by her. Pizarro testified to meetings with Vicenta in Davao (1960) and Hong Kong (1966) and claimed other family recollections and documentary transfers, while other witnesses attempted to identify the photographs by memory of childhood facial traits.

Trial court credibility findings and factual determinations

The trial court carefully weighed credibility and disbelieved Pizarro and his corroborating witnesses. It found the photographic identifications unreliable, rejected testimony that the woman in the exhibits could write or speak Chavacano and English given her long residency in China since age seven, and considered several testimony inconsistencies and improbabilities (e.g., the alleged revealing of a scar on the thigh after a 43-year absence). The court concluded that the documentary instruments and pictures did not prove that the woman who executed Exhs. 19 and 20 was in fact Vicenta, and that Pizarro’s accounts “ring with untruthfulness” and were inconsistent.

Appellate proceedings and attempted interventions

The trial court rendered judgment assigning the property and its rentals to the City for public benefit and ordering Pizarro to account for collected income and to deliver the owner’s duplicate title. Pizarro appealed to the Court of Appeals but died during the appeal. A later claimant, Luis Tan (alias Chen Yek An), moved to intervene in the Court of Appeals claiming to be a son of Dominga; the motion was denied as tardy and unduly delaying final adjudication. The Court of Appeals affirmed the trial court’s judgment.

Legal issues presented to the Supreme Court

The petition for certiorari to the Supreme Court raised principally: (1) whether the City of Davao had the legal personality to file the escheat petition; and (2) whether the Court of Appeals erred in treating the petitioner (Vicenta) as presumptively dead. Ancillary issues included whether Pizarro was a real party in interest and whether Vicenta, if extant, had been properly made a party or served extraterritorially.

Governing procedural rules and their application

The Supreme Court held that the escheat petition, filed while the 1940 Rules of Court were in force, was governed by Rule 92 of the 1940 Rules, which expressly authorized a municipality or city to file a petition to declare an intestate estate escheated where no heirs are found. The Revised Rules of Court (which centralized escheat authority in the Republic through Rule 91) took effect on January 1, 1964; application of the Revised Rules to this petition would have worked injustice under Rule 144’s saving clause, so the 1940 procedure applied. Consequently the City had legal standing to bring the petition.

Party status, extraterritorial service and real party-in-interest

The Court observed that Vicenta was never properly made a party nor served extraterritorially under Section 17, Rule 14 of the Rules of Court; she did not appear, file pleadings, or submit to jurisdiction in the trial court. The trial court’s temporary order purporting to substitute her for Pizarro had been set aside and not appealed. Ramon Pizarro was not the real party in interest and thus lacked standing to oppose the petition on behalf of the alleged heirs. Fundamental procedural rules require actions to be prosecuted by real parties in interest; the appellate court correctly treated Pizarro’s role as deficient in that respect.

Presumption of death, authority to declare it, and evidentiary sufficiency

The Court reaffirmed that courts may declare an absentee presumptively dead in the context of proceedings to settle an intestate estate. It relied on established precedent (In re Szatraw) and Article 390 of the New Civil Code, which prescribes presumptions of death after prolonged absence: seven years generally, and ten years for opening a succession (with attendant qualifications). The Court found that the evidence showed Dominga and her family left in 1923 and had remained unheard of up to the filing of the petition; that no heir had timely asserted a claim; and that the oppositor’s asser

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