Case Summary (G.R. No. 200148)
Antecedent Facts
Rivera was Accounting Manager of BANFF, hired in September 2002 with Php 30,000 monthly salary, resigned effective February 3, 2006 but worked until March 2006 to turn over records to successor Jennifer Lumapas. In April 2006 Rivera sought payment of unpaid salaries, benefits and incentives; Lumapas informed her that certain checks were unsigned and incentives were on hold by Syhunliong. On April 6, 2006 Rivera sent two short text messages to BANFF’s company cellular phone held by Lumapas complaining about suffering in collecting her last pay and stating “God bless ras. Sana yung pagsimba niya, alam niya real meaning.” Rivera later filed a labor complaint before the NLRC for unpaid wages and related claims.
Criminal Information and Motion to Quash
Syhunliong filed a complaint for libel based on the April 6, 2006 text messages; the information (dated June 21, 2007) charged Rivera with malicious publication of defamatory statements by text. Rivera moved to quash the information arguing the messages merely reflected grievance over delayed pay, lacked malice and public imputation required for libel, and were privileged communications. Rivera pleaded not guilty at arraignment.
RTC Orders Denying Motion to Quash
The RTC denied Rivera’s motion to quash on December 4, 2008, and denied reconsideration on June 18, 2009. The RTC reasoned that the issues raised were evidentiary and for full trial, that only probable cause is required to indict, and that probable cause was found during preliminary investigation. The RTC also observed that qualified privilege only removes a presumption of malice and that malice may still be proven by the plaintiff.
CA Decision Dismissing the Information
The Court of Appeals, on review, dismissed the libel information. The CA analyzed libel’s definition and concluded the text message, read as a whole, consisted of: (1) an expression of suffering in collecting last pay; (2) a statement that she did not deserve such suffering; and (3) an admonition directed to Syhunliong about understanding the “real meaning” of attending mass. The CA found the first two statements non-defamatory and held the third ambiguous and insufficient to impute a crime, vice or defect. Doubt was resolved in favor of the accused. The CA further held the communication qualified for privileged treatment under Article 354 because Rivera had an interest/duty to seek redress, addressed the person (via Lumapas) best able to assist, and acted without malice or unnecessary publicity.
Issues Presented to the Supreme Court
Syhunliong raised five principal issues: (a) whether denial of a motion to quash may be assailed by certiorari; (b) whether Rivera waived the motion to quash by being arraigned; (c) whether the CA exceeded its jurisdiction in reviewing RTC findings of probable cause; (d) whether the facts in the information constituted libel; and (e) whether the CA erred in finding the messages privileged.
Parties’ Contentions Before the Supreme Court
Syhunliong argued, citing Soriano, that certiorari is not the proper remedy to assail denial of a motion to quash and that Rivera waived objections by pleading; he insisted the text was libelous and that privileged communication is ordinarily a defense to be proven at trial (citing People v. Judge Gomez). Rivera reiterated that the messages were privileged, lacked malice, and argued the complaint was barred by prescription under Articles 90 and 91 of the RPC; she also maintained she was denied due process during preliminary investigation.
Supreme Court’s Resolution — Prescription
The Supreme Court denied the petition, primarily because the libel complaint was instituted beyond the one‑year prescriptive period for libel (Article 90), a fact not effectively disputed by petitioner. The Court reiterated the substantive nature of prescription as extinguishing the State’s right to prosecute, requiring liberal construction in favor of the accused, and held that prescription may be raised at any stage because it goes to the State’s loss of prosecutorial right. The Court applied established precedents (including Romualdez and People v. Moran) and Rule 117(9) which preserves the defense of extinction of criminal liability from being deemed waived. Because prescription had run, dismissal was compelled irrespective of procedural technicalities.
Supreme Court’s Alternative Ruling — Qualified Privilege
Although prescription alone warranted dismissal, the Court also affirmed the CA’s substantive determination that the text message constituted a qualified privileged communication under Article 354. It restated the three requisites for qualified priv
...continue readingCase Syllabus (G.R. No. 200148)
Citation and Panel
- Decision rendered by the Supreme Court, First Division, reported at 735 Phil. 349, G.R. No. 200148, dated June 4, 2014.
- Opinion by Justice Reyes; Sereno, C.J. (Chairperson), Leonardo-De Castro, Bersamin, Villarama, Jr., and Reyes, JJ., concurred.
- The petition sought review of the Court of Appeals Decision dated July 11, 2011 and Resolution dated January 6, 2012 in CA-G.R. SP No. 110335, which set aside the Regional Trial Court (RTC), Quezon City, Branch 84, Orders dated December 4, 2008 and June 18, 2009 denying respondent Rivera’s Motion to Dismiss/Quash in Criminal Case No. Q-07-147802 (libel).
Procedural Posture and Relief Sought
- Petitioner Ramon A. Syhunliong filed a petition for review in the Supreme Court contesting the Court of Appeals’ dismissal of the libel information against respondent Teresita D. Rivera.
- The CA had granted Rivera’s petition for certiorari and ordered dismissal of the libel information; Syhunliong moved for reconsideration in the CA which the CA denied by Resolution dated January 6, 2012.
- The Supreme Court considered whether to reverse the CA’s Decision and Resolution and reinstate the libel information or otherwise.
Parties and Their Roles
- Ramon A. Syhunliong: private complainant in Criminal Case No. Q-07-147802; President of BANFF Realty and Development Corporation (BANFF); owner of other business interests.
- Teresita D. Rivera: accused/defendant in the libel information; former Accounting Manager of BANFF; hired September 2002; resigned effective February 3, 2006 but continued to March 2006 to complete turnover to successor Jennifer Lumapas.
Factual Background
- Rivera resigned effective February 3, 2006 but actually stayed until March 2006 to turn over papers to Jennifer Lumapas.
- In April 2006 Rivera contacted Lumapas to request payment of remaining salaries, benefits and incentives. Lumapas informed Rivera that benefits would be paid but the salary check was unsigned and incentives were put on hold by Syhunliong.
- On April 6, 2006, at about 11:55 a.m., Rivera sent a text message from her phone to one of BANFF’s official cellular phones held by Lumapas that included: “I am expecting that. Grabe talaga sufferings ko dyan hanggang pagkuha ng last pay ko. I donat deserve this [because] I did my job when I [was] still there. God bless ras. Sana yung pagsimba niya, alam niya real meaning.” (Italics in source).
- Minutes later Rivera sent another text: “Kailangan release niya lahat [nang] makukuha ko diyan including incentive up to the last date na nandyan ako para di na kami abot sa labor.”
- In December 2006 Rivera filed a complaint before the National Labor Relations Commission for underpaid salaries, 13th to 16th month pay, incentive pay, gratuities and tax refund totaling Php 698,150.48.
- Pending resolution of the labor case, Syhunliong instituted a criminal complaint for libel against Rivera (the institution date of the complaint varies in the record: April 16, 2007 in some submissions; Syhunliong’s petition narration mentions August 18, 2007; the information is dated June 21, 2007).
Criminal Information and Allegations
- Information dated June 21, 2007 charged Rivera with libel for allegedly publishing defamatory statements via text messages through the company’s cellular phone that impeached Syhunliong’s honor, virtue, character and reputation and exposed him to public dishonor, discredit, contempt and ridicule.
- The information alleged malice and public dissemination sufficient to constitute libel under Article 353 et seq. of the Revised Penal Code.
Rivera’s Motion to Quash — Grounds and Arguments
- Rivera filed a Motion to Quash the information asserting:
- The text message merely reflected her suffering and legitimate grievances over delay in payment; it did not constitute libel.
- The elements of malice and defamatory imputation for public consumption were absent.
- The message was not prompted by ill will or spite but by her duty to defend her interests; it was a qualified privileged communication.
- The communication fell within the protections of Article 354 (privileged communications).
- Under Sections 3(a) and 9, Rule 117 of the Rules of Court, the defense that the facts charged do not constitute an offense can be raised by motion to quash even after arraignment.
RTC Orders (December 4, 2008; June 18, 2009) — Denial of Motion to Quash
- RTC on December 4, 2008 denied the Motion to Quash:
- Held bereft grounds raised were evidentiary in nature and proper for full trial rather than by motion to quash.
- Emphasized that probable cause had been established during preliminary investigation and Rule on Criminal Procedure requires only probable cause to indict.
- Observed Rivera should have participated in preliminary investigation or moved for re-investigation prior to arraignment.
- Cited jurisprudence that a writing to a person other than the person defamed is sufficient to establish publication.
- RTC on June 18, 2009 denied Rivera’s motion for reconsideration:
- Cited Lu Chu Sing and Lu Tian Chiong v. Lu Tiong Gui to explain that privileged character merely negates presumption of malice but does not preclude plaintiff from proving malice.
- Concurred with the Public Prosecutor’s finding of probable cause that Rivera’s statements ascribed a vice or defect to Syhunliong and tended to cause dishonor or discredit.
Rivera’s Petition for Certiorari to the Court of Appeals
- Rivera sought certiorari relief before the CA to assail the RTC’s denial of her motion to quash, reiterating:
- Article 354 exception for private communications in performance of legal, moral or social duty.
- The three requisites for qualified privileged communication per Brillante v. Court of Appeals: (1) duty or interest of communicator; (2) communication addressed to person/authority having interest/duty and power to furnish protection; (3) made in good faith and without malice.
- Reliance on Rule 117 allowing motion to quash even after arraignment on ground that facts charged do not constitute an offense.
- The text message was a qualified privileged communication, intended to expedite payment and not to injure reputation.
Court of Appeals Decision (July 11, 2011) — Dismissal of Information
- The CA granted Rivera’s petition and ordered dismissal of the libel information, reasoning in substance as follows:
- Fundamental question: whether the facts charged and the undisputed facts on record show libel.
- Libel defined as a public and malicious imputation of a crime, vice or def