Title
Spouses Refugia vs. Alejo
Case
G.R. No. 138674
Decision Date
Jun 22, 2000
Family dispute over property ownership after joint housing loan; trial court allowed amended complaint, affirmed by higher courts, emphasizing procedural liberality and jurisdiction.
spouses refugia
alejo
specific performance
A

Case Summary (G.R. No. 138674)

Factual Background

Private respondents alleged that Mamerto Refugia had been a former employee of San Miguel Corporation and received P20,000.00 as retirement pay in 1975. Mamerto desired to own a house and lot, but the amount was said to have been sufficient only to buy a lot. Acting on the advice of his son, Arturo Refugia, Mamerto agreed to use Arturo’s SSS membership to obtain a housing loan because Mamerto, allegedly, was no longer qualified to avail of any housing loan.

Under the alleged arrangement, Mamerto would utilize Arturo’s SSS membership on the condition that a two-door or duplex apartment would be constructed and that Arturo would pay the monthly amortizations. After full payment, the parties were to divide ownership of the property. Private respondents claimed that Mamerto purchased a parcel of land in Marulas, Valenzuela in September 1975, but the land was titled in Arturo’s name as a requirement for the SSS housing loan. A duplex apartment was constructed on that lot. After completion, Arturo and Aurora occupied one unit, while Mamerto and his family occupied the other.

After Arturo and Aurora had allegedly paid the SSS loan in full, private respondents asserted that they repeatedly demanded surrender of ownership and title over the one-half portion of the property to them, corresponding to their unit and share. Petitioners refused and, according to the complaint, even filed an ejectment case against private respondents on the basis that the land title was in petitioners’ names. The specific-performance complaint thus prayed that Mamerto Refugia be declared the owner of the one-half portion of the parcel covered by TCT No. T-218979, including the one-door apartment erected thereon.

Procedural History in the Trial Court

Petitioners filed an answer and raised prescription as an affirmative defense. The case was archived sometime in July 1995 to yield to the final determination of the earlier ejectment case. On January 21, 1997, private respondents filed a Motion to Revive their complaint; the case was withdrawn from archives and set for hearing on April 3, 1997.

On August 22, 1997, petitioners moved to set for preliminary hearing their prescription defense. On September 4, 1997, private respondents filed a notice of death, informing the trial court that Mamerto had died in 1993 and that Feliza had died in July 1997, and sought substitution by legal heirs: Teresita Nejal, Ricardo Refugia, Francisca Violeta Legal, and Rosario Velasco.

On September 8, 1997, the trial court denied petitioners’ prescription defense. Petitioners filed a motion for reconsideration on October 6, 1997. On October 17, 1997, private respondents filed a Motion for Leave of Court to File Amended Complaint, attaching an amended complaint and asserting the necessity of amendment to articulate their complete claim. Petitioners opposed, arguing that the amendments would only delay proceedings and that the alleged grounds were fictitious and baseless.

On October 29, 1997, the trial court granted leave and admitted the amended complaint, holding that the purpose was only to correct inadequate allegations in the original complaint. Petitioners moved for reconsideration on December 1, 1997, contending that the amendment should not have been allowed while petitioners’ motion for reconsideration of the September 8, 1997 order was pending. The trial court denied the motion for reconsideration in an order dated May 5, 1998.

Antecedent Ejectment Litigation (Effect on the Dispute)

The narrative in the record reflected that petitioners had earlier pursued ejectment based on title. The Metropolitan Trial Court dismissed the ejectment case on March 4, 1994, concluding that Mamerto and his family were lawful occupants and that ejectment would not lie. On appeal, the RTC affirmed the dismissal with modification by declaring Arturo and Mamerto co-owners of the subject lot and the duplex apartment. The Court of Appeals later reversed, ordering Mamerto and the other defendants to vacate. Ultimately, the Supreme Court affirmed the Court of Appeals in a decision dated July 5, 1996 (G.R. No. 118284), thereby sustaining the ejectment outcome on possession.

Petitioners’ Petition for Certiorari in the Court of Appeals

On July 17, 1998, petitioners filed with the Court of Appeals a petition for certiorari with prayer for a writ of preliminary injunction and/or temporary restraining order. Petitioners alleged grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction when the trial court granted leave to file an amended complaint and admitted it without first resolving petitioners’ pending motion for reconsideration of the denial of prescription. Petitioners argued that the resolution of the pending motion would determine whether the private respondents’ action had already prescribed.

On February 15, 1999, the Court of Appeals dismissed the petition for lack of merit. It denied reconsideration on May 10, 1999.

Issues Raised Before the Supreme Court

Petitioners sought review, alleging that the Court of Appeals committed reversible error amounting to grave abuse of discretion for two main reasons. First, petitioners claimed grave abuse arose from the trial court’s alleged failure to resolve their motion for reconsideration before admitting the amended complaint. Second, petitioners challenged the Court of Appeals’ conclusion that the amendments were intended solely to correct inadequate allegations, rather than to introduce a substantially different and already prescribed cause of action.

In their memorandum, petitioners invoked the Court of Appeals ruling that it was “too late in the day” to raise the non-resolution issue and that petitioners were responsible for what they complained of. Petitioners insisted that the trial court should have acted on the pending motion for reconsideration first. They also maintained that even assuming they did not raise the non-resolution issue in opposing the leave-to-amend motion, they raised it timely in their motion for reconsideration after the amended complaint had been admitted.

The Court of Appeals’ Sustaining Rationale

The Supreme Court sustained the Court of Appeals and held that the procedural objection raised by petitioners was not substantial. It noted that petitioners identified no rule that was transgressed by resolving the motion to admit the amended complaint ahead of the motion for reconsideration on the prescription defense. The Court further emphasized that even if an error had occurred, it would not go into the court’s jurisdiction. When a court acts within its jurisdiction, alleged errors in the exercise of that jurisdiction amount to errors of judgment correctible through timely appeal, not through certiorari, which is intended to address jurisdictional defects and grave abuse of discretion amounting to excess or lack of jurisdiction.

On the timing of the non-resolution complaint, the Court agreed that petitioners belatedly raised the issue. It observed that the private respondents filed their leave-to-amend motion on October 17, 1997 when petitioners’ motion for reconsideration of the September 8, 1997 order was already pending. The records showed the motion for reconsideration had been filed as early as October 6, 1997 and remained pending even up to when petitioners filed their opposition on October 23, 1997. Yet, petitioners did not raise the pendency of the motion in the opposition to the leave-to-amend request. The Court thus adopted the Court of Appeals’ observation that petitioners could have invoked the pending motion as a bar to any premature action on the leave-to-amend motion, but they did not. It further reasoned that the later attempt to raise the issue after leave had already been granted could not be used to transform a discretionary ruling into a jurisdictional error. The Court assumed that by granting leave to amend, the trial judge effectively denied the earlier motion for reconsideration.

Discretion to Allow Amendments of Pleadings

Petitioners also contended that the trial court had no recourse but to admit the amended complaint based on liberality in amendments, yet they asked that it should have dismissed it because the amended complaint allegedly revealed that the cause of action was subject to a potestative condition that had already prescribed.

The Supreme Court rejected this argument. It reiterated that the grant of leave to file an amended pleading was a matter addressed to the trial court’s sound discretion. That discretion was broad, subject only to limitations that amendments should not substantially change the cause of action or alter the theory of the case, or be made to delay the proceedings. Once exercised, the discretion would not be disturbed on appeal absent abuse. The Court further underscored the policy behind amendments: the courts should be liberal in allowing them to avoid multiplicity of suits and to present the real controversies so that rights could be determined and the case decided on the merits without unnecessary delay.

The Court found particular liberality justified because the amendment was made before trial. It thus treated petitioners’ claims as questions of procedural judgment, not jurisdictional issues cognizable through certiorari.

Prescription as an Issue Not Properly Reviewable by Certiorari

Petitioners’ challenge also sought to put in issue the merits of the trial court’s September 8, 1997 order denying their prescription defense. The Supreme Court agreed with the Court of Appeals that certiorari could not be used to correct alleged errors in findings or conclusions, and that the remedy was available only to keep the court within the bounds of its jurisdiction or to prevent grave abuse of discretion amounting to excess or lack of jurisdiction. The Court thus held that, even assuming arguendo that the trial court erred in finding the cause not yet prescribed, petitioners’ attack on the September 8, 1997 ruling was improper in a sp

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