Facts:
Spouses
Arturo Refugia and
Aurora Refugia petitioned for review on certiorari to annul and set aside the
Court of Appeals decision dated February 15, 1999 in CA-G.R. SP No. 48315 dismissing their original action for certiorari with prayer for a temporary restraining order and/or preliminary injunction, as well as the resolution dated May 10, 1999 denying their motion for reconsideration. The controversy originated when
Mamerto Refugia, joined by his wife
Feliza and their children
Rodolfo and
Candelaria (later substituted by their heirs
Teresita Nejal,
Ricardo Refugia,
Francisca Violeta Legal, and
Rosario Velasco), filed on
November 15, 1993 with the
Regional Trial Court of Valenzuela a complaint for
Specific-Performance with prayer for
Preliminary Injunction and
Temporary Restraining Order against the petitioning spouses and
Judge Winlove M. Dumayas. The complaint alleged that Mamerto, who had received
P20,000.00 retirement pay in 1975, wanted to own a house and lot but could only afford a lot; upon the advice of his son, Arturo, Mamerto agreed to use Arturo’s
SSS membership to obtain a housing loan on the condition that a
two-door or duplex apartment would be constructed and that Arturo would pay the monthly amortizations, after which they would divide ownership between them. It further alleged that Mamerto purchased a parcel of land in Marulas, Valenzuela in September 1975, but the title was placed in Arturo’s name as a requirement for the SSS housing loan; after completion, Arturo and Aurora occupied one door while Mamerto and his family occupied the other; and after Arturo and Aurora had fully paid the SSS loan, private respondents demanded transfer of ownership/title to Mamerto’s half portion, but the petitioners refused and instead filed an ejectment case relying on the fact that the title remained in Arturo’s name. In response, the petitioners filed an answer and raised
prescription as an affirmative defense. The case was archived in July 1995 due to a pending ejectment case. On January 21, 1997, private respondents moved to revive and the case was withdrawn from the archives and set for hearing. On August 22, 1997, petitioners moved to set for preliminary hearing the defense of prescription, and on September 4, 1997 private respondents notified the court of the death of Mamerto and Feliza and prayed for substitution of the heirs. On September 8, 1997, the trial court denied the prescription defense. Petitioners moved for reconsideration, but on October 17, 1997 private respondents filed a
Motion for Leave of Court to File Amended Complaint, attaching an amended complaint to point out the complete claim. Petitioners opposed, asserting the amendments would only delay proceedings and that the asserted grounds were fictitious. On October 29, 1997, the trial court granted leave to file the amended complaint, finding its purpose was only to correct inadequate allegations in the original complaint. Petitioners sought reconsideration of that order, but it was denied on May 5, 1998. On July 17, 1998, petitioners filed in the Court of Appeals a certiorari petition asserting that the trial court committed grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction for (one) admitting the amended complaint without first resolving their motion for reconsideration of the September 8, 1997 order on prescription, and (two) granting leave on the basis that the amendments merely corrected allegations. The Court of Appeals dismissed the petition on February 15, 1999 for lack of merit, and denied reconsideration on May 10, 1999. Petitioners thus elevated the matter to the Supreme Court, insisting that the Court of Appeals erred in sustaining the trial judge’s alleged failure to first resolve their pending motion for reconsideration before admitting the amended complaint, and in characterizing the amendments as made only to correct inadequate allegations.
Issues:
Whether the Court of Appeals committed reversible error in holding that the trial court did not commit
grave abuse of discretion amounting to
lack or excess of jurisdiction when it admitted private respondents’
amended complaint despite the pendency of petitioners’ motion for reconsideration regarding the denial of their
affirmative defense of prescription, and when it found that the intended amendments were only to correct inadequate allegations.
Ruling:
Ratio:
Doctrine: