Title
Reyes-Rara vs. Chan
Case
G.R. No. 142961
Decision Date
Aug 4, 2006
Petitioners accused of estafa failed to submit counter-affidavit, delayed proceedings, and sought deferral of arraignment. Courts denied motions, upheld due process, and affirmed trial proceedings.
suspension of arraignment
trial court
arrest of accused

Case Summary (G.R. No. 142961)

Factual Background

On November 23, 1998, Brenda Chan instituted an affidavit complaint for estafa against Rhoda and Jose Emmanuel Reyes-Rara. At the scheduled hearing before the investigating prosecutor on December 8, 1998, petitioners failed to appear. On December 21, 1998, petitioners’ counsel signified that the counter-affidavit would be submitted on January 13, 1999. Petitioners did not file the counter-affidavit on the promised date. The parties then agreed to reset the hearing for the last time on January 22, 1999 and to submit the case for resolution afterward. Petitioners later requested a further resetting to February 6, 1999 on account of Rhoda’s travel, but the request was denied.

At the January 22, 1999 hearing, petitioners again failed to appear, and the matter was submitted for resolution. In a Resolution dated February 1, 1999, Assistant City Prosecutor Edgardo T. Paragua found probable cause. On March 23, 1999, an Information for estafa was filed in the trial court. On the same date, Rhoda filed a motion before the prosecutor’s office to admit a counter-affidavit with an attached counter-affidavit, while Jose Emmanuel did not file a counter-affidavit.

Petitioners then moved for reconsideration of the February 1, 1999 resolution. The trial court set arraignment for June 22, 1999. On June 10, 1999, petitioners filed a motion to defer arraignment, citing the pending motion for reconsideration before the prosecutor. The trial court granted the motion and moved arraignment to July 27, 1999. On July 2, 1999, the prosecutor’s office denied reconsideration, but petitioners received the denial only on August 6, 1999. Accordingly, on July 19, 1999, petitioners filed another motion to defer arraignment, again anchored on the alleged pendency of their motion for reconsideration.

On July 27, 1999, the trial court denied the motion to suspend arraignment, directed the issuance of warrants for petitioners’ arrest, and ordered forfeiture of the cash bond. The trial court later, on July 28, 1999, granted petitioners’ motion to lift the warrant and to reinstate their bond, and set arraignment anew for August 10, 1999. Petitioners filed on August 3, 1999 a petition for prohibition with prayer for TRO and/or temporary restraining order in the Court of Appeals. They also appealed to the Department of Justice on August 9, 1999 the prosecutor’s July 2, 1999 resolution, contending that they were denied due process for lack of an opportunity to file a counter-affidavit and that the probable cause finding lacked basis. On August 10, 1999, counsel orally moved to defer arraignment because of the pendency of the DOJ appeal and the Court of Appeals petition, but the motion was denied and warrants were ordered.

Petitioners were arrested and arraigned on August 13, 1999, entered not guilty pleas, and the trial was set for October 4, 5, and 11, 1999. On September 7, 1999, the Court of Appeals issued a TRO, and the trial court suspended proceedings. On January 3, 2000, the Secretary of Justice dismissed petitioners’ appeal based on Department of Justice Order No. 223, which authorized the Secretary to motu proprio dismiss the appeal if the accused was arraigned during the pendency of said appeal. With the TRO having lapsed, the trial court, upon the prosecution’s motion, issued an Order dated January 26, 2000, setting trial for February 21 and 22, 2000, after finding no remaining legal impediment to the reception of evidence.

Proceedings in the Court of Appeals and the Present Petition

After the trial court resumed scheduling, petitioners filed with the Court of Appeals a motion to resolve their pending petition for prohibition. On April 18, 2000, the Court of Appeals denied the petition, holding that the trial court had not committed abuse of discretion in refusing to suspend proceedings and defer arraignment. Petitioners then came before the Supreme Court, alleging that respondent Judge Bacalla committed grave abuse of discretion in issuing orders dated July 27, 1999, August 10, 1999, and January 26, 2000.

Issue and Petitioners’ Theory

The sole issue for determination was whether Judge Bacalla gravely abused his discretion in denying petitioners’ motion to defer arraignment and to suspend proceedings. Petitioners’ position focused on the alleged arbitrary refusal to pause the proceedings despite the pendency of their requests before the prosecutor and their subsequent appellate remedies, and they also invoked due process concerns regarding the non-submission of counter-affidavits at the prosecutorial stage.

The Parties’ Contentions Before the Supreme Court

Petitioners argued that the refusal to defer arraignment was an abuse of discretion and that they were denied due process because they allegedly were not able to file counter-affidavits. They further maintained that the determination of probable cause was made without proper basis.

Respondent Judge Bacalla, as sustained by the Court of Appeals, maintained that the trial court could properly proceed because petitioners’ procedural requests did not present the kind of legal circumstances that would compel suspension, especially considering that no operative directive compelled the trial court to withhold arraignment or trial proceedings.

Ruling of the Supreme Court

The Supreme Court denied the petition and affirmed the April 18, 2000 Decision of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. SP No. 54111. The Court held that no grave abuse of discretion was committed by respondent Judge in denying petitioners’ motions to defer arraignment and to suspend the proceedings.

Legal Basis and Reasoning

The Court began by reiterating the standard for grave abuse of discretion. It explained that grave abuse implies a capricious and whimsical exercise of judgment tantamount to lack or excess of jurisdiction. The exercise of power must be arbitrary or despotic, driven by passion or personal hostility, and must be so patent and gross as to amount to an evasion of positive duty or a virtual refusal to perform a duty enjoined by law.

Applying that standard, the Court found no grave abuse in the trial court’s July 27, 1999 ruling. Petitioners’ July 19, 1999 motion to defer arraignment was grounded on the pendency of the motion for reconsideration with the prosecutor’s office. The Court noted that the trial court denied the motion only on July 27, 1999, after the prosecutor’s office denied the motion for reconsideration on July 2, 1999. Thus, the trial court could not be characterized as acting arbitrarily or precipitately because the prosecutorial resolution preceded the trial court’s order. The Court further observed that the trial court had in fact deferred arraignment during the pendency of the motion for reconsideration, thereby demonstrating that it did not act precipitously.

The Court likewise rejected petitioners’ challenge to the trial court’s refusal to suspend arraignment and arraignment proceeded on August 13, 1999. Petitioners’ counsel invoked the pendency of the petition for prohibition in the Court of Appeals and the appeal with the Secretary of Justice. However, the Court of Appeals did not issue a TRO to suspend arraignment. The Supreme Court therefore found that the trial court could not be faulted for proceeding, because the appellate forum where suspension was sought had chosen not to enjoin arraignment.

The Court also addressed Section 11(c), Rule 116 of the 2000 Rules on Criminal Procedure, which mandates that arraignment shall be suspended for a period not exceeding sixty (60) days from the filing of a petition for review with the DOJ. It held that this rule was not yet in effect when Judge Bacalla denied the motion to defer in 1999. At the time, suspension was still discretionary for the judge, depending on the circumstances of each case. The Court recognized that the proviso allowing deferment due to a petition pending before the DOJ had its origin in Roberts, Jr. v. Court of Appeals and Dimatulac v. Villon, but it held that those cases did not apply to petitioners’ situation. The Court distinguished Roberts, Jr. on the ground that the DOJ there had expressly taken cognizance of the petition and directed the prosecutor to move for suspension, reflecting the Secretary’s intention to exercise review authority. It distinguished Dimatulac because that case involved procedural irregularities during the prosecutorial stage that resulted in manifest advantage to the accused and grave prejudice to the State and the complainant. The Court held that such irregularities were not present here.

The Court further rejected the due process claim. It held that petitioners were given ample opportunity to file a counter-affidavit but failed to do so in time through their own fault. It added that the arguments in their counter-affidavit were later passed upon by the Court of Appeals in petitioners’ review of the Secretary of Justice’s January 3, 2000 resolution, specifically in Reyes-Rara v. Tuquero, CA-G.R. SP No. 61796. The Court noted that the Court of Appeals in that case dismissed the petition and categorically held that petitioners were not denied due process and that the matters in the counter-affidavit were defensive issues properly to be ventilated at trial. It also observed that the decision became final and executory because petitioners did not file a motion for reconsideration or appeal despite notice on August 31, 2001.

With respect to petitioners’ invocation of Dimatulac v. Villon, the Court reiterated that the factual backdrop differed materially because there was no irregularity at the prosecutoria

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