G.R. No. 209132 - Heirs of Villanueva vs. Heirs of Mendoza

On November 23, 1998, private respondent Brenda Chan filed an affidavit complaint for estafa against petitioners Rhoda Regina Reyes-Rara and Jose Emmanuel Rara.
At a scheduled hearing before the investigating prosecutor on December 8, 1998, the petitioners failed to appear.
On December 21, 1998, petitioners’ counsel indicated that a counter-affidavit would be submitted on January 13, 1999; however, the counter-affidavit was not filed on the said date.

The parties agreed to reset the hearing for January 22, 1999, after the failure to submit the counter-affidavit.
Petitioners later requested to reset the hearing to February 6, 1999 due to petitioner Rhoda’s travel schedule (leaving on January 10, 1999 and returning on February 6, 1999), but this request was denied.
At the hearing on January 22, 1999, petitioners again failed to appear, leading to the submission of the case for resolution.
On February 1, 1999, Assistant City Prosecutor Edgardo T. Paragua issued a resolution finding probable cause against the petitioners, and on March 23, 1999, an Information for the crime of estafa was filed.

On June 10, 1999, petitioners filed a motion to defer the arraignment, invoking the pendency of their motion for reconsideration of the February 1, 1999 resolution by the Prosecutor’s Office. The trial court granted this motion, moving the arraignment from June 22, 1999 to July 27, 1999.
On July 2, 1999, the Prosecutor’s Office denied petitioners’ motion for reconsideration, though petitioners received notice only on August 6, 1999.
Subsequently, on July 19, 1999, petitioners again moved for deferral of the arraignment, based on the pending motion for reconsideration.
On July 27, 1999, the trial court denied the motion to suspend the arraignment and issued orders for the arrest of petitioners, including the forfeiture of their posted cash bond.
The following day, July 28, 1999, the trial court lifted the arrest warrant and reinstated the bond, resetting the arraignment to August 10, 1999.

On August 3, 1999, petitioners filed a petition for prohibition with a prayer for a preliminary injunction and/or temporary restraining order (TRO) to suspend the arraignment.
On August 9, 1999, petitioners appealed the Prosecutor’s July 2, 1999 denial to the Department of Justice (DOJ), contending that their due process rights had been violated.
On August 10, 1999, petitioners’ counsel made an oral motion before the trial court to defer the arraignment on account of pending appellate remedies; this motion was denied, leading to their arrest and subsequent arraignment on August 13, 1999, where they pleaded not guilty.
Trial dates were set for October 4, 5, and 11, 1999.
A TRO issued by the Court of Appeals on September 7, 1999, temporarily suspended the proceedings at the trial court.
On January 3, 2000, the Secretary of Justice dismissed petitioners’ appeal based on DOJ Order No. 223, which authorized a dismissal if the accused was arraigned during the pendency of the petition.
Consequently, on January 26, 2000, with the TRO expired and the appeal dismissed, the trial court resumed proceedings and set the trial on the merits for February 21 and 22, 2000.

Petitioners sought review of the Court of Appeals’ April 18, 2000 decision which denied their petition for prohibition and application for a writ of injunction that aimed to suspend the trial proceedings.
The grievance centered on the allegation that respondent Judge Bacalla gravely abused his discretion in denying motions to defer the arraignment and suspend proceedings, thereby denying petitioners due process—specifically, the opportunity to file a counter-affidavit in a timely manner.

Whether respondent Judge Bacalla gravely abused his discretion in denying petitioners’ motions:

The motion to defer arraignment filed on July 19, 1999 based on the pending motion for reconsideration with the Prosecutor’s Office.
The oral motion to suspend arraignment on August 10, 1999, allegedly based on the pendency of both the petition for prohibition before the Court of Appeals and the appeal with the Secretary of Justice.

Whether the trial court’s decision to resume proceedings and set the trial on the merits on January 26, 2000, violated petitioners’ due process rights:

Considering that the TRO issued by the Court of Appeals had lapsed and the Secretary of Justice had dismissed the appeal, was the order on January 26, 2000 justified?

Whether the failure of petitioners to submit a counter-affidavit on the prescribed date amounted to a denial of due process, thereby justifying a suspension of the trial proceedings.