G.R. No. 142961 - Reyes-Rara vs. Chan

On November 23, 1998, private respondent Brenda Chan filed an affidavit complaint for estafa against petitioners Rhoda Regina Reyes-Rara and Jose Emmanuel Rara.
Petitioners failed to appear at the scheduled hearing before the investigating prosecutor on December 8, 1998.
On December 21, 1998, petitioners' counsel indicated that a counter-affidavit would be submitted by January 13, 1999, but this was not done.

The parties agreed to reset the hearing to January 22, 1999, with the case to be submitted for resolution thereafter.
Petitioners requested another resetting to February 6, 1999, citing Rhoda's trip to Tokyo, but the request was denied.
On January 22, 1999, petitioners again failed to appear, and the case was submitted for resolution.

On February 1, 1999, Assistant City Prosecutor Edgardo T. Paragua found probable cause against petitioners.
An Information for estafa was filed against them on March 23, 1999.
On the same date, Rhoda filed a motion to admit a counter-affidavit, but no counter-affidavit was filed by Jose Emmanuel.

The trial court set the arraignment for June 22, 1999.
On June 10, 1999, petitioners filed a motion to defer arraignment, citing the pendency of their motion for reconsideration of the Prosecutor's resolution.
The arraignment was deferred to July 27, 1999.
On July 2, 1999, the Prosecutor's Office denied petitioners' motion for reconsideration, but petitioners only received this on August 6, 1999.
On July 19, 1999, petitioners filed another motion to defer arraignment, which was denied on July 27, 1999.

On July 27, 1999, the trial court denied the motion to suspend arraignment and issued warrants for petitioners' arrest.
On July 28, 1999, the trial court lifted the warrants and reinstated the bond, setting the arraignment for August 10, 1999.
On August 3, 1999, petitioners filed a petition for prohibition with the Court of Appeals, seeking to suspend the arraignment.
On August 10, 1999, the trial court denied the oral motion to defer arraignment, and petitioners were arraigned on August 13, 1999, pleading not guilty.

On August 9, 1999, petitioners appealed the Prosecutor's resolution to the Department of Justice (DOJ).
On September 7, 1999, the Court of Appeals issued a TRO, suspending the trial court proceedings.
On January 3, 2000, the DOJ dismissed petitioners' appeal, citing Department of Justice Order No. 223, which allows dismissal if the accused is arraigned during the appeal.
On January 26, 2000, the trial court set the case for trial on February 21 and 22, 2000.

No Grave Abuse of Discretion: The trial court acted within its discretion in denying the motions to defer arraignment. The Prosecutor's Office had already denied petitioners' motion for reconsideration before the trial court's July 27, 1999 Order. The trial court deferred the arraignment until the motion for reconsideration was resolved, showing no arbitrariness.
No Legal Impediment for Trial: The trial court's January 26, 2000 Order setting the case for trial was proper, as the TRO from the Court of Appeals had lapsed, and the DOJ had dismissed petitioners' appeal. There were no legal obstacles to proceeding with the trial.
Due Process Not Violated: Petitioners were given ample opportunity to file a counter-affidavit but failed to do so through their own fault. The Court of Appeals also ruled in a related case that petitioners were not denied due process.
Inapplicability of Precedents: The cases of Roberts, Jr. v. Court of Appeals and Dimatulac v. Villon were not applicable, as there was no directive from the DOJ to suspend proceedings, and no procedural irregularities were found in the prosecutorial stage.
Oral Motion Insufficient: Petitioners' oral motion to suspend arraignment on August 10, 1999, was insufficient, as no proof of the appeal's pendency with the DOJ was provided to the trial court.

The Supreme Court found no grave abuse of discretion by the trial court and affirmed the Court of Appeals' decision. The petition was denied.