Title
Re: Imposition of Corresponding Penalties for Habitual Tardiness
Case
A.M. No. 00-6-09-SC
Decision Date
Aug 14, 2003
Employees of the Supreme Court faced disciplinary action for habitual tardiness; explanations like family duties, health, and traffic were deemed insufficient, resulting in suspensions or reprimands.
tardiness
disciplinary action
employees

Case Summary (A.M. No. 00-6-09-SC)

Referral and Requirement to Explain

The Leave Division’s referral was premised on the list of employees who incurred tardiness ten times or more per month for two months during the second semester of 2002, or for two consecutive months in the year 2002. Acting on the referral, Atty. Candelaria required each concerned employee to submit a written explanation within five days from notice as to why no disciplinary action should be imposed.

The employees responded with explanations that varied in their factual basis and in the legal theories they invoked. The record shows that the Court later treated these explanations under established standards: habitual tardiness could not be excused by reasons that the Court had previously ruled insufficient, though such reasons might be considered only to mitigate the administrative liability.

The Employees’ Explanations

Fe Malou B. Castelo, a Court Stenographer II in the Office of the Clerk of Court, reported twelve times tardy in August and ten times in October. She attributed her tardiness to the need to write papers for school requirements, stating she attended evening classes until 9:00 in the evening, then had to travel from school to her home in Meycauayan, Bulacan, reaching it at about 11:00 p.m., and still had to catch time for her assignments and other matters.

Susan L. Belando, an HRM Assistant in the Records Division of the Office of Administrative Services (OCA), incurred tardiness thirteen times in July and eleven times each in September and November. She argued that there was an error in the actual number of her tardiness, maintaining that she had been tardy only eight times in July based on the Record of Absences and Tardiness (RAT). She also explained that she was a single parent of four children.

Eleonor V. Pacheco, a Records Officer I in the Judicial Records Office, was alleged to have been late eleven times in September, ten times in October, and eleven times in November. She claimed that during these periods she suffered vaginal spotting while in her seventh month of pregnancy, which required her to slow down her activities.

Perpetua Socorro Jocelyn S. Guerrero, a Court Attorney IV in the OCA, incurred tardiness ten times each in June and July. She stated that the Court had already sanctioned her in A.M. No. 2002-15-SC for habitual tardiness for June 2002, contending that disciplining her again for the same month amounted to double jeopardy. As to July, she admitted the tardiness, explaining she was “heavy with her third child” and thus delayed her arrival.

Lolita T. Buenaventura, a Clerk II in the Judicial and Bar Council, was late ten times in November and fourteen times in December, which she attributed to staying up late caring for her father after a major operation and for her son who suffered from constant asthma attacks.

Ma. Cecilia C. Dycueco, a Data Entry Machine Operator in the OCA, was late thirteen times in August, eleven times in September, and ten times in November. She admitted the infractions and explained she had no housemaid, forcing her to attend personally to her family’s needs, especially her old parents and her aunt who had breast cancer.

Ma. Lourdes P. Buelva-Dela Cruz, Bookkeeper I in PHILJA, was late ten times in August and eleven times in November. She explained that she attended evening review classes in August and was preparing for her wedding in November. She also added that her tardiness during these periods was only for a few minutes.

Cyrus P. Borja, a Project Development Officer V in the Program Management Office, incurred tardiness twelve times each in October and November. He claimed the tardiness resulted from daily heavy traffic from his residence in Los Baños, Laguna to the Court. He requested a schedule change to adjust the official hours. He also stated that he compensated by staying beyond office hours.

Ma. Cielito L. Chua, a Clerk II in the Leave Division of the OCA, reported late ten times in July and eleven times in November. She explained she suffered from insomnia, which prevented her from waking early. She insisted that her tardiness did not prejudice her work performance.

Atty. Candelaria’s Findings and Recommended Penalties

After evaluating the explanations, Atty. Candelaria concluded that the reasons did not justify excusing the employees from liability. For Castelo, Atty. Candelaria found no sufficient explanation and considered it the employee’s fourth offense, noting that the Court had earlier warned her and others that they would be dismissed if they committed similar offenses in the future. Atty. Candelaria also found a lack of remorse and that the employee had not lived up to any promise to reform.

For Belando, Atty. Candelaria acknowledged an error in the computer printout for the total number of tardiness. He accounted for the error for July, reducing her July tardiness count to reflect what the employee claimed, while rejecting her attempt to treat additional tardiness in September and November as excused half-day absences. Atty. Candelaria explained that half-day leave-of-absence cannot be treated as excusing tardiness unless the employee files an application for leave covering the alleged half days within a reasonable time and the application is duly approved. He held that a mere notation in the RAT that the employee went on half-day leave did not, by itself, legally convert tardiness into approved half-day leave absence.

For Guerrero, Atty. Candelaria found the explanation unsatisfactory. He held that her claim regarding her average daily outputs was self-serving and was contradicted by her own admission that during the periods of tardiness she moved slower due to pregnancy complications. While Atty. Guerrero argued that work output should not be measured purely by hours, Atty. Candelaria stated that all government officials and employees had specific regular official time that must be observed. He further rejected her double jeopardy theory, reasoning that habitual tardiness liability required meeting the time-based threshold within the semester and that her tardiness in the relevant months involved different offenses, not a repeated punishment for the same acts.

For Dycueco, Buelva-Dela Cruz, Borja, and Chua, Atty. Candelaria treated their justifications as insufficient under the Court’s established standards. He likewise considered personal circumstances, domestic responsibilities, traffic difficulties, and health concerns insufficient to excuse habitual tardiness, though such factors could be considered only for mitigation.

Atty. Candelaria recommended the following penalties based on the employees’ prior offenses and the Court’s prior resolution dated November 27, 2002: Castelo be dismissed, but suspended instead for three months without pay for humanitarian considerations with a warning; Belando be suspended for thirty days; Pacheco be suspended for five days; Guerrero and Buenaventura be reprimanded as second offenders; and Dycueco, Buelva-Dela Cruz, Borja, and Chua be sternly warned as first offenders.

Governing Standards on Habitual Tardiness

The decision applied the rule that under Civil Service Commission Memorandum Circular No. 14, s. 1991, an officer or employee is considered habitually tardy when the employee incurs tardiness, regardless of the number of minutes, ten times a month for at least two months in a semester or at least two consecutive months during the year. The Court held that there was no question that the employees had incurred habitual tardiness. It emphasized that habitual tardiness undermined efficiency and compromised public service.

The Court further anchored discipline on the constitutional command that public office is a public trust. It also underscored the importance of strict compliance with prescribed office hours, stating that punctuality is a virtue and that tardiness and absenteeism are impermissible. The decision additionally relied on the Court’s prior ruling in In Re: Imposition of Corresponding Penalties for Habitual Tardiness Committed During the Second Semester of 2000, A.M. No. 00-6-09-SC, November 27, 2002, reiterating that moral obligations, performance of household chores, traffic problems, and health, domestic and financial concerns are not sufficient reasons to excuse habitual tardiness, although they may mitigate the penalty.

The Court also invoked the sanctioning framework under Sec. 52(C)(4), Rule VI of CSC Memorandum Circular No. 19, Series of 1999. It stated that under the rule, the penalty for habitual tardiness was reprimand for the first offense, suspension for one to thirty days for the second offense, and dismissal from the service for the third offense.

Assessment of the Employees’ Explanations and Rejection of Excuses

The Court found that none of the reasons relied upon by the employees merited excusal. It reiterated that habitual tardiness is inherently condemnable and that the nature of the employees’ functions required them to be role models for strict observance of office hours. It recognized that the employees’ explanations might sometimes relate to mitigation, but it declined to treat such reasons as legally sufficient to erase administrative liability.

As to Guerrero’s claim of double jeopardy, the Court held that the claim lacked factual and legal support. It explained that the habitual tardiness law speaks in terms of the required time coverage, and that Guerrero’s tardiness during the relevant months constituted separate offenses under the rule, including the period already addressed in the prior sanction for the first semester, and the consecutive months that formed another offense.

The Court likewise rejected attempts to convert tardiness into excused absences without the legally required leave application and approval. It treated Belando’s approach as contrary to the administrative requirement that half-day leave must be duly applied for and approved in order to be officially considered as half-day absence rather tha

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