Title
Poe-Llamanzares vs. Commission on Elections
Case
G.R. No. 221697
Decision Date
Mar 8, 2016
Mary Grace Poe-Llamanzares, a foundling, reacquired Philippine citizenship and ran for president; the Supreme Court ruled her residency and citizenship claims were in good faith, overturning COMELEC's cancellation of her candidacy.

Case Summary (G.R. No. 208908)

Jurisdiction of COMELEC in Section 78 Petitions

The COMELEC has constitutional authority under Article IX-C, Section 2 to enforce election laws and decide all questions affecting elections except those involving the right to vote. Section 78 of the OEC empowers the COMELEC to deny due course to or cancel certificates of candidacy exclusively on the ground of false material representations therein. Contrary to petitioner’s contention that COMELEC lacked jurisdiction to rule on candidacy qualifications without a prior determination by a proper authority, the COMELEC’s power includes preliminary determination of truth or falsity of material representations in certificates of candidacy. Election contests involving proclaimed winners, such as President or Vice-President, fall exclusively under the electoral tribunals—the Supreme Court en banc as the Presidential Electoral Tribunal (PET)—after proclamation. Prior to election and proclamation, challenges to qualifications must proceed under Section 78 before the COMELEC. This division of jurisdiction preserves COMELEC’s power to screen candidates pre-election while reserving final adjudication of qualifications for elected officials to their respective tribunals.


Nature and Scope of Judicial Review

Petitions for certiorari under Rule 64 in relation to Rule 65 review decisions of the COMELEC on the limited ground of grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction. Grave abuse of discretion involves a capricious, whimsical, or arbitrary exercise of power that amounts to a refusal to perform a positive duty enjoined by law. Mere errors of judgment do not suffice. This Court’s review is deferential to COMELEC’s factual findings supported by substantial evidence but compelled to intervene when COMELEC’s appreciation of evidence is grossly unreasonable or tainted by wrong or irrelevant considerations.


Material Misrepresentation and Its Elements

Under Sections 74 and 78 of the OEC, certificates of candidacy must be sworn and contain truthful statements regarding candidacy and eligibility, including citizenship and residency. A petition to deny due course to or cancel a certificate is anchored on the exclusivity of false material representation. The core elements for such petition to prosper are: (1) representation pertaining to a material fact; (2) falsity of said representation; and (3) intent to mislead or deceive the electorate. However, jurisprudence holds that while intent to deceive is often considered, it is not an indispensable element—in many cases the existence of a false material representation suffices. The true determining factor remains the fact of eligibility rather than subjective intent. Erroneous statements made without deliberation do not justify disqualification if the candidate is in fact qualified.


Citizenship of Petitioner as a Foundling

Petitioner admits being a foundling with unknown biological parents. The 1935 Constitution, governing petitioner’s birth, does not explicitly include foundlings in the enumeration of citizens but adopts the jus sanguinis principle—citizenship by blood relation to a Filipino father or mother. Citizenship requires proof of such blood relation, and there is no conclusive presumption that foundlings are natural-born citizens absent such proof. However, the Court recognized that foundlings should not be penalized by strict proof requirements given their status. Circumstantial evidence such as petitioner’s abandonment in a predominantly Filipino area, her Filipino physical features, the demographic context, and official acts recognizing her as a citizen, including adoption, issuance of birth certificates, passports, voter registration, and election to public office, support her claim of natural-born citizenship. International law covenants ratified by the Philippines, such as the Convention on the Rights of the Child and the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, oblige the State to protect the rights of children, including foundlings, to acquire nationality and avoid statelessness. These support, but do not supplant, constitutional and statutory provisions. The Court adopted a functionalist interpretation harmonizing constitutional guarantees of equality, human dignity, and social justice with the jus sanguinis principle, concluding petitioner is a natural-born Filipino absent proof to the contrary.


Reacquisition of Citizenship and Residency Period

Petitioner became a naturalized U.S. citizen in 2001. She filed for and was granted reacquisition of Philippine citizenship under R.A. No. 9225 on July 18, 2006. The Court clarified that reacquisition of citizenship under R.A. No. 9225 restores a person’s natural-born status if originally natural-born; the act of reacquisition is not a new naturalization. Nonetheless, under prevailing jurisprudence, residency for qualification purposes can only be reckoned from the time of reacquisition of citizenship and/or waiver of permanent alien or resident status; temporary visits or stay under visas (such as the one-year visa-free balikbayan program under R.A. No. 6768 as amended) do not suffice to establish residency. Petitioner’s physical presence in the Philippines began May 24, 2005, when she and her children returned temporarily under the balikbayan program; her husband stayed temporarily in the U.S. until mid-2006 to dispose of their U.S. property. Petitioner enrolled children in Philippine schools, purchased property, registered as taxpayer and voter between 2005 and 2006, establishing an incremental process of domicile reestablishment completed by mid-2006. The Court found no grave abuse of discretion in applying these legal standards to limit residency reckoning from the date of citizenship reacquisition. Petitioner’s occasional return trips to the U.S. and retention of real property there did not negate her intent or physical presence in the Philippines sufficient for residency.


On the Previous Certificate of Candidacy

Petitioner declared a residency period of six years and six months before May 13, 2013 in her 2012 senatorial certificate of candidacy. The COMELEC and respondents considered this an admission against interest that is binding. Petitioner explained it was an honest mistake, reckoning residency as of the date of filling the 2012 COC rather than immediately before election day. The Court accepted that a candidate’s honest mistake in a previous COC should not derogate from the fact of actual residence established by substantial evidence. The Supreme Court’s precedent states that it is the fact o




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