Title
Perez vs. People
Case
G.R. No. 164763
Decision Date
Feb 12, 2008
A municipal treasurer admitted using public funds for personal expenses, fully restituted the amount, but was convicted of malversation; the Supreme Court upheld the conviction, ruling restitution does not exonerate.

Case Summary (G.R. No. 164763)

Factual Background

On December 28, 1988, an audit team headed by Auditor I Arlene R. Mandin conducted a cash examination of the municipal treasury of Tubigon, Bohol, while petitioner was then the acting municipal treasurer. The audit revealed P21,331.79 in petitioner's safe against an expected balance of P94,116.36, producing a shortage of P72,784.57. The audit team served a Cash Production Notice dated January 4, 1989 and a demand letter received by petitioner on January 5, 1989. Petitioner initially explained verbally to the auditors that portions of the funds were used to pay his late brother's loan, for family food and for his medicine. Auditor Mandin prepared a memorandum dated January 13, 1989 recommending the filing of appropriate criminal charges.

Restitution and Receipts

Petitioner remitted sums to the Provincial Treasurer of Bohol sequentially as follows: P10,000.00 and P15,000.00 on January 16, 1989; P35,000.00 on February 14, 1989; P2,000.00 and P2,784.00 on February 16, 1989; and P8,000.00 on April 17, 1989. The six official receipts in evidence established full restitution of the P72,784.57 shortage before the administrative and criminal processes concluded.

Administrative and Criminal Proceedings

An administrative case against petitioner was filed on February 13, 1989. Petitioner filed an Answer dated February 22, 1989 in the administrative proceedings recounting how the missing funds were spent. On March 1, 1990, petitioner pleaded not guilty before the Sandiganbayan. Pre-trial was set for June 1990; despite a defense motion for postponement, the Sandiganbayan proceeded on June 5, 1990, dispensed with pre-trial and admitted the prosecution's witness, Auditor Mandin. Petitioner testified in his defense, revoked his earlier administrative Answer and filed a second Answer dated March 2, 1989 asserting that the funds were in the custody of his accountable personnel and were subsequently remitted to him. Petitioner rested his case on October 20, 1990.

Trial Evidence and Defense Contentions

The prosecution relied on Auditor Mandin’s testimony and the audit report which established the cash count, the demand for production and petitioner’s initial admissions. Petitioner testified to illness and lack of counsel when he executed his first administrative Answer and later sought to recant that statement, claiming responsibility for the remitted amounts rested with subordinates until after the audit. The Sandiganbayan credited the prosecution evidence and treated petitioner’s extrajudicial admissions as probative under Rule 130, Section 26 of the Rules of Court and applicable jurisprudence holding that voluntary declarations by a party may be used against him.

Sandiganbayan Judgment and Post-Trial Motions

On September 24, 2003, the Sandiganbayan found petitioner guilty beyond reasonable doubt of malversation of public funds under Article 217 of the Revised Penal Code, sentenced him to an indeterminate term of ten years and one day of prision mayor as minimum to fourteen years and eight months of reclusion temporal as maximum, imposed perpetual special disqualification and ordered a fine equal to the amount malversed, P72,784.57. Petitioner filed a motion for reconsideration which the Sandiganbayan denied with finality on August 6, 2004. Petitioner appealed to the Supreme Court on September 23, 2004.

Issues on Appeal

Petitioner principally alleged: (1) that the Sandiganbayan’s decision, rendered nearly thirteen years after the close of trial, violated his rights to a speedy disposition and due process; and (2) that the law relied upon and the sentence imposed were cruel and therefore unconstitutional under Art. III, Sec. 19 of the 1987 Constitution.

Supreme Court Ruling on Liability for Malversation

The Court held that petitioner was properly convicted under Article 217 of the Revised Penal Code. The Court reiterated the elements of malversation and observed that the first three elements — status as a public officer, custody or control of public funds by reason of office, and accountability therefor — were present. The Court explained that under Article 217 a prima facie presumption arises when an accountable officer fails to produce funds on demand, shifting the burden to the accused to explain the disappearance. The Court found that petitioner failed to rebut that presumption. Auditor Mandin’s testimony and petitioner’s initial administrative Answer, which detailed how the funds were disposed of, satisfied the fourth element and supported the conclusion that petitioner misappropriated the funds. The Court rejected petitioner's contention that absence of counsel in the administrative proceedings rendered his first Answer inadmissible, noting that assistance of counsel is not indispensable in administrative inquiries and that voluntary extrajudicial declarations are admissible against their declarant.

Supreme Court Ruling on Speedy Disposition and Due Process

The Court applied the balancing test articulated in Barker v. Wingo and adopted by this Court in subsequent decisions, weighing: length of delay, reasons for delay, assertion of the right by the accused, and prejudice to the accused. The Court measured delay from the date the case was submitted (petitioner rested on October 20, 1990) to the Sandiganbayan decision on September 24, 2003, a period of twelve years and eleven months. The Court found that petitioner neither asserted the right to speedy disposition during those years nor took overt steps to expedite resolution. The Court further found that the prejudice to petitioner was minimal and largely speculative. Applying the cited precedents and the balancing test, the Court concluded that the delay did not amount to a deprivation of the right to speedy disposition or of due process.

Supreme Court Ruling on Cruel and Unusual Punishment

The Court rejected petitioner’s claim that imposition of penalty for malversation, where full restitution was made, amounted to cruel and unusual punishment under Art. III, Sec. 19 of the 1987 Constitution. The Court explained that malversation punishes the act of misappropriation by an accountable public officer and that damage to the government is not a requisite element of the offense; hence, restitution does not constitute a defense but only a possible mitigating circumstance. The Court emphasized the pr

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