Case Summary (G.R. No. L-22944)
Petitioner’s Action and Trial Court Ruling
The People appealed an order of the Court of First Instance of Leyte (Ormoc City) dated April 17, 1964, which granted the defense motion to quash an indictment charging violation of section 133 of the Revised Election Code. The trial court dismissed the information on the ground that the facts charged did not constitute an offense under U.S. v. Pompeya, 31 Phil. 245.
Allegations in the Information (Factual Allegations)
The information alleged that on or about November 12, 1963, at about 10:00 a.m., at the polling place for Precinct No. 1 at City Central School, Ormoc City, the accused, conspiring and acting together, willfully, unlawfully and feloniously used force to prevent Generosa Pilapil from exercising her right to freely enter the polling place in order to vote. For purposes of the motion to quash, the defense is treated as having admitted the material averments of the information.
Statutory Provision at Issue
Section 133 of the Revised Election Code (Order of Voting) guarantees: (1) voters the right to vote in order of their entrance into the polling place; (2) the right to freely enter the polling place as soon as they arrive unless there are more than forty voters waiting inside; and (3) if there are more than forty inside, the right to enter in order of arrival as those inside exit after voting. Section 138 classifies violations under section 133 as serious election offenses.
Procedural and Legal Question Presented
Because the trial court quashed the information for legal insufficiency, the appellate inquiry is limited to whether the information sufficiently averred all essential elements of the offense. The core question is whether the information must negative the statutory qualification ("unless there are more than forty voters waiting inside") to be legally sufficient to charge an offense under section 133.
Standard for Testing Sufficiency on Motion to Quash
On a motion to quash predicated on insufficiency of the information, the prosecution is entitled to have the facts alleged taken as true (defense admissions are presumed). The information need only allege the essential elements of the offense; matters that constitute exceptions or affirmative defenses are ordinarily for the accused to plead and prove.
Precedents and Analogs Relied Upon
The Court examined prior rulings: U.S. v. Chan Toco (12 Phil. 268), which holds that statutory exceptions that withdraw particulars from the operation of an enacting clause are not part of the definition of the crime and need not be negatived in the information; People v. Cadabis, 97 Phil. 829, applying the same principle to section 53 of the Revised Election Code (prohibition against carrying deadly weapons with exceptions for public officers); and U.S. v. Pompeya, 31 Phil. 245, which is distinguishable because the ordinance there applied only to specified classes and special conditions, making the exemptions integral to the offense’s definition and thus required to be alleged.
Application of Precedent to the Present Case
The court reasoned that the statutory qualification in section 133 ("unless there are more than forty voters waiting inside") is an exception but not an essential ingredient of the offense’s definition. Unlike Pompeya, the prohibition in section 133 is of general application to all persons and the exception is separable; hence the prosecutor need not negative the exception in the information. If the defendants claim they come within the exception, tha
...continue readingCase Syllabus (G.R. No. L-22944)
Court and Citation
- Reported at 130 Phil. 515, G.R. No. L-22944, decided February 10, 1968.
- Decision authored by Justice Castro.
Procedural Posture
- Appeal by the People of the Philippines from an order of the Court of First Instance of Leyte (Ormoc City) dated April 17, 1964.
- The lower court order quashed, on motion of the defense, an indictment charging violation of Section 133 of the Revised Election Code.
- The Supreme Court reviews whether the information (indictment) is legally sufficient; the case is before this Court on appeal from dismissal by the trial court.
Allegations Contained in the Information
- The information charges that on or about 12 November 1963 (election day), at around 10:00 o'clock in the morning, at the polling place at the City Central School, Ormoc City, Philippines, within the jurisdiction of the court, the accused CLAUDIA SAN JUAN and SEVERO SAN JUAN, conspiring, cooperating, confabulating and helping with one another, did willfully, unlawfully, and feloniously, with the use of force, prevent the complaining witness GENEROSA PILAPIL from exercising her right to freely enter the polling place of Precinct No. 1 in order to vote.
- The indictment thus charges willful, unlawful, felonious prevention by force of a duly registered voter's free entry into the polling place to cast her vote.
Order Appealed From (Character and Text)
- The appealed order is a one-sentence dismissal stating: "As the facts charged do not constitute an offense, pursuant to the ruling of our Supreme Court in the case of U.S. vs. Pompeya, 31 Phil. 245, this case is hereby dismissed."
- The order quashed the indictment on the ground that the facts alleged did not, as charged, constitute an offense under the controlling precedent cited.
Effect of Motion to Quash on Pleadings and Scope of Review
- Because the case was dismissed on a motion to quash predicated upon insufficiency of the information, the defense is to be assumed, for purposes of that motion, to admit all material averments of the information.
- Consequently, the sole inquiry on appeal is limited to whether the indictment sufficiently avers all the essential elements of the proscribed act under the statute charged.
Statutory Provision at Issue (Section 133, Revised Election Code)
- Section 133, titled "Order of Voting," provides in full as quoted:
- "The voters shall have the right to vote in order of their entrance into the polling place. The voters shall have the right to freely enter the polling place as soon as they arrive unless there are were than forty voters waiting inside, in which case they have the right to enter in the order of their arrival as those who are inside go out, which the latter shall immediately do after having cast their votes."
- A violation of Section 133 is characterized as a "serious election offense" by Section 138 of the same Code (as noted in the decision).
Legal Issue Presented
- Whether the information, as drafted, sufficiently alleges the essential elements of an offense under Section 133 of the Revised Election Code.
- More precisely, whether the information must negative the statutory exception ("unless there are more than forty voters waiting inside") in order to be legally sufficient to charge an offense for preventing a voter's free entry into a polling place.
Legal Effect and Content of the Statutory Right Alleged
- Implicit in the averment that the complainant was at the polling place "in order to vote" is that she was a duly registered voter intent on exercising the right of suffrage.
- The statute guarantees the voter the rights:
- to vote in the order of her entrance into the polling place;
- to freely enter the polling place as soon as she arrives unless there are then more than forty voters waiting inside; and
- in the event there are more than forty waiting inside, to enter in the order of her arriva