G.R. No. 86695 - Malaga vs. Penachos, Jr.

The People of the Philippines filed an information against Claudia San Juan and Severo San Juan for violation of Section 133 of the Revised Election Code.
The accused were charged with willfully and unlawfully preventing Generosa Pilapil from freely entering the polling place at Precinct No. 1, Ormoc City, on November 12, 1963, the election day, at approximately 10:00 a.m.
The Court of First Instance of Leyte (Ormoc City) quashed the indictment based on the insufficiency of the information, citing the Supreme Court ruling in U.S. vs. Pompeya.

Section 133 of the Revised Election Code grants voters the right to vote in order of entrance into the polling place and to freely enter the polling place upon arrival unless more than forty voters are already inside. Under that limitation, voters enter in order as others exit after voting.
Section 138 of the Revised Election Code categorizes violations of Section 133 as serious election offenses.
The information alleged use of force to prevent complainant from exercising her right to freely enter the polling place to vote.

The motion to quash was granted based on the allegation that the information failed to sufficiently negative the statutory exception—i.e., that there might have been more than forty voters inside—thus, according to the lower court, the facts charged did not constitute any offense.
The Supreme Court reviewed the order on appeal with the assumption that all material facts in the information were admitted by the defense for purposes of the motion to quash.

Whether the information was legally sufficient to charge the accused with violating Section 133 of the Revised Election Code despite not explicitly negating the exception that the right to freely enter the polling place does not apply if there were more than forty voters inside.
Whether an indictment must allege that the accused is outside a statutory exemption or exception to sustain its sufficiency.