G.R. No. L-27683 - People vs. Liwanag

Case Summary (G.R. No. L-27683)

Factual Background

Silvestre Liwanag alias Linda Bie joined the Hukbo ng Bayan Laban sa Hapon (Hukbalahap) in June, 1942 and served as commander of Squadron 18-E and later as military inspector until the organization was disbanded at liberation. Before the 1946 elections the organization revived; he became provincial commander for Pampanga and later vice commander of the Central Luzon Regional Command. In 1948 he attended a Communist Party of the Philippines conference in Norzagaray, Bulacan, was nominated to the Central Committee, and continued his membership in the reorganized Hukbong Mapagpalaya ng Bayan (HMB). He served as supervisor and adviser to Squadron 18 of Field Command 25, planned and effected captures at Orani in 1949 and Camp Makabolos on August 26, 1950, and was named chief of the RECO Military Department of RECO 2 from late 1956 until March, 1958, supervising armed forces in several provinces. He engaged in encounters with Government forces in 1958, retreated to Bataan, and, although later on leave for ailment, continued to be consulted. A Philippine Constabulary patrol captured him and his wife in their hideout at Barrio Kalungusan, Orion, Bataan on June 21, 1960.

Charge and Information

The accused was charged by information in the Court of First Instance of Bataan with violation of Republic Act No. 1700, specifically for unlawfully and willfully continuing and remaining as officer and/or ranking leader of the Communist Party of the Philippines and its military arm, the Hukbong Mapagpalaya ng Bayan, until his apprehension on June 21, 1960, without having renounced such leadership or membership within the period prescribed by law, and, while remaining as such leader or high-ranking member, taking up arms against the Government by making and conducting raids, ambuscades, and armed attacks against civilians, Philippine Constabulary, and local police forces.

Trial Court Proceedings

Pursuant to Section 5 of Republic Act No. 1700, the Court of First Instance of Bataan conducted the preliminary investigation with the accused present and represented; counsel cross-examined the witnesses. Upon finding a prima facie case the court issued an arrest warrant and set the case for trial. At arraignment the accused, assisted by counsel, waived reading of the information and pleaded not guilty. The court granted him twenty days to file a motion to quash; he filed such motion on April 14, 1961, alleging prior conviction for rebellion based on the same overt acts and asserting that Republic Act No. 1700 was an ex post facto law or bill of attainder. The trial court denied the motion on September 11, 1961. The prosecution sought and obtained an order to adopt the testimony given at the preliminary investigation as part of its evidence in chief, subject to the right of the defense to further cross-examine the witnesses. The prosecution recalled the preliminary-investigation witnesses, called three additional witnesses, and the defense presented the accused who admitted prior conviction for rebellion, acquittal for murder, his surrender, and, on court cross-examination, membership in the Hukbalahap and the HMB from 1948 to 1960 and nonacceptance of the 1948 amnesty. On March 28, 1967 the trial court found the accused guilty of subversion as charged; for security reasons and at prior request the decision was promulgated in the Court of First Instance of Rizal, Pasig Branch, while the accused was confined at Fort Bonifacio.

Issues on Appeal

On appeal the accused assigned errors contending: (a) violation of his constitutional right to confront witnesses because the trial court admitted preliminary-investigation testimony into evidence; (b) failure to observe the two-witness rule of Section 7 of Republic Act No. 1700; (c) double jeopardy because he had previously been convicted of rebellion based on the same overt acts; and (d) procedural irregularity in the promulgation of the decision, asserting improper place of promulgation and that the reading should have been by Judge Pedro Navarro rather than by Judge Tito V. Tizon.

The Parties' Contentions

The prosecution defended the admission of preliminary testimony by noting that such testimony was not ex parte but was taken orally in the presence of the accused and his counsel who cross-examined the witnesses; the trial court required that the witnesses be recalled and be subject to further cross-examination at trial. On the two-witness rule the prosecution relied upon testimony by former associates — Santos Miguel, Melencio Guevara, Pablo Guintu, and Lazaro Esteban — and upon the accused’s sworn statement (Exhibit B) and his in-court admissions to establish his status as officer or ranking leader and to supply corroboration for overt acts, including gun battles of June 8 and June 21, 1960 testified to by witnesses. On double jeopardy the prosecution argued that subversion under Republic Act No. 1700 is a crime distinct from rebellion and that the periods covered differ: the rebellion conviction extended only to June 19, 1957, whereas prosecution for subversion necessarily concerned the period from June 20, 1957, when the Act took effect, to June 21, 1960. On promulgation the prosecution relied on the record showing detention at Fort Bonifacio since November 20, 1962 and on Section 6 of Rule 120 to justify promulgation in the sala of Judge Pedro Navarro and the delegation of the mechanical act of reading.

Ruling of the Supreme Court

The Court affirmed the judgment of the trial court with costs. The Court held that the accused’s confrontation right under Article III, Section 1, No. 17, 1935 Constitution was not infringed by the adoption into evidence of testimony elicited at the preliminary investigation because that testimony had been taken orally in the presence of the accused and his counsel, who cross-examined the witnesses, and because the trial court conditioned admission upon the right of the defense to further cross-examine the witnesses, who were recalled and again examined in the accused’s presence. The Court found sufficient evidence to establish that the accused was an officer or ranking leader of the Communist Party of the Philippines and the HMB, relying on the testimony of former associates and the accused’s own sworn statement and admissions, as well as testimony concerning armed encounters in June, 1960. The Court held that violation of Republic Act No. 1700 is distinct from the crime of rebellion and that the periods covered by the prior rebellion conviction and the subversion prosecution did not overlap; the rebellion conviction covered up to June 19, 1957, while the instant prosecution necessarily covered June 20, 1957 to June 21, 1960. Finally, the Court ruled that the record established confinement at Fort Bonifacio, that the decision was promulgated in the sala of Judge Pedro Navarro as provided by Section 6 of Rule 120, and that the mechanical act of reading a decision may be delegated by the court.

Legal Basis and Reasoning

On confrontation the Court relied upon Article III, Section 1, No. 17, 1935 Constitution and precedent, noting the constitutional purpose to secure the accused’s right to meet witnesses face to face and to permit effective cross-examination, and it distinguished depositions or ex parte affidavits from oral testimony taken at preliminary investigation then reproduced at trial with opportunity for further cross-examination; the Court cited U.S. vs . Javier, 37 Phil. 449 in that context. On the two-witness requirement the Court applied Section 7 of Republic Act No. 1700, which requires at least

Case Syllabus (G.R. No. L-27683)

Parties and Procedural Posture

THE PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES prosecuted the case under Republic Act No. 1700 before the Court of First Instance of Bataan.
SILVESTRE LIWANAG alias LINDA BIE, DEFENDANT-APPELLANT was arraigned, pleaded not guilty, and appealed the conviction to the Supreme Court.
The trial court found the accused guilty of violating Republic Act No. 1700 and sentenced him to suffer reclusion perpetua with the legal accessories and to pay costs.
The trial court conducted the preliminary investigation under Section 5, Republic Act No. 1700 and set the case for trial upon finding a prima facie case.

Key Factual Allegations

The accused joined the Hukbo ng Bayan Laban sa Hapon (Hukbalahap) in June 1942 and served as commander of Squadron 18-E and later as military inspector until liberation.
Before the 1946 national elections the organization revived and the accused became provincial commander for Pampanga and later vice commander of the Central Luzon Regional Command.
The accused attended a 1948 conference of the Communist Party of the Philippines (CPP) and was nominated to the Central Committee, after which he continued membership in the renamed Hukbong Mapagpalaya ng Bayan (HMB).
The accused served as supervisor and adviser to Squadron 18 of Field Command 25 and later as chief of the RECO Military Department of RECO 2 until March 1958, supervising armed forces in several provinces.
The accused planned and effected the capture of Orani, Bataan in 1949 and Camp Makabolos, Tarlac on August 26, 1950, and participated in numerous armed encounters with government forces through the 1950s.
The accused was captured by a Philippine Constabulary patrol on June 21, 1960 in Barrio Kalungusan, Orion, Bataan together with his wife.

Procedural History

The preliminary investigation before the Court of First Instance of Bataan was conducted in accordance with Section 5, Republic Act No. 1700, with the accused present and represented by counsel who cross-examined prosecution witnesses.
The trial court issued a warrant after finding a prima facie case and the accused was arraigned, waived reading of the information, and pleaded not guilty.
The accused filed a motion to quash on April 14, 1961, alleging prior conviction for rebellion and that Republic Act No. 1700 operated as an ex post facto law or bill of attainder, and the trial court denied the motion on September 11, 1961.
The prosecution moved to adopt testimony taken at the preliminary investigation into its evidence in chief, and the trial court allowed adoption provided the accused could further cross-examine the witnesses, who were subsequently recalled at trial.
The accused testified at trial and admitted prior conviction for rebellion, an acquittal for murder, that he surrendered on June 21, 1960, and on court cross-examination admitted membership in the Hukbalahap and HMB from 1948 to 1960 without availing the 1948 amnesty.
The Court of First Instance rendered judgment on March 28, 1967 finding the accused guilty as charged, and the decision was promulgated in the Court of First Instance of Rizal, Pasig Branch, for security reasons.
The accused appealed to the Supreme Court which affirmed the trial court decision.

Issues Presented

Whether the accused was deprived of his constitutional right to confront witnesses under Article III, Section 1, No. 17, 1935 Constitution when the trial court permitted adoption of preliminary-investigation testimony.
Whether the prosecution complied with the two-witness requirement of Section 7, Republic Act No. 1700 for conviction where the accused was an officer or ranking leader or took up arms.
Whether prior conviction for rebellion barred prosecution for subversion under Republic Act No. 1700 by reason of double jeopardy or res judicata.
Whether the promulgation of the decision in the Court of First Instance of Rizal, Pasig Branch, and reading by a judge other than the trial judge rendered the judgment defective.

Contentions of the Parties

The accused contended that adoption of preliminary-investigation testimony denied his right to meet witnesses face to face under Article III, Section 1, No. 17, 1935 Constitution.
The accused contended that Section 7, Republic Act No. 1700 required testimony of at least two witnesses to the same overt act and t