Case Digest (A.C. No. 9176)
Facts:
The People of the Philippines, Plaintiff-Appellee, vs. Silvestre Liwanag alias Linda Bie, Defendant-Appellant, G.R. No. L-27683, October 19, 1976, Supreme Court Second Division, Concepcion Jr., J., writing for the Court.The appellant, Silvestre Liwanag (also known by numerous aliases), joined the Hukbo ng Bayan Laban sa Hapon (Hukbalahap) in June 1942 and rose through its ranks, later becoming provincial commander for Pampanga and vice commander of the Central Luzon Regional Command when the movement revived before the 1946 elections. In about 1948 he attended a Communist Party of the Philippines (CPP) conference at which he was nominated to the Central Committee; he thereafter carried his membership into the Hukbong Mapagpalaya ng Bayan (HMB), the CPP’s military arm. Liwanag served in various military posts, planned and participated in armed operations (including captures of Orani, Bataan and Camp Makabolos, Tarlac), and by the late 1950s was chief of the Regional Command Military Department (RECO 2) supervising armed units in several provinces.
On June 21, 1960, a Philippine Constabulary patrol captured Liwanag and his wife at a hideout in Orion, Bataan. An information was filed in the Court of First Instance (CFI) of Bataan charging him with violation of Republic Act No. 1700 (Anti-Subversion Act) for having unlawfully remained an officer/ranking leader of the CPP/HMB and, while such, taking up arms against the Government, without having renounced his membership within the period prescribed by law. Pursuant to Section 5 of R.A. 1700, a preliminary investigation was conducted by the CFI of Bataan; the accused and counsel were present and cross-examined the witnesses. Finding a prima facie case, the CFI issued an arrest warrant and set the case for trial.
At arraignment Liwanag pleaded not guilty and was given time to move to quash. On April 14, 1961 he moved to quash on grounds including alleged prior conviction for rebellion based on the same overt acts, and that R.A. 1700 was an ex post facto law; the CFI denied the motion on September 11, 1961. During trial the prosecution sought to adopt testimony from the preliminary investigation as its evidence in chief; the trial court allowed this subject to the right of the accused to further cross-examine the witnesses. Those witnesses were recalled and cross-examined at trial; the prosecution also produced additional witnesses. The defense presented Liwanag, who admitted his long membership in Hukbalahap/HMB and that he did not accept the 1948 amnesty; he said he had been previously charged and convicted of rebellion in CFI Pampanga and acquitted on a separate murder charge in Tarlac.
On March 28, 1967 the trial court found Liwanag guilty of subversion under R.A. 1700, sentenced him to reclusion perpetua with legal accessories, and the decision was promulgated in the CFI of Rizal, Pasig Branch, for security reasons. Liwanag appealed to the Supreme Court assigning, among others, (1) denial of his confrontation rights when preliminary-investigation testimony wa...(Pro-only)
Issues:
- Was the accused deprived of his constitutional right to confront witnesses when the trial court admitted testimony taken at the preliminary investigation into the prosecution’s evidence in chief?
- Was the required “two-witness” rule of Section 7 of R.A. 1700 satisfied to support conviction?
- Does prosecution and conviction under R.A. 1700 after a prior conviction for rebellion constitute double jeopardy?
- Was the promulgation of the trial court’s decision improper because it was read in the CFI of Rizal, Pasig Branch and read ...(Pro-only)
Ruling:
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Ratio:
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Doctrine:
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