Case Summary (G.R. No. L-47405)
Procedural History
An information charging slight physical injuries (a light offense) allegedly committed on May 28, 1953, was filed in the Municipal Court of Pasay City on July 27, 1953. The accused moved to quash the information on the ground that the offense had prescribed under Articles 90 and 91 of the Revised Penal Code. The municipal court sustained the motion and dismissed the case. The People appealed directly to the Supreme Court under section 17, sub-paragraph 6 of the Judiciary Act of 1948, invoking only questions of law.
Statutory Provisions at Issue
Article 90 (Revised Penal Code) prescribes prescription periods, providing that light offenses prescribe in two months. Article 91 directs that the period of prescription "shall commence to run from the day on which the crime is discovered by the offended party, the authorities or their agents." Article 13 of the Civil Code supplies rules on computing periods, including that in computing a period the first day is excluded and the last included, and defines other aspects of the meaning of a "month" for legal computation. Article 18 of the Civil Code directs that deficiencies in special laws are to be supplied by Civil Code provisions.
Trial Court's Ruling and Reasoning
The municipal court treated the two-month prescription for light offenses as having expired because it construed the term "month" under Article 90 in conformity with Article 13 of the Civil Code (interpreting "month" as 30 days) but computed the prescriptive period as commencing on the very day the offense was committed (May 28, 1953). Counting from May 28, the court concluded the two-month period had expired by the 61st day, so the information filed on the 61st day (July 27) was too late. The municipal court therefore sustained the motion to quash and dismissed the case.
Solicitor General's Argument on Computation
The Solicitor General conceded that Article 13 of the Civil Code should govern the meaning of "month" when interpreting the Revised Penal Code, but argued that Article 13’s separate rule on computation (third paragraph: exclude the first day, include the last) must also be applied. Applying that rule would make July 27 the 60th day after the offense (counting from May 29), thus within the two-month prescriptive period and rendering the information timely.
Issues Presented to the Supreme Court
- Whether the prescriptive period runs from the very day the crime was committed or from the day following the commission (i.e., whether the first day is excluded in computation).
- Whether the term "month" in Article 90 of the Revised Penal Code means a calendar (civil) month or a regular 30-day month.
Court's Analysis — Computation: Exclusion of the First Day
The Court examined the language of Article 91 and observed that the provision sets the commencement of prescription but does not specify the method of computing the period. It relied on long-standing procedural practice and statutory rules (section 1, Rule 28 of the Rules of Court; section 13, Revised Administrative Code; Article 13, Civil Code; and prior jurisprudence such as Surbano v. Gloria) that, in computing periods, the first day is excluded and the last day included. The Court reasoned that this method of computation existed in the jurisdiction even before the American regime and therefore the Legislature, by enacting Article 91 without specifying a different rule, must be presumed to have intended the established method (exclude the first day, include the last). The Court also noted Article 18 of the Civil Code as a basis for supplying any deficiency in a special law's silence regarding computation. Consequently, the trial court erred in counting the prescriptive period from the day of the offense rather than from the following day.
Court's Analysis — Meaning of "Month"
The Court addressed whether "month" in Article 90 should be a civil/calendar month or a 30-day month. It observed that the Revised Penal Code itself did not define "month." Historical provisions varied: the old Civil Code (Spanish-derived) had treated a month as 30 days, while the Revised Administrative Code at one point provided that a month meant the civil/calendar month. With the enactment and approval of the Civil Code of the Philippines (R.A. No. 386), Article 13 returned to the Spanish Civil Code approach defining a month as a 30-day period. The Court held
...continue readingCase Syllabus (G.R. No. L-47405)
Citation and Source
- Reported at 97 Phil. 67.
- G.R. No. L-7234.
- Decision date: May 21, 1955.
- Decision authored by Justice Labrador.
- Concurring Justices: Pablo, Acting C. J., Bengzon, Montemayor, Reyes, A., Bautista Angelo, Concepcion, and Reyes, J.B.L.
- Final line of disposition: "Without costs."
Procedural Posture
- An information was filed on July 27, 1953 in the Municipal Court of Pasay City charging Paz M. del Rosario with slight physical injuries allegedly committed on May 28, 1953.
- The accused moved to quash the information on the ground that the offense charged had prescribed pursuant to Articles 90 and 91 of the Revised Penal Code.
- The municipal court sustained the motion to quash and dismissed the case.
- Appeal was taken directly to the Supreme Court under section 17, sub-paragraph 6 of the Judiciary Act of 1948 on the ground that only questions of law were involved.
Facts Relevant to Prescription Calculation
- Date of alleged commission of offense: May 28, 1953.
- Date information filed: July 27, 1953.
- Offense charged: slight physical injuries, a "light offense" under the Revised Penal Code.
- The municipal court concluded that the prescriptive period had expired at filing because it considered the prescriptive two-month period to have begun on May 28 and to be a calendar computation resulting in expiration before July 27.
- The Solicitor General argued for a computation excluding the day of commission and treating the prescribed period as having been satisfied only on the 60th day.
Statutory Provisions Construed
- Article 90, Revised Penal Code:
- States that "The offenses of oral defamation and slander by deed shall prescribe in six months. Light offenses prescribe in two months."
- Article 91, Revised Penal Code:
- Provides that "The period of prescription shall commence to run from the day on which the crime is discovered by the offended party, the authorities or their agents, * * *."
- Article 13, Civil Code of the Philippines:
- Contains the rule "In computing a period, the first day shall be excluded, and the last day included" and, more generally in the decision, is cited as defining "month" as a 30-day month.
- Article 18, Civil Code (formerly Article 16 of old Civil Code):
- Directs that any deficiency in a special law must be supplied by the Civil Code's provisions (invoked to supply computation rules absent in the Revised Penal Code).
- Prior and related provisions referenced:
- Article 7, old Civil Code: previously provided that a month shall be understood as containing 30 days (not quoted in full but referenced).
- Section 13, Revised Administrative Code: previously provided that "month" meant the civil or calendar month (cited by the Court as a prior departure corrected by the new Civil Code).
Issues Presented
- Primary issues certified for decision:
- Whether the period of prescription for a crime commences to run from the very day on which the crime was committed, or from the following day (i.e., whether the first day is excluded in computation), in light of Article 91, R.P.C., and Article 13, Civil Code.
- Whether the term "month" in Article 90 of the Revised Penal Code should be understood as a 30-day month (regular month) or as the civil/calendar month.
Parties' Contentions
- Accused/Appellee:
- Moved to quash alleging the offense had prescribed under Articles 90 and 91 because the two-month period had already expired when the information was filed.
- Municipal court adopted reasoning that the prescriptive period commenced on May 28 (day of commission) and, applying Article 13 as to the length of a month, concluded the period had expired when the information was filed on the 61st day.
- People/Appellant (Solicitor General):
- Argued that Article 13 of the Civil Code must be applied not only to define the length of a month but also to the rule "In computing a period, the first day shall be excluded, and the last day included," so that the information should be considered filed on the 60th day and not the 6