G.R. No. 137666 - People vs. Ortillas y Gamlanga

On May 28, 1953, an act causing slight physical injuries was committed by Paz M. del Rosario.
On July 27, 1953, an information charging the accused with the offense was filed in the Municipal Court of Pasay City.
The defendant, del Rosario, filed a motion to quash the information on the ground that the offense had already prescribed in accordance with the prescriptive periods set forth in Articles 90 and 91 of the Revised Penal Code.
The municipal court sustained the motion and dismissed the case for prescription of the offense.

Article 90 of the Revised Penal Code: Establishes the prescriptive period for light offenses and specifies that light offenses prescribe in two months.
Article 91 of the Revised Penal Code: Provides the rules on the computation of the prescriptive period, namely that it commences to run “from the day on which the offense is discovered by the offended party, the authorities or their agents.”
Article 13 of the new Civil Code of the Philippines: Sets forth the method of computing periods—excluding the first day and including the last day—and, by implication, defines a “month” as a 30-day period for the purposes of such computations.
Recognition of the absence of an express definition of “month” in the Revised Penal Code, necessitating reliance on the Civil Code’s provisions and historical interpretations.

The accused contended that the offense had prescribed since the two-month period (interpreted as 60 days based on a 30-day month) had already expired by the filing date.
The Solicitor General argued that the computation of the prescriptive period must incorporate two key elements:

The period must be computed excluding the day on which the crime was committed (May 28, 1953), in accordance with Article 13 of the Civil Code.
The term “month” as used in Article 90 of the RPC should be understood as a 30-day month rather than the civil or calendar month.

Emphasis was placed on the method already long followed in Philippine jurisprudence—rooted in the Rules of Court, the Revised Administrative Code, and even the Spanish Civil Code—where the first day is excluded and the last day is included in any period computation.

Whether the prescriptive period should be counted from the actual day of commission of the offense (May 28, 1953) or starting the day following that, in line with the computation rule (excluding the first day as mandated by Article 13 of the Civil Code).

Whether “month” in Article 90 of the Revised Penal Code should be interpreted as a calendar month or as a regular 30-day month in accordance with the new Civil Code’s provisions and historical legal doctrine.