Title
PAO vs. Sandiganbayan
Case
G.R. No. 154297-300
Decision Date
Feb 15, 2008
PAO lawyers sought relief as counsel de oficio for non-indigent accused; Sandiganbayan retained two, citing constitutional rights. SC dismissed petition as moot, finding no grave abuse of discretion.
petition
lawyers
counsels de oficio

Case Summary (G.R. No. 154297-300)

Parties, Procedural Posture, and Court Involved

The petition was filed against the Sandiganbayan, Special Division, a special court created through a Supreme Court Administrative Circular to hear and decide cases of former President Joseph Estrada and others. Petitioners alleged that the Sandiganbayan committed grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction when it retained two PAO lawyers despite the claim that the accused were not indigent and, therefore, allegedly not qualified to avail themselves of PAO services.

Principal Legal Provisions Invoked

Petitioners anchored their argument on Sec. 7, Rule 116 of the Revised Rules of Criminal Procedure, which provides for the appointment of counsel de oficio. They contended, however, that the Sandiganbayan’s power to appoint and retain PAO lawyers was limited by Sec. 20 of LOI No. 20 and by PD No. 1725, which define the government legal assistance mandate of the Citizens Legal Assistance Office (renamed as Public Attorneys Office under the 1987 Administrative Code). Petitioners further relied on PAO’s indigency guidelines under Memorandum Circular No. 5 (Series of 1997), as amended, including Memorandum Circular No. 18 (Series of 2002), particularly the indigency test that sets income thresholds for those considered “indigent persons” qualified to avail themselves of PAO services. They also invoked Rule 14.02 of the Code of Professional Responsibility, emphasizing the duty of a lawyer not to decline an appointment as counsel de oficio except for serious and sufficient cause.

Factual Background: PAO’s Requests and the Sandiganbayan’s Denial

On March 15 and 18, 2002, Atty. Persida V. Rueda-Acosta, Chief Public Attorney of PAO, personally appeared before the Sandiganbayan Special Division to request relief for PAO as counsel de oficio for the accused. The request was denied. Subsequently, on May 8, 2002, the Chief Public Attorney filed an Urgent and Ex-Parte Motion to be relieved as court-appointed counsel, citing a swelling administrative workload and asserting that the accused were not indigent persons and were thus allegedly not qualified to avail of PAO services.

On May 9, 2002, the Sandiganbayan found the reasons of the Chief Public Attorney plausible and relieved her as counsel de oficio of former President Joseph Estrada and Mayor Jose Estrada. Thereafter, on May 14, 2002, eight remaining PAO lawyers filed an Ex-Parte Motion To Be Relieved As Court-Appointed Counsels, reiterating that the accused were not indigent and were therefore allegedly not qualified for PAO legal assistance.

The May 28, 2002 Resolution: Denial and Retention of Two PAO Lawyers

On May 28, 2002, the Sandiganbayan issued a Resolution denying the motion, while reducing the number of PAO counsel. It explained that there were no compelling and sufficient reasons to abandon the Court’s previous rulings. It recognized that the Chief Public Attorney’s earlier rationalization had been found meritorious due to her unexpected administrative workload, including administration and supervision of approximately 1,000 PAO lawyers and 700 staff nationwide, among other functions requiring her immediate attention.

Nevertheless, the Sandiganbayan, “in the exercise of its sound discretion,” deemed it proper to retain only two PAO lawyers out of eight—Atty. Wilfredo C. Andres and Atty. Maximo B. Usita—to continue as counsels de oficio for accused Joseph and Jose Jinggoy Estrada. The two retained PAO lawyers later joined four court-appointed private-sector counsels: Prospero Crescini, Justice Manuel Pamaran, Irene Jurado, and Noel Malaya.

Motion for Reconsideration and the June 10, 2002 Resolution

Petitioners filed a motion for reconsideration on June 4, 2002. In a Resolution dated June 10, 2002, the Sandiganbayan denied the motion. It held that the grounds raised by the PAO lawyers were mere rehashes or reiterations of earlier arguments and were not valid justification to be relieved, either temporarily or permanently, as counsels de oficio in the cases.

The Core Issue Framed by the Petition

The petition raised the issue of whether the Sandiganbayan committed grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction when it issued the subject Resolutions retaining two PAO lawyers as counsels de oficio despite the accused allegedly being not indigent.

Petitioners’ Position: Alleged Misapplication of Counsel de Oficio Rules and Limits on PAO

Petitioners maintained that the Sandiganbayan relied on Sec. 7, Rule 116 as authority for retaining PAO lawyers as counsel de oficio, and that such reliance was improper because PAO’s mandate is limited to indigent persons. They asserted that Sec. 20 of LOI No. 20 and PD No. 1725 circumscribed PAO’s representation to indigent persons or specified beneficiaries under Republic Act No. 6035, and that the 1987 Administrative Code only renamed the office while preserving its legal aid functions.

They pointed out that PAO’s Memorandum Circulars provided a specific indigency test, with income thresholds depending on residence location. They argued that the Statement of Assets and Liabilities in the accused’s cases showed that the accused were not indigent. They cited, in particular, that the wife of former President Estrada had an income exceeding P14,000.00 per month. Petitioners further argued that the only recognized exception to PAO’s representation of non-indigents was a narrow, stage-specific situation where no available lawyer could assist the client during arraignment or during the taking of a prosecution witness’s direct testimony subject to cross-examination by private counsel. Even then, they asserted PAO’s appearance would be provisional.

Petitioners thus contended that the Sandiganbayan should have considered not only PAO lawyers’ status as members of the bar, but especially PAO’s statutory and regulatory mandate to serve indigent persons. They argued that the Sandiganbayan’s approach created contradiction in PAO’s duties and undermined effective legal service to PAO’s intended beneficiaries. They also suggested that as government lawyers, PAO lawyers were limited by their mandate notwithstanding professional duties under Rule 14.02.

Respondent’s Position: Constitutional Duty to Ensure Counsel and Exercise of Sound Discretion

The Sandiganbayan Special Division, represented by the Office of the Special Prosecutor, opposed the petition and denied grave abuse of discretion. It argued that it did not act arbitrarily, capriciously, or whimsically. It explained that it faced a crisis at the time of the Resolutions.

It stated that then accused former President Joseph Estrada had relieved his counsels on nationwide television. It further noted that the counsels of record of co-accused Jose Estrada withdrew, and both accused became adamant against hiring new counsels because they allegedly did not trust the Sandiganbayan. According to the Sandiganbayan, it had the duty to decide the cases, but it could not proceed with trial where the accused were not assisted by counsel.

The respondent invoked its duty to protect the constitutional right of the accused “to be heard by himself and counsel.” It asserted that it acted within its prerogative under Sec. 7, Rule 116 by appointing Chief Public Attorney Persida V. Rueda-Acosta and eight other PAO lawyers as counsels de oficio. It reiterated that the Chief Public Attorney and most PAO lawyers were later relieved, but it retained two PAO lawyers to meet possible exigencies if the accused later relieved private counsel.

The Sandiganbayan also argued that the circumstances justified the reduction of PAO representation once private counsels entered the picture. It contended that there was no grave abuse because the retained PAO lawyers were retained to ensure continuity and readiness to safeguard the right to counsel during trial.

Legal Standard for Grave Abuse of Discretion Applied

In addressing the petition, the Court framed grave abuse of discretion by reference to prevailing jurisprudence, stating that grave abuse implies capricious and whimsical exercise of judgment equivalent to lack of jurisdiction, or the exercise of power in an arbitrary manner due to passion, prejudice, or personal hostility. It emphasized that the abuse must be so patent or gross as to amount to evasion of a positive duty or a virtual refusal to perform the duty enjoined or to act at all in contemplation of law. The Court cited Land Bank of the Philippines v. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 129368, August 25, 2003.

Court’s Reasoning: No Caprice, and Retention Justified by the Right to Counsel

The Court held that the Sandiganbayan did not gravely

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