G.R. No. 154297-300 - PAO vs. Sandiganbayan

Petitioners Atty. Maximo B. Usita, Jr. and Atty. Wilfredo C. Andres, both lawyers from the Public Attorney’s Office (PAO), were retained as counsels de oficio by the Sandiganbayan, Special Division, to represent former President Joseph Estrada and his son, Jose “Ajinggoya” Estrada in their criminal cases.
The petition for certiorari alleges that the Sandiganbayan acted with grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction by issuing the Resolutions dated May 28, 2002 and June 11, 2002, which retained the petitioners despite the fact that the accused were not indigent persons.

On March 15 and 18, 2002, PAO Chief Public Attorney Atty. Persida V. Rueda-Acosta appeared before the respondent court to request the relief of the PAO’s appearance as de oficio counsel for the accused. This request was denied.
On May 8, 2002, the Chief Public Attorney filed an Urgent and Ex-Parte Motion to be Relieved as Court-Appointed Counsel, citing a heavy administrative workload and the observation that the accused were not indigent.
On May 9, 2002, the court found the rationale of the Chief Public Attorney plausible and relieved her from representing former President Estrada and Mayor Jose Estrada.
On May 14, 2002, the remaining eight PAO lawyers filed a similar motion for relief on the basis that the accused, not being indigents, were unqualified to avail PAO services.
On May 28, 2002, the court issued a Resolution denying the motion but decided to retain only two of the eight PAO lawyers – namely, petitioners Atty. Usita, Jr. and Atty. Andres – while relieving the others.
On June 4, 2002, the petitioners filed a motion for reconsideration, which was again denied in a Resolution dated June 10, 2002, with the court stating that the reasons raised were mere reiterations of their previous arguments.
On September 21, 2004, PAO filed a Manifestation and Compliance, informing the court that petitioners Usita and Andres had been appointed as Assistant City Prosecutors in Quezon City, thereby leaving PAO as the sole petitioner in the case.

The appointment of counsel de oficio was made pursuant to Sec. 7, Rule 116 of the Revised Rules of Criminal Procedure, which allows the court to appoint experienced members of the bar for effective defense.
PAO contended that respondent’s reliance on Sec. 7 was improper because its power to appoint PAO lawyers is limited by Sec. 20 of Letter of Implementation (LOI) No. 20 and Presidential Decree (PD) No. 1725—statutes that restrict PAO’s services to indigent persons.
PAO further emphasized the criteria for indigency as defined in their Memorandum Circulars, detailing income thresholds for different areas in the Philippines, and pointed to evidence that the accused were economically capable of hiring private counsel, as indicated by the income of Estrada’s wife.

PAO (and thereby the petitioners) petitioned for certiorari alleging grave abuse of discretion by the respondent in retaining PAO lawyers for non-indigent clients, arguing that such action violates the statutory mandate of PAO.
The respondent, represented by the Office of the Special Prosecutor, defended its actions by asserting that its judgment was not arbitrary but a necessary measure to ensure the accused’s constitutional right to be represented, especially given the crisis created by the withdrawal of private counsels and the accused’s insistence on self-representation.

Whether the retention of two PAO lawyers as counsels de oficio for the accused, who were not indigent persons, constituted grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction by the respondent.
Whether the respondent improperly relied solely on Sec. 7, Rule 116 of the Revised Rules of Criminal Procedure in light of the PAO’s statutory mandate, which limits its representation to indigent persons, as provided under LOI No. 20 and PD No. 1725.
Whether the circumstances at the time of the retention—marked by the withdrawal of private counsels and the accused’s insistence on self-representation—justified the court’s discretionary appointment and subsequent retention of the PAO lawyers.