G.R. No. L-23052 - City of Manila vs. Teotico

Case Summary (G.R. No. L-23052)

Factual Background

On May 23, 2017, President Rodrigo R. Duterte issued Proclamation No. 216, declaring a state of martial law and suspending the privilege of the writ of habeas corpus in the whole of Mindanao for a period not exceeding sixty days. The President cited armed attacks and atrocities by the Abu Sayyaf and Maute groups as the factual basis. Within forty-eight hours he furnished a written Report to the Senate and the House. The Senate conducted a closed briefing on May 29, 2017 with defense and security officials. The Senate considered two resolutions on May 30, 2017: a resolution expressing support for the proclamation, which it adopted by seventeen to five votes and which became Senate Resolution No. 49, and a resolution calling for a joint session, which failed by nine to twelve votes. The House constituted itself as a Committee of the Whole and held a closed briefing on May 31, 2017, and thereafter adopted House Resolution No. 1050 expressing full support for the proclamation and rejected a proposal to call a joint session.

Procedural History

Petitioners in G.R. No. 231671 filed a Petition for Mandamus on June 6, 2017, seeking an order directing Congress to convene in joint session to deliberate on and vote upon Proclamation No. 216. Petitioners in G.R. No. 231694 filed a Petition for Certiorari and Mandamus on June 7, 2017, which, among other prayers, sought a declaration that the Congress' refusal to convene joint session was grave abuse of discretion and a writ directing convening in joint session. Respondent Congress, through the Office of the Solicitor General and the Senate Legal Counsel, filed consolidated comments. Petitioners in G.R. No. 231671 filed a Manifestation on July 14, 2017 noting the imminent lapse of the sixty-day period. On July 22, 2017, Congress convened in joint session and voted to extend the proclamation until December 31, 2017 by 261 to 18 votes. The Court rendered its en banc Decision on July 25, 2017, dismissing the petitions.

Statement of Issues

The Court framed the issues as whether: (1) the Court had jurisdiction over the consolidated petitions; (2) the petitions satisfied the requisites for judicial review; (3) Congress had a mandatory duty under Article VII, Section 18, 1987 Constitution to convene in joint session upon the President's proclamation of martial law or suspension of the writ; and (4) a writ of mandamus or certiorari could be issued in the circumstances presented.

The Padilla Petition's Contentions

The petitioners in G.R. No. 231671 argued that there existed an actual case or controversy, that they had legal standing as citizens, taxpayers, and, in Senator De Lima's case, as a Member of Congress, and that the matter was ripe for judicial resolution. They contended that the plain text of Article VII, Section 18 and the intent of the 1986 Constitutional Commission required Congress to convene in joint session and vote as a single deliberative body to review any presidential proclamation of martial law or suspension of the writ. They relied on the Court's statements in Fortun v. Macapagal-Arroyo to characterize Congress' duty to convene as "automatic" and urged that the Congress' duty was ministerial such that mandamus should issue to compel performance.

The Tanada Petition's Contentions

The petitioners in G.R. No. 231694 similarly asserted that a joint session is mandatory when the President declares martial law or suspends the privilege of the writ, and that failure to convene jointly deprived lawmakers of an adequate deliberative forum and the public of transparent proceedings. They urged that standing should be liberally construed because the petition raised a matter of first impression and of transcendent public importance. They argued that the writs of mandamus and certiorari were appropriate remedies to remedy what they characterized as grave abuse of discretion by Congress in refusing to convene jointly.

Respondents' Contentions

Respondents maintained that the Constitution did not impose a duty to convene in joint session except when Congress was to revoke or extend the proclamation, since Article VII, Section 18 required the Congress to vote jointly only for purposes of revocation or extension. They argued that petitioners lacked standing, that the petitions presented a nonjusticiable political question, and that matters touching national security could justify executive-limitations on public deliberation and information. Respondents emphasized that both Houses acted in accordance with their rules, that the Senate and the House had each undertaken briefings and separate resolutions, and that there was no grave abuse of discretion to warrant relief by mandamus or certiorari.

Court’s Determination of Jurisdiction and Political-Question Doctrine

The Court held that it had jurisdiction to resolve the constitutional question because the dispute required interpretation of Article VII, Section 18 and thus fell within the judiciary's duty to declare what the law is. The Court explained that the political-question doctrine has limited application and does not preclude judicial review where the controversy presents actual, legally enforceable rights or grave abuse of discretion by a government branch. The Court relied on precedent recognizing the expansion of certiorari jurisdiction to redress grave abuse of discretion.

Standing and Justiciability

The Court found that petitioners had legal standing. It reiterated that a citizen who asserts a public right may represent the public at large and thus has locus standi to challenge an allegedly unconstitutional act. The Court also recognized that legislators such as Senator De Lima have standing to defend their constitutional prerogatives. The Court further concluded that an actual case or controversy existed because petitioners alleged conflicting legal claims regarding whether Congress had a mandatory duty to convene in joint session. The petitions made a prima facie case for mandamus and certiorari by alleging omission of a constitutional duty.

Mootness and Exceptional Considerations

Although the sixty-day period had lapsed and Congress subsequently convened and extended the proclamation, the Court invoked doctrines that permit decision of otherwise moot cases where grave constitutional issues of transcendent importance are presented, where the matter is capable of repetition yet evading review, and where guidance is required. The Court therefore proceeded to decide the merits to articulate controlling principles.

Interpretation of Article VII, Section 18 — The Court’s Ruling on the Duty to Convene Jointly

The Court held that Congress is not constitutionally mandated to convene in joint session automatically upon the President's proclamation of martial law or suspension of the writ, except when it must vote jointly to revoke or extend the proclamation. The Court read Article VII, Section 18 literally and applied the verbatim rule. It identified the operative clause as: "The Congress, voting jointly, by a vote of at least a majority of all its Members in regular or special session, may revoke such proclamation or suspension..." The Court construed the word "may" as permissive, conferring discretion on Congress whether to revoke, but prescribing a joint vote by a majority should Congress elect to revoke. The Court emphasized that the provision nowhere explicitly commands an immediate joint session whenever the President acts.

Constitutional Commission Deliberations and Legislative Practice

The Court examined the deliberations of the 1986 Constitutional Commission and found that the framers deliberately removed any requirement of prior congressional concurrence for the initial effectivity of a proclamation, and that they deliberately prescribed "voting jointly" as the manner to avoid deadlocks when revocation was sought. The Commission debates showed proponents favored joint voting to prevent stalemate and to permit senators to contribute, while other Commissioners warned of absorbing the Senate into the House. The Commission settled on joint voting by the Congress but did not insert explicit language requiring an automatic joint session upon proclamation. The Court concluded that the ConCom's discussions did not manifestly establish a constitutional duty to convene jointly except in the event Congress sought to exercise its revocation or extension power.

Legislative Rules, Practice, and the Actions of the Two Houses

The Court observed that by practice both Houses must adopt a concurrent resolution to convene in joint session and thereafter adopt ad hoc rules for that session. The Senate and the House acted promptly and in accordance with their separate rules: they accepted the Presi

Case Syllabus (G.R. No. L-23052)

Parties and Posture

Alexander A. Padilla, Rene A.V. Saguisag, Christian S. Monsod, Loretta Ann P. Rosales, Rene B. Gorospe, and Senator Leila M. De Lima filed a petition for mandamus docketed as G.R. No. 231671.
Former Senator Wigberto E. Tanada, Bishop Deogracias Iniguez, Bishop Broderick Pabillo, Bishop Antonio Tobias, Mo. Adelaida Ygrubay, Shamah Bulangis, and Cassandra D. Deluria filed a petition for certiorari and mandamus docketed as G.R. No. 231694.
Congress of the Philippines, represented by the Senate and the House of Representatives, opposed the petitions through the Office of the Solicitor General and separate Senate counsel.
The consolidated petitions assailed Congress’s failure or refusal to convene in joint session to deliberate and vote on Proclamation No. 216 issued by the President declaring martial law and suspending the privilege of the writ of habeas corpus in Mindanao.
The petitions principally sought mandamus or certiorari to compel Congress to convene in joint session and to vote jointly on the proclamation.

Key Facts

On May 23, 2017 President Rodrigo R. Duterte issued Proclamation No. 216 declaring martial law and suspending the privilege of the writ of habeas corpus in Mindanao for a period not exceeding sixty days.
The President transmitted his report on the proclamation to Congress within forty-eight hours and executive and security officials briefed each House between May 29 and May 31, 2017.
The Senate adopted P.S. Resolution No. 388, later promulgated as Senate Resolution No. 49, expressing the sense of the Senate not to revoke the proclamation.
P.S. Resolution No. 390, which sought to call for a joint session, failed in the Senate by nine votes in favor and twelve against.
The House constituted itself as a Committee of the Whole, received briefings, and adopted House Resolution No. 1050 expressing full support for the proclamation and rejecting a proposed joint session.
On July 22, 2017 Congress later convened in joint session and voted two hundred sixty-one to eighteen to extend the proclamation and suspension until December 31, 2017.

Issues Presented

Whether the Court had jurisdiction to entertain the consolidated petitions challenging Congressional inaction.
Whether petitioners satisfied the requisites for judicial review, including standing and the existence of an actual case or controversy.
Whether under Article VII, Section 18, 1987 Constitution Congress has a mandatory duty to convene in joint session immediately to deliberate and vote as a single body upon the President’s proclamation of martial law or suspension of the writ.
Whether a writ of mandamus or certiorari was appropriate to compel Congress to convene in joint session.

Relevant Constitutional Provision

Article VII, Section 18, 1987 Constitution requires the President to submit a report within forty-eight hours of a proclamation and provides that "The Congress, voting jointly, by a vote of at least a majority of all its Members in regular or special session, may revoke such proclamation or suspension" and that "The Congress, if not in session, shall, within twenty-four hours following such proclamation or suspension, convene in accordance with its rules without need of a call."

Petitioners' Contentions

Petitioners argued that Congress has a mandatory, ministerial duty to convene in joint session to deliberate and vote jointly under Article VII, Section 18 and that mandamus lies to compel performance of that duty.
Petitioners asserted judicial review was proper because an actual controversy existed, they possessed standing as citizens, taxpayers, and in Senator De Lima’s case as a legislator, and the issue was ripe and of transcendental public importance.
Petitioners relied on the plain text of the Constitution, framers’ intent, Fortun v. Macapagal-Arroyo, and legislative practice to support the view that joint convening and deliberation are required immediately after a proclamation.

Respondents' Contentions

Respondents contended that the Constitution does not mandate automatic joint convening except when Congress is to vote joi