G.R. No. L-25895 - Pacete vs. Secretary of the Commission on Appointments

Case Summary (G.R. No. L-25895)

Key Dates

Appointment by the President: August 31, 1964; assumed office September 11, 1964.
Submission to Commission on Appointments: 1965 session.
Commission confirmation: May 20, 1965 (unanimous).
Communication claiming motion for reconsideration filed by a member of the Commission: May 21, 1965.
Directive advising petitioner to vacate: February 7, 1966.
Filing of petition for mandamus and prohibition: April 4, 1966.
Decision under review: July 23, 1971.

Applicable Law

Constitution in force at the time: 1935 Philippine Constitution, Article VII, Section 10 (appointment powers and ad interim appointment rule).
Internal rule at issue: Rule 21 of the Revised Rules of the Commission on Appointments regarding motions for reconsideration (time limit for filing, requirement of concurrence by majority to grant reconsideration, and the effect of laying a motion on the table).

Factual Background

Petitioner received an ad interim appointment during Congress recess, promptly qualified, and performed official duties. The Commission on Appointments unanimously confirmed the appointment on May 20, 1965. On May 21, 1965, a member of the Commission (Senator Rodolfo Ganzon) sent a letter asserting he filed a motion for reconsideration based on derogatory information. That communication was relied upon by the Secretary of the Commission on Appointments and relayed to the Secretary of Justice, which led to a February 7, 1966 directive advising petitioner to vacate and resulted in withholding of salaries by the Department of Justice disbursing officer.

Petitioner's Position and Relief Sought

Petitioner contended that the confirmation became final and executory upon the adjournment of Congress and that a mere filing of a motion for reconsideration by a single member, without approval by the Commission, has no legal effect to set aside a confirmation. He sought a writ of mandamus compelling issuance of a certificate of confirmation and a writ of prohibition preventing enforcement of the vacate directive and restoration of his rights and salary.

Respondents' Assertions and Defenses

The Secretary of the Commission on Appointments argued that the filing of the motion for reconsideration effectively recalled the confirmation and that the matter involved internal rules of the Commission not subject to judicial inquiry. The Secretary of Justice and the Disbursing Officer maintained they acted in reliance on the Commission's communication—an agency entrusted by the Constitution with the power to confirm—and thus had no alternative but to treat the confirmation as not duly made.

Controlling Precedent: Altarejos v. Molo

The Court relied on its previous decision in Altarejos v. Molo, which interpreted Rule 21 and held that the mere filing of a motion for reconsideration does not recall or set aside a confirmation unless the motion is approved by a majority of the members present. Altarejos clarified that Rule 21 requires concurrence of a majority to reopen an appointment and that unacted-upon motions for reconsideration after adjournment are considered not approved and therefore ineffective.

Legal Issue Presented

Whether the mere filing of a motion for reconsideration by a member of the Commission on Appointments, unacted upon by the Commission as a whole, suffices to nullify a duly made confirmation of an ad interim appointment.

Court’s Interpretation of Rule 21 and Its Application

The Court applied the language of Rule 21: a motion for reconsideration must be presented within one day after approval and requires concurrence of a majority of members present to grant reconsideration, which would reopen and require resubmission of the appointment. The Court rejected the view that filing alone operates as a recall. Reliance on the Commission’s Chairman’s statement in Altarejos—that motions unacted upon after adjournment are not approved and thus have no effect—supported the interpretation that only an approved motion can vacate a confirmation.

Constitutional Analysis Regarding Ad Interim Appointments

Under the 1935 Constitution, an ad interim appointment is effective immediately and remains so "until disapproval by the Commission on Appointments or until the adjournment of the next session of the Congress." The Court emphasized that a duly made unanimous confirmation constitutes constitutional protection for the appointee, and that construing a single member’s filing as sufficient to nullify that confirmation would frustrate the constitutional scheme by effectively giving one member veto power over the collective will of the Commission.

On the Political Question Doctrine and Judicial Review

The Court rejected respondents’ contention that the matter was beyond judicial review as an internal commission rule issue. It held that judicial inquiry is appropriate when private rights are affected and when a construction of rules would defeat an individual's constitutional rights to a public o

Case Syllabus (G.R. No. L-25895)

Facts

Petitioner Felizardo S. Pacete was appointed by the then President of the Philippines on August 31, 1964 as Municipal Judge of Pigcawayan, Cotabato.
Petitioner assumed office on September 11, 1964 and discharged the duties of municipal judge.
Because the appointment was made during the recess of Congress, it was submitted to the Commission on Appointments at its next session in 1965.
On May 20, 1965, the Commission on Appointments unanimously confirmed petitioner’s appointment.
Two days after confirmation, petitioner was sent a congratulatory telegram by the then Senate President Ferdinand E. Marcos, who was also Chairman of the Commission on Appointments.
On February 7, 1966, more than nine months after confirmation, the then Secretary of Justice, through the Judicial Superintendent, advised petitioner to vacate his position on the ground that his appointment had been by-passed.
Petitioner sought clarification from the Secretary of the Commission on Appointments and was informed that on May 21, 1965, Senator Rodolfo Ganzon wrote to the Chairman of the Commission stating that he was filing a motion for the reconsideration of petitioner’s confirmation in view of derogatory information received.
The Secretary of the Commission on Appointments notified the Secretary of Justice, following what he considered prevailing practice, that the mere presentation of such letter “automatically vacated the confirmation of the appointment in question.”
Acting on that notification, the Secretary of Justice, through the Judicial Superintendent, advised petitioner to vacate his position; the Disbursing Officer of the Department of Justice withheld petitioner’s salaries.
Petitioner filed an original action for mandamus and prohibition with the Supreme Court on April 4, 1966 seeking (a) prohibition against enforcement of the directive to vacate and (b) mandamus compelling the Secretary of the Commission on Appointments to issue a certificate of confirmation.

Procedural History

April 4, 1966: Petitioner’s suit for mandamus and prohibition filed with the Supreme Court.
April 13, 1966: This Court required respondents to answer the petition.
May 18, 1966: Answer filed by respondent Secretary of the Commission on Appointments, praying dismissal on grounds that the confirmation had been recalled upon the filing of a motion for reconsideration; special defense that the matter involved internal rules of the Commission not subject to judicial inquiry.
May 21, 1966: Answer filed for respondent Secretary of Justice and Disbursing Officer by the Solicitor General (now Associate Justice Antonio P. Barredo), admitting facts but seeking dismissal on the ground that the Secretary of Justice relied on notification from the Commission on Appointments.
July 20, 1966: Hearing held; parties were given ten additional days to submit memoranda.
August 1, 1966: Petitioner’s memorandum submitted.
July 23, 1971: Decision of this Court rendered in favor of petitioner (opinion by Justice Fernando).

Issues Presented

Whether the filing of a motion for reconsideration with the Commission on Appointments, without its being thereafter acted on and approved by the Commission, suffices to set at naught a confirmation duly made of an ad interim appointment.
Whether the Court may review and adjudicate claims arising from the interpretation of the Commission on Appointments’ rules where such interpretation affects the constitutional right of an individual to hold public office.

Petitioner’s Contentions

The confirmation of petitioner’s ad interim appointment became final and executory upon the adjournment of the fourth regular session of the Fifth Congress at midnight of May 21, 1965.
The Commission on Appointments’ power to approve or disapprove appointments is conferred by the Constitution on the Commission as a body and not on its individual members; approval is exercised through the vote of a majority of the members present at a quorum as provided by Section 10 of the Commission’s Rules.
Once an appointment is approved by that majority, the approval becomes an act of the Commission and cannot be changed, voided, vacated or set aside except by the same Commission acting through the required majority.
A mere motion to reconsider, unless approved by the required majority, has no force or effect; to contend otherwise would make the will of a single member prevail over the will of the Commission.

Respondents’ Contentions

Respondent Secretary of the Commission on Appointments maintained that there was a recall of the confirmation of petitioner’s appointment upon the filing of the motion for reconsideration by Senator Ganzon.
The Secretary of the Commission argued that the q