G.R. No. L-25895 - Pacete vs. Secretary of the Commission on Appointments

Petitioner Felizardo S. Pacete was appointed as Municipal Judge of Pigcawayan, Cotabato by the then President on August 31, 1964, during the recess of Congress.
He assumed office on September 11, 1964 and immediately discharged his judicial duties under the ad interim appointment scheme.

Owing to the recess appointment, petitioner’s nomination was submitted to the Commission on Appointments in its first session of 1965.
On May 20, 1965, the Commission on Appointments unanimously confirmed petitioner’s appointment, which was further reinforced by a congratulatory telegram from the Senate President, Ferdinand E. Marcos—who also served as the Commission’s Chairman.

On February 7, 1966—more than nine months after confirmation—the then Secretary of Justice directed petitioner, via the Judicial Superintendent, to vacate his position.
The justification provided was that petitioner’s appointment had allegedly been “by-passed” due to subsequent developments.

Petitioner discovered that on May 21, 1965, a letter had been sent by Senator Rodolfo Ganzon to the Commission on Appointments’ Chairman indicating that he was filing a motion for reconsideration of petitioner’s confirmation based on derogatory information received.
Acting on this communication and what was purported to be prevailing practice, the Secretary of the Commission on Appointments notified the Secretary of Justice that petitioner’s confirmation was automatically vacated.
Consequently, the Disbursing Officer of the Department of Justice withheld petitioner’s salaries, reinforcing the contention that the appointment was not duly confirmed.

Petitioner contended that his appointment had become final and irrevocable upon the adjournment of the fourth regular session of the Fifth Congress on May 21, 1965, in accordance with constitutional provisions regarding ad interim appointments.
He argued that the power to review or reconsider an appointment resides with the Commission on Appointments as a body, requiring a majority vote to effect any reconsideration—not merely the filing of a motion by an individual member.
Relying on the precedent set in Altarejos v. Molo, petitioner maintained that a motion for reconsideration, without the necessary approval, is devoid of any force to nullify the confirmation.
Petitioner sought a writ of mandamus compelling the issuance of a certificate of confirmation and a writ of prohibition against the enforcement of the vacatur directive.

The respondent Secretary of the Commission on Appointments argued for the dismissal of the suit, claiming that the filing of the motion for reconsideration had the effect of recalling the confirmation.
Respondents further maintained that the matter fell within the internal rules of the Commission, thus asserting that it was not subject to judicial inquiry.
The respondent Secretary of Justice, through his representative, acknowledged the facts but contended that he had acted in full faith on the notification from the Commission, which deemed petitioner’s appointment unconfirmed.

Whether the filing of a motion for reconsideration with the Commission on Appointments, in the absence of a majority approval on such motion, suffices to set aside a confirmation that had been duly made.
Whether the confirmation of an ad interim appointment becomes final and irrevocable upon adjournment of the Congress session, in line with constitutional mandates.
Whether the judicial intervention in reviewing the internal rules and procedures of the Commission on Appointments, particularly concerning motions for reconsideration, is warranted when an individual’s constitutional right to hold a public office is at stake.