Title
Ong vs. People
Case
G.R. No. 140904
Decision Date
Oct 9, 2000
A buyer discovered a purchased machine was mortgaged, leading to a criminal estafa case. Courts debated evidence admissibility, culminating in the Supreme Court dismissing the case due to insufficient evidence, invoking double jeopardy.
estafa
double jeopardy
demurrer to evidence

Case Summary (G.R. No. 222180)

Factual Background of the Transaction and Criminal Charge

On February 8, 1993, Zeny Alfonso purchased a paper bag-making machine for P362,000.00 from Solid Cement Corporation. When she went to the corporation’s Antipolo plant, no machine was delivered because the machine sold had allegedly been earlier mortgaged to another creditor, and that creditor refused to release the mortgage.

Alfonso allegedly refused petitioners’ offer to return the money. She then filed a criminal complaint with the City Prosecutor of Makati. The City Prosecutor dismissed the complaint on the theory that any liability was civil rather than criminal. The dismissal was reversed by the Department of Justice. Thereafter, on October 18, 1994, an Information for estafa and other deceit based on Article 318 of the Revised Penal Code was filed with the MeTC of Makati City.

Proceedings in the MeTC: Demurrer to Evidence and Denial

After pre-trial, the prosecution presented Zeny Alfonso as its sole witness. The prosecution then offered its documentary evidence and rested its case. Petitioners objected to the admission of the documents. The disputed materials were presented as photocopies of several items, including purported sale approvals, receipts, gate passes, and letters involving delivery, compromise, refund offers, internal recommendations, and other related corporate documents, as well as a copy of a resolution dated July 26, 1993 from the Provincial Prosecutor’s Office of Rizal.

Petitioners argued that the documents were unauthenticated photocopies of the originals and that the signatures were unidentified or unverified. They moved for leave to file a demurrer to evidence and attached their demurrer on July 12, 1996, stressing the inadmissibility of the documentary evidence.

Without ruling on the motion for leave to file demurrer, the MeTC, by an order dated August 19, 1996, denied the demurrer and simultaneously granted a motion for the issuance of departure orders against petitioners. In its discussion of the private complainant’s testimony, the MeTC described Alfonso’s account of paying the purchase price in full, receiving a plant gate pass for pull-out and shipment to Cebu, and later being informed that the machine’s release had been stopped at the order of Mr. Ong, followed by subsequent demands and failed compromise.

The MeTC further stated that it found a prima facie case based on the documentary record, reasoning that the machine was mortgaged to another creditor who refused to release the mortgage. On this basis, the MeTC denied the demurrer and proceeded toward trial.

RTC Review on Certiorari and Order of Dismissal

Petitioners sought relief through a petition for certiorari and prohibition before the RTC of Makati. By an order dated May 19, 1997, the RTC reversed the MeTC’s denial of the demurrer to evidence. The RTC set aside the MeTC orders, declared them null and void, and ordered the dismissal of the criminal case.

The decision by the RTC was lifted to the Court of Appeals by the People.

Court of Appeals: Reinstatement of Trial and Permanent Injunction

On April 8, 1999, the 13th Division of the Court of Appeals issued a reversal decision. It set aside the RTC’s May 19, 1997 decision and its related order, and made the writ of preliminary injunction issued on June 5, 1998 permanent. The Court of Appeals also gave the private respondents the option to either present evidence in the reinstated criminal case or to submit the case for decision based solely on the prosecutor’s evidence.

The Court of Appeals reasoned that, after the denial of the demurrer to evidence by the MeTC, petitioners should have pursued appeal rather than certiorari, citing jurisprudential rules that certiorari does not lie to review interlocutory orders denying a motion to dismiss (including those equivalent to a demurrer to evidence), absent grave abuse of discretion or excess of jurisdiction. It also rejected petitioners’ invocation of double jeopardy, holding that the RTC dismissal did not amount to a valid acquittal because it was viewed as a “fruit” of grave abuse, and because the trial judge in certiorari proceedings allegedly should not have decided whether the prosecution evidence met the proof standard beyond reasonable doubt.

Petitioners’ Assignments of Error Before the Supreme Court

Petitioners submitted that the Court of Appeals committed grave abuse of discretion in three principal respects. First, it allegedly erred in holding that appeal, not certiorari, was the proper remedy. Second, it allegedly erred in the assessment that the RTC should not have evaluated the sufficiency and admissibility of the prosecution evidence. Third, it allegedly failed to treat the RTC resolution dismissing the case as an acquittal, and to apply double jeopardy.

Supreme Court’s Ruling: Grave Abuse and Inadmissibility of Evidence

The Supreme Court granted the petition. It ruled that the MeTC’s denial of the demurrer to evidence was attended by grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction, and that certiorari was therefore proper under recognized exceptions to the general rule against attacking interlocutory orders denying demurrers.

The Court explained the nature of a demurrer to evidence. It stated that the court, in passing upon a demurrer, was required only to determine whether there was competent or sufficient evidence to sustain the indictment or a verdict of guilt. In the case at bar, the Court held that such evidence was lacking.

The Supreme Court focused on the documentary evidence offered by the prosecution. It held that the documents were uncertified photocopies of purported private instruments whose signatures were unidentified or unauthenticated, and that the prosecution had failed to prove their due execution and authenticity during the testimony of the sole witness. Invoking Section 20, Rule 132 of the Revised Rules of Court, the Court emphasized that, before any private document offered as authentic is received, its due execution and authenticity must be proved either by a witness who saw the document executed or by evidence of the genuineness of the signature or handwriting. Where no proof is offered as to the authenticity of the executor’s signature, the private document must be excluded.

The Court further reasoned that the documents were private instruments executed by private persons, and therefore required proof of due execution and authenticity. It added that the documents were mere photocopies and thus constituted secondary evidence, which would not be admissible unless the prosecution proved the loss of the originals as required by Section 3, Rule 130 of the Revised Rules of Court. The prosecution had neither proved the loss of the originals nor shown that the originals were public records in the custody of a public office or otherwise under the control of petitioners.

Because the documentary evidence was deemed incompetent and inadmissible, the Court concluded that the prosecution’s proof of estafa and other deceit failed at both the existence-of-the-crime element and the precise participation element. The Court noted that, aside from the complainant’s testimony, the only evidence tying petitioners to the alleged offense was a photocopy of the “approval of the sale” containing petitioners’ names, but that document was also inadmissible. The Court underscored that, as far as Alfonso testified, her personal contact was only with Mr. Ong, and after the alleged approval and sale, Ong could not have misrepresented anything to induce the complainant to part with money. With respect to the other petitioners, the Court stated that the absence of personal dealings rendered the speculation of their involvement unsupported.

The Supreme Court held that, with the documentary evidence excluded, there was no competent and sufficient evidence to support a conviction, and therefore it was grave abuse of discretion for the MeTC to conclude that a prima facie case existed and to require petitioners to go through trial.

Certiorari Review and the Double Jeopardy Issue

The Court also addressed the Court of Appeals’ view that the RTC’s dismissal could not be treated as an acquittal. The Supreme Court clarified the function of certiorari. It acknowledged the general limitation that certiorari corrects jurisdictional errors and keeps an inferior court within its jurisdiction, not mere procedural errors or erroneous findings. It nonetheless recognized that certiorari may properly lie where the factual findings complained of are not supported by evidence on record.

The Court held that, since the prosecution’s documentary evidence was inadmissible, the MeTC’s finding of a prima facie case was glaringly unsupported by the record. The RTC, therefore, properly reviewed those findings in determining whether grave abuse of discretion attended the denial of the demurrer.

Having granted the demurrer to evidence, the Court held that the RTC’s action constituted a

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