Facts:

In the case of Rene S. Ong, Magdaleno B. Albarracin, Jr., Petronio C. Aaliwin, and J.O. Nerit vs. People of the Philippines and Court of Appeals (G.R. No. 140904) decided on October 9, 2000, the incident began on February 8, 1993, when Zeny Alfonso purchased a paper bag-making machine for P362,000.00 from Solid Cement Corporation. However, upon visiting the company's Antipolo plant to retrieve the machine, she was informed that it was already mortgaged to another creditor, who refused to release it. In light of this situation, the petitioners offered to return Alfonso's payment, but she declined and instead filed a criminal complaint for estafa against them with the City Prosecutor of Makati. This complaint was initially dismissed by the prosecutor on the grounds that any liability would be civil. The Department of Justice later reversed this dismissal. Consequently, on October 18, 1994, an Information for estafa was filed against the petitioners. During the trial, the p

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Facts:

Transaction and Dispute

• On February 8, 1993, Zeny Alfonso purchased a paper bag-making machine for ₱362,000.00 from Solid Cement Corporation.
• Upon her visit to the corporation’s Antipolo plant, it was discovered that the machine sold had already been mortgaged to a creditor who refused to release the mortgage.
• Petitioners (Rene S. Ong, Magdaleno B. Albarracin, Jr., Petronio C. Aaliwin, and J.O. Nerit) offered to return the amount paid, but the complainant, Mrs. Alfonso, declined the refund.
• Instead, Mrs. Alfonso filed a criminal complaint with the City Prosecutor of Makati.

Criminal Proceedings and Evidentiary Issues

• The City Prosecutor initially dismissed the complaint on the grounds that any liability would be civil, not criminal; however, this decision was reversed by the Department of Justice.
• On October 18, 1994, an Information for estafa and other deceit (under Article 318 of the Revised Penal Code) was filed before the Metropolitan Trial Court (MeTC) of Makati City.
• During the trial, after the pre-trial phase, the prosecution presented its sole witness, the complainant Mrs. Alfonso, and introduced documentary evidence.
• The documentary evidence submitted comprised ten pieces, including photocopies of:
• The alleged approval of the sale signed by petitioners.
• An official receipt evidencing the payment.
• A plant gate pass for machine pull-out.
• A letter from Attorney Maximino Robles demanding delivery of the machine.
• A letter from Rene S. Ong offering a refund.
• Another letter from Attorney Robles regarding refusal to accept the refund.
• A memorandum from five Solid Cement Corporation officials recommending the sale.
• A second gate pass from Ramon Enriquez.
• A letter from Lorenzo P. Ligot thanking Solid Cement.
• A copy of the resolution of the Provincial Prosecutor’s Office dated July 26, 1993.
• Petitioners objected to the admission of these documents on the ground that they were only unauthenticated and uncertified photocopies bearing unidentified signatures.

Motion for Demurrer to Evidence and Subsequent Orders

• On July 12, 1996, petitioners filed a motion for leave to file a demurrer to evidence, arguing that the documents were inadmissible.
• On August 19, 1996, without ruling on the motion, the MeTC judge denied the demurrer to evidence and simultaneously ordered a departure order for the accused.
• The MeTC’s ruling was based primarily on the testimony of Mrs. Alfonso and on the purported existence of a prima facie case, despite evidentiary deficiencies noted by petitioners.

Reversal and Further Appellate Proceedings

• Responding to petitioners’ appeal, Judge Teofilo Guadiz, Jr. of the Regional Trial Court (RTC) on May 19, 1997, reversed the MeTC’s denial, setting aside the Order denying the demurrer to evidence and dismissing Criminal Case No. 157290.
• The People elevated the matter to the Court of Appeals.
• On April 8, 1999, the Court of Appeals reversed the RTC’s reversal. It set aside the RTC orders and made permanent the writ of preliminary injunction, offering private respondents the option to either present evidence in the reinstated criminal case or have the case decided solely on the prosecutor’s evidence.
• Petitioners argued that the Court of Appeals committed grave abuse of discretion by:
• Holding that appeal, not certiorari, was the proper remedy.
• Erroneously evaluating the sufficiency and admissibility of the prosecution’s evidence.
• Failing to recognize that the RTC’s May 19, 1997 resolution constituted an acquittal, thereby invoking the right against double jeopardy.

Evidentiary Analysis and Conclusion of Facts

• The prosecution’s evidence was almost entirely dependent on uncertified photocopies and the uncorroborated testimony of a single witness.
• Key documents were found to be inadmissible because:
• They were private writings without due authentication as required by Section 20, Rule 132 and Section 3, Rule 130 of the Revised Rules of Court.
• The original documents were not produced or proven to have been lost under circumstances justifying secondary evidence.
• Consequently, the evidence against petitioners was deemed grossly insufficient to sustain the charge of estafa and other deceit.
• The trial court’s determination of a prima facie case and the subsequent orders ordering trial were found to be against the evidence and thus marked by grave abuse of discretion.

Issue:

Appropriateness of the Remedy

• Whether the petitioners should have availed themselves of appeal instead of filing a petition for certiorari after the denial of their demurrer to evidence.
• Whether certiorari is applicable when an interlocutory order denying a motion to dismiss (or demurrer to evidence) is tainted with grave abuse of discretion.

Admissibility and Sufficiency of Evidence

• Whether the prosecution’s documentary evidence, being uncertified photocopies with unauthenticated signatures, meets the requirements for admissibility under the Rules of Court.
• Whether, in the absence of authenticating evidence for the private documents, the prosecution’s evidence (comprised of these documents and the single testimony) is legally sufficient to establish guilt beyond reasonable doubt.

Double Jeopardy and Acquittal Considerations

• Whether the RTC’s reversal of the MeTC’s order (i.e., ordering dismissal) could be considered an acquittal so as to invoke the constitutional protection against double jeopardy.
• Whether subsequent prosecution on the same charge, after a demurrer to evidence has been effectively granted, would amount to double jeopardy.

Scope of Judicial Discretion in Certiorari Proceedings

• To what extent the court’s superintending power via certiorari may be utilized to correct interlocutory orders that involve factual findings not supported by evidence.
• Whether the denial of the demurrer to evidence, despite being interlocutory, constitutes a grave abuse of discretion warranting the issuance of a writ of certiorari.

Ruling:

• (Subscriber-Only)

Ratio:

• (Subscriber-Only)

Doctrine:

• (Subscriber-Only)