Title
Moday vs. Court of Appeals
Case
G.R. No. 107916
Decision Date
Feb 20, 1997
Municipality of Bunawan expropriated private land for public use despite Sangguniang Panlalawigan disapproval; Supreme Court upheld expropriation’s validity, citing public purpose and authority under local government code.

Case Summary (G.R. No. L-6407)

Procedural History

The Sangguniang Bayan of Bunawan adopted Resolution No. 43-89 authorizing commencement of expropriation; the municipal mayor approved and transmitted it to the Sangguniang Panlalawigan, which disapproved the resolution. The municipality filed a Petition for Eminent Domain in the Regional Trial Court. The RTC granted the municipality’s motion to take possession after deposit of the provisional valuation (P632.39), and set hearing for just compensation. Petitioners’ motion for reconsideration in the RTC was denied. Petitioners sought certiorari relief in the Court of Appeals, which dismissed the petition and denied reconsideration. Petitioners then filed a petition for review with the Supreme Court; a temporary restraining order was issued by the Supreme Court in December 1993, and subsequent contempt proceedings and administrative developments (including payment of fines and change of municipal administration) followed.

Lower Courts’ Reasoning

The RTC ruled that the Sangguniang Panlalawigan’s disapproval did not render the municipal resolution void because the provincial body had not declared the resolution invalid on the statutory ground of lack of authority; the RTC also considered that the SP’s role was limited to review under the then-applicable provisions and that eminent domain was not among the acts listed as requiring SP approval under Section 19 of B.P. Blg. 337. The Court of Appeals affirmed, finding the public purpose of the expropriation clear from the municipal resolution and noting that the Sangguniang Panlalawigan did not expressly declare the resolution invalid; the CA further observed that the SP’s reason for disapproval failed to identify alternative municipal lots allegedly available for the same purpose.

Issues Presented to the Supreme Court

(1) Whether a municipality may lawfully exercise eminent domain based on a municipal sanggunian resolution that the provincial sanggunian disapproved; (2) whether the Sangguniang Panlalawigan’s disapproval, based on asserted lack of necessity, rendered the municipal resolution null and void; (3) whether the expropriation was tainted by political motive or was unnecessary given alleged available municipal lands; and (4) whether the former mayor could be held personally liable in damages for enforcing a void resolution.

Applicable Law and Constitutional Foundation

The Court applied the 1987 Constitution (Article III, Section 9: private property shall not be taken for public use without just compensation) as the operative constitutional standard. The statutory framework invoked was Batas Pambansa Blg. 337 (Local Government Code then in force): Section 9 (permitting local government units to exercise eminent domain through their head pursuant to a sanggunian resolution) and Section 153 (Sangguniang Panlalawigan review procedure and the limited ground for declaring municipal ordinances/resolutions invalid). The Court also considered Section 19 (enumerating acts of the Sangguniang Bayan requiring Sangguniang Panlalawigan approval) to note that eminent domain was not among those specified.

Court’s Analysis on the Scope of Sangguniang Panlalawigan Review

The Court emphasized that Section 153 grants the Sangguniang Panlalawigan a narrowly circumscribed power: it may declare a municipal ordinance, resolution, or executive order invalid only if it is beyond the powers conferred upon the sanggunian or mayor. Reliance was placed on prior jurisprudence (Velazco v. Blas and earlier authorities) holding that provincial disapproval must be premised on a strictly legal question of authority; disapproval on other grounds (such as policy, convenience, or asserted lack of necessity) exceeds the provincial board’s statutory function and impermissibly usurps municipal legislative authority. Applying that principle, the Court found that because B.P. Blg. 337 expressly authorized municipalities to exercise eminent domain through a sanggunian resolution, the Sangguniang Panlalawigan lacked statutory authority to nullify Resolution No. 43-89 on the ground that expropriation was unnecessary.

Public Use, Necessity, and Evidence on Alternatives

The Court reiterated the limitations on eminent domain: the taking must be for public use, just compensation must be provided, and due process must be observed; moreover, necessity and public character of the taking

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