Title
MIAA vs. Powergen, Inc.
Case
G.R. No. 164299
Decision Date
Feb 12, 2008
MIAA contracted Powergen for a power plant under a BOO scheme. Dispute arose over energy rates; Powergen sought injunction for minimum consumption payments. SC ruled injunction improper, preserving status quo pending trial.

Case Summary (G.R. No. 164299)

Applicable Law and Legal Basis

The case was adjudicated under the 1987 Philippine Constitution (applicable because the decision date is after 1990) and the Rules of Court (Rule 45 for petitions for review on certiorari; Rule 65 for petitions to the Court of Appeals). The governing principles invoked concern the nature, purpose and strict limitations on preliminary injunctive relief, especially preliminary mandatory injunctions, as developed in Philippine jurisprudence (cases cited include Ortigas & Company, Capitol Medical Center, Sy v. CA, Yujuico v. Quiambao, and PAL, Inc. v. NLRC).

Factual Background: power problems and procurement choice

In the early 1990s Metro Manila, including the airport area, suffered frequent power interruptions, voltage fluctuations and surges that impaired airport operations. MIAA, previously wholly dependent on MERALCO, decided to procure a baseload power plant on a Build-Operate-Own (BOO) scheme to secure continuous supply. Lacking in-house capability, MIAA conducted public bidding and issued a Notice of Award to Powergen, Inc., followed by execution of a Power Generation Agreement (PGA).

Contractual terms: Article 7.3 and Sixth Schedule

The PGA allocated obligations to MIAA including a guaranteed minimum energy off-take of 4,000,000 kWh per month at a privileged discount rate (Article 7.3). The Sixth Schedule provided that energy fees for the fifteen-year cooperation period (including testing/commissioning) would be computed using the MERALCO billing rate less a 40% discount (i.e., MERALCO prevailing rate x 0.60). Monthly billing would take into account the minimum guaranteed consumption "whichever is higher."

Notice to Proceed and its purported modification of obligations

On December 18, 1995, MIAA issued a Notice to Proceed for construction of an initial 7.25 MW power station and expressly stated that the guaranteed minimum energy consumption of 4,000,000 kWh per month stipulated in Article 7.3 "shall be ignored" and MIAA "shall not be liable" to purchase such guaranteed consumption until the full KW capacity in the BOO contract was attained. Powergen’s president signed an acknowledgment accepting the Notice of Proceed.

Implementation, billing dispute, and initiation of litigation

Powergen constructed and operated the diesel power station and billed MIAA accordingly; payments were made following respondent’s billings. In June 2000 MIAA discovered MERALCO’s rate (P2.03/kWh) was lower than Powergen’s billing (P2.22/kWh) and thereafter paid using the lower rate. Powergen filed suit on January 4, 2001 seeking reformation of the PGA, judicial determination of the correct rate, and a directive compelling MIAA to comply with the guaranteed minimum off-take of 4,000,000 kWh. An amended complaint added a request for injunctive relief to prevent MIAA from deducting alleged overpayments.

Trial court and Court of Appeals actions on injunctive relief

The trial court granted Powergen’s urgent motion and issued a writ of preliminary mandatory injunction (order dated January 21, 2003; writ January 23, 2003). MIAA’s motions to set aside or quash the writ were denied. The Court of Appeals affirmed the trial court’s issuance of the preliminary mandatory injunction. MIAA elevated the matter to the Supreme Court by petition for review under Rule 45.

Issue presented

The dispositive issue before the Supreme Court was whether Powergen was entitled to a preliminary mandatory injunction compelling MIAA to comply with Article 7.3 (i.e., to pay the guaranteed minimum energy consumption and the contracted rate) pending trial on the merits.

Legal principles governing preliminary mandatory injunctions

The Court reiterated that an injunction is a preservative, provisional remedy meant to maintain the status quo until the merits are adjudicated; it is not a substitute for trial. A preliminary mandatory injunction is more intrusive than a prohibitory one and generally improper before final hearing except in narrowly defined circumstances: extreme urgency, a very clear right free from doubt, considerations of relative convenience favoring the complainant, a willful and unlawful invasion of rights producing continuing injury, or to reestablish and maintain a preexisting continuing relation recently and arbitrarily interrupted. Granting such a writ is improper when it effectively disposes of the main case absent trial.

Supreme Court analysis and application to the facts

The Court found that resolving whether the Notice to Proceed amended Article 7.3 would require adjudication of the merits of the main action and therefore was not appropriate by preliminary writ. Issuing the mandatory injunction in effect grant

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