Mercado vs. Lopena

Procedural Posture, Relief Sought, and Governing Rules

Petitioners filed a Petition for Certiorari and Prohibition under Rule 65 of the Rules of Court. They invoked the Court’s power over procedural rules and sought a declaration that the cases filed by private respondents against them were Strategic Lawsuits Against Public Participation (SLAPP), allegedly contrary to the Constitution, public policy, and international law, and allegedly offensive to the equality of women and men and the spirit and intent of R.A. No. 9262. Petitioners also asked for a TRO/Writ of Preliminary Injunction to restrain public respondents from conducting further hearings and to order the immediate dismissal of the subject cases. Petitioners further sought amendment of A.M. No. 04-10-11-SC (Rule on Violence Against Women and Children) to include provisions against SLAPP.

Factual Background: The Domestic Dispute and the Case Proliferation

The Court described the controversy as originating in a domestic dispute between estranged spouses Mercado and Go. The dispute escalated into numerous suits filed by both parties against each other. The Court then summarized the principal filings that mattered to the petition.

Cases Filed by Private Respondents Against Petitioners

In October 2015, Go filed a Petition for Habeas Corpus with Custody of their children, docketed as Civil Case No. R-QZN-15-08943, raffled to and still pending with the RTC of Quezon City, Branch 86, presided by Judge Roberto P. Buenaventura.

Between September 2015 and November 2015, private respondents also filed several cases against petitioners: People v. Sugar Mercado and Yolanda Mercado for violation of R.A. No. 7610; People v. Yolanda Mercado for violation of R.A. No. 7610; Kristofer Go v. Sugar Mercado-Go for libel; Kristofer Go v. Yolanda Mercado for libel; People v. Sugar Mercado for Physical Injuries, Oral Defamation, Slander by Deed, and Unjust Vexation; and People v. Yolanda and Reynaldo Mercado for Unjust Vexation, Unlawful Arrest, Slight Physical Injuries, and Grave Coercion. The Court noted that these cases were pending when the petition was filed, except NPS XV-INV-151-11698, which had been dismissed by the Office of the City Prosecutor (OCP) of Quezon City via a Resolution dated November 23, 2016.

Beginning February 2016, private respondents initiated additional cases: Kristofer Go and Christina Palileo v. Yolanda Mercado for Grave Threats; Kristofer Go v. Sugar Mercado for violation of R.A. No. 10175; and two civil cases for Indirect Contempt: Kristofer Go v. Sugar Mercado (Civil Case No. R-QZN-16-02517-CV) and Kristofer Go v. Sugar Mercado (Civil Case No. R-QZN-16-07881-CV). The Court also stated that NPS-XV-02-INV-16C-00840 was dismissed for lack of probable cause.

Cases Filed by Petitioners Against Private Respondents

On November 5, 2015, petitioner Mercado filed an Urgent Petition for Issuance of Temporary and/or Permanent Protection Order (TPO/PPO) docketed as Civil Case No. R-QZN-15-10201 (the PPO Case). The case was raffled to RTC Branch 86. In that petition, Mercado complained of acts of Go allegedly constituting domestic violence.

Mercado also filed a criminal complaint for violation of R.A. No. 9262 against Go and his parents. That complaint was eventually dismissed for insufficiency of evidence. On February 19, 2016, the Court stated that the RTC in the PPO Case granted the petition and issued a PPO in favor of Mercado.

The Court further noted that Go appealed the PPO Order to the Court of Appeals (CA) and that the appeal was docketed as CA-G.R. No. 106476. In a Decision dated March 3, 2017, the CA denied Go’s appeal. Go then elevated the case to the Court via Rule 45 appeal in G.R. No. 232206 (Kristofer Jay I. Go v. AAA), which the Court denied on October 2, 2017 for failure to show any reversible error.

In addition, petitioners filed other cases against private respondents, including: Sugar Mercado v. Kristofer Jay Go (R-QZN-16-05478-CV) for Indirect Contempt; Sugar Mercado v. Krystle Anne I. Go-Cantillo for violation of R.A. No. 10175; and two criminal complaints involving R.A. No. 9262: Ma. Sugar Mercado v. Kristofer Hay Go, Peter and Esther Go (NPS-XV-03-INV-15K-12139) and Ma. Sugar Mercado v. Kristoffer Jay Go, Peter and Esther Go (NPS-XV-INV-16C-00802 OCP). The Court reported that the two R.A. No. 9262 complaints were dismissed by the OCP for lack of probable cause.

Petitioners’ Theory: The Subject Cases as SLAPP and as Violence Under R.A. No. 9262

Petitioners averred that private respondents’ cases were SLAPP intended to harass, intimidate, and silence them. They argued that the complaints were false and baseless and were meant to drain them emotionally, psychologically, and financially, and to pressure Mercado to give up custody of their minor children.

Petitioners also argued that the filing of the subject cases fell within “abuse” and “violence against women” under R.A. No. 9262. They claimed that public respondents committed grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction in taking cognizance of the subject cases, despite Mercado being a “judicially declared victim of domestic violence” with a PPO in her favor. On that basis, petitioners sought the declaration of SLAPP status, restraint of further proceedings, and dismissal.

Private Respondents’ and Public Respondents’ Responses

Private respondents filed their Comment on September 14, 2017, alleging that the Petition failed to satisfy procedural requisites for judicial review and that petitioners were guilty of forum-shopping. They also argued that filing the subject cases did not violate the PPO because some cases were filed before the PPO was issued on February 19, 2016, and they emphasized that the PPO did not expressly declare that such filings were violative of it. Substantively, private respondents asserted that the cases had factual and legal bases and that enforcing a right or seeking redress through judicial processes did not constitute violence under R.A. No. 9262. They maintained that public respondents committed no grave abuse of discretion.

Public respondents, represented by the Office of the Solicitor General, filed their Comment on November 9, 2017. They stressed procedural infirmities, including: (i) absence of requisites for judicial review; (ii) prematurity due to other plain, speedy, and adequate remedies; and (iii) failure to observe the hierarchy of courts. On the merits, public respondents contended that they committed no grave abuse of discretion because SLAPP rules apply specifically to environmental cases only. They further argued that petitioners’ requested relief lacked legal and procedural basis.

The Court’s Ruling on Procedural Grounds: Prematurity and Failure to State Material Dates

The Court dismissed the Petition.

First, it found the Petition premature. It reiterated that for a petition for certiorari or prohibition to prosper, the Rules require that there be no other plain, speedy, and adequate remedy in the ordinary course of law. The Court held that the cases before public respondents were still pending. Hence, petitioners had the remedy of participating in the cases and awaiting RTC judgment. If an adverse judgment came, they could appeal to the CA. For cases filed before the OCP, the Court stated that review could proceed by petition to the Secretary of Justice and thereafter to the Office of the President. If probable cause findings were sustained, the case would proceed to trial.

The Court also pointed out that petitioners were not without remedies under R.A. No. 9262 if they believed there was a violation of the PPO issued on February 19, 2016. The Court cited Section 21 of R.A. No. 9262, stating that violation of any provision of a TPO or PPO constitutes contempt of court punishable under Rule 71 of the Rules of Court, without prejudice to other criminal or civil actions.

Second, the Court found the Petition dismissible for failure to state material dates. It applied Rule 56 of the Rules of Court in relation to Section 3 of Rule 46, requiring, in Rule 65 petitions for certiorari, the statement of: the date of receipt of notice of the judgment, order, or resolution assailed; the date a motion for new trial or reconsideration was filed; and the date of receipt of notice of denial. The Court emphasized that the failure to include these requirements sufficed for dismissal because it prevented the Court from determining whether the Petition was filed within the proper reglementary period. It further noted that the Petition did not include such material dates, nor did petitioners cite the specific orders or rulings they sought to question. Petitioners also did not offer any satisfactory explanation for these omissions.

Hierarchy of Courts: Unwarranted Direct Invocation of the Court

In addition to prematurity and material-date defects, the Court found that the direct filing of the Petition with it was unjustified. It reaffirmed that the general rule is that a direct invocation of the Court’s original jurisdiction to issue extraordinary writs should be allowed only for special and important reasons.

The Court cited recognized exceptions, including instances where there are genuine issues of constitutionality that must be addressed immediately, issues of transcendental importance, cases of first impression, constitutional issues best decided by the Court, and situations where the time element cannot be ignored. The Court acknowledged that petitioners’ arguments involved, at least, a case of first impression. However, it held that novelty could not cure the Petition’s inherent procedural defects, and that litigants must comply with the Rules of Court. It refused to relax the Rules in the absence of compelling and exceptional reasons.

Rule-Making Power Cannot Be Invoked Through a Rule 65 Petition

The Court further rejected petitioners’ attempt to obtain relief by invoking the Court’s rule-making power. It held that the power to promu