Title
Mendoza vs. National Labor Relations Commission
Case
G.R. No. 131405
Decision Date
Jul 20, 1999
Employee Mendoza accused of misconduct, terminated without substantial evidence; Supreme Court ruled dismissal illegal, awarded back wages and separation pay, citing lack of proof for abandonment or breach of trust.
illegal dismissal
extortion
abandonment

Case Summary (G.R. No. 131405)

Factual Background

Petitioner began working for the private respondent in the latter part of April 1994 and was soon appointed finance manager, a position described as involving custody and disbursement of company funds. Petitioner claimed that on June 9, 1995 she was summoned by Ms. Ma. Angela Celeridad, the company’s vice-president, and was informed that management had decided to terminate her employment. Petitioner averred that she was told to resign or face dismissal and that later that day, the company president, Johnny P. Lee, announced that her employment was already terminated. On June 23, 1995, petitioner filed a complaint for illegal dismissal.

The private respondent, however, narrated a different sequence. It denied having issued any written memorandum or letter of dismissal. It alleged that on May 20, 1995 it received complaints from several marketing and sales agents accusing petitioner of deliberate delays in releasing and paying commissions in violation of company policy, allegedly refusing to release commissions unless the agents gave petitioner a certain amount as her “cut.” The complainants included Amado Roa (acting vice-president for marketing and all division heads of the Sales Department), namely Leonora Punongbayan, Elma Mendoza, Nestor Pamintuan, and Melly Rubid. According to the company, it furnished petitioner with a copy of the complaint and gave her time to answer, including an extension, but petitioner failed to submit a reply. The company further asserted that petitioner stopped reporting for work on June 10, 1995.

Additionally, the company alleged that on June 15, 1995 Rufino Pahati lodged a complaint regarding petitioner’s cash advance application, claiming that petitioner made him apply but took the money and promised repayment without effectuating it. The company said it sent a letter dated June 24, 1995 demanding petitioner’s explanation. After petitioner did not respond, the company conducted an investigation in her absence and found petitioner responsible for the imputed anomalies. Finally, the company notified petitioner that as of June 15, 1995 she was considered resigned from her job. Petitioner’s illegal dismissal complaint was filed on June 23, 1995.

Proceedings Before the Labor Arbiter and the NLRC

In the labor arbiter’s Decision dated May 17, 1996, the complaint for illegal dismissal was granted. The labor arbiter ordered the private respondent to pay one month’s separation pay in lieu of reinstatement, back wages from June 16, 1995 up to the time of decision, moral damages, and attorney’s fees.

On appeal, the NLRC reversed and set aside the labor arbiter’s disposition and dismissed the complaint for lack of merit. The NLRC ruled that, as finance manager, petitioner held a sensitive position that depended on the employer’s continued trust and confidence. It found that petitioner committed acts sufficient to justify loss of trust and confidence. It also rejected petitioner’s reliance on the dismissal of the criminal complaints, holding that acquittal or dismissal in a criminal case does not bar the employer from evaluating misconduct in a labor context. It further faulted petitioner for allegedly refusing to report for work to avoid and prevent an investigation, concluding that the company had no choice but to consider her services ended.

Petitioner’s motion for reconsideration was denied in a Resolution dated September 19, 1997.

The Issues Framed in Certiorari

Although petitioner did not pinpoint the issues, the Court treated the controversy as centering on whether the NLRC committed grave abuse of discretion in reversing the labor arbiter and declaring that petitioner was not illegally dismissed. To resolve the matter, the Court subdivided the discussion into: whether it should review factual findings of the labor tribunals; whether petitioner abandoned her post; and whether petitioner could be validly dismissed for breach of trust and loss of confidence.

The Court’s Rationale: Review of Factual Findings

The Court emphasized that factual findings of labor tribunals, when supported by record evidence, generally deserve great respect on appeal. The Court recognized, however, that the factual findings of the NLRC conflicted with those of the labor arbiter. As an exception to the rule that certiorari under Rule 65 typically addresses questions of law, the Court undertook a full review of the record to determine the controlling facts.

Abandonment: The Employer’s Burden and the Failure to Prove It

The labor arbiter had rejected abandonment, reasoning that abandonment requires the concurrence of intention to abandon work and overt acts indicating such intention. It also found it incredible that petitioner would abandon employment, considering her family situation and the fact that she filed a complaint immediately with prayer for reinstatement.

The NLRC disagreed and treated petitioner’s absence as abandonment motivated by a desire to avoid investigation. The Court refused to concur. It reiterated the unflinching rule that in illegal dismissal cases, the employer bears the burden of proof. The Court held that to establish abandonment, the employer must prove a deliberate and unjustified refusal to resume work without intention to return, showing both intention and overt acts demonstrating no desire to return. It found that the private respondent failed to establish either element.

The company argued that the absence of a termination notice proved abandonment, but the Court found otherwise. Mere absence from work—especially where petitioner had been verbally told not to report—could not, by itself, constitute abandonment. Further, petitioner’s filing of a complaint for illegal dismissal within a reasonable time negated abandonment. In particular, the Court noted that the complaint was filed about two weeks after petitioner had been dismissed or deemed resigned.

Loss of Trust and Breach of Confidence: Substantial Evidence and Procedural Due Process

Petitioner contended that the complaints against her were afterthoughts concocted to justify her illegal dismissal, pointing to the dismissal by the city prosecutor of criminal complaints for estafa. The Court agreed with the NLRC insofar as it held that the dismissal of criminal complaints did not preclude the employer from considering the allegations to evaluate trustworthiness, and that proof beyond reasonable doubt was not required in labor cases. The Court still required, however, substantial evidence—evidence sufficient to induce belief that the employee committed misconduct.

The Court then examined petitioner’s challenges to evidentiary and procedural matters. Petitioner questioned the NLRC’s admission of the letter-complaint and alleged that she never received copies of it and learned of them only after she filed her illegal dismissal complaint. The Court held that the notices served on her adequately apprised her of the nature of the accusations. It referred to a letter dated June 2, 1995 from the company president informing her that there was a complaint from Amado Roa and other Sales Department heads for deliberate withholding or delaying the release and payment of commissions unless she was given a certain amount in consideration of expeditious release. It also cited Celeridad’s June 24, 1995 letter reiterating the same gripe. The Court ruled that the lack of receipt of the underlying complaint copies did not show fabrication because procedural due process required only written notices of the specific acts or omissions constituting grounds for dismissal and an opportunity to be heard. It further held that petitioner should have exercised her right to request copies. The Court also rejected the argument that the notices were fabricated because they were presented only during the NLRC appeal, noting that the NLRC could receive evidence and weigh its probative value and that the company was not required to send the notices via registered mail if service could be made in the office where petitioner was working.

Despite these rulings on notice and admissibility, the Court found the employer’s substantive proof wanting. It restated that unsubstantiated suspicions, accusations, and conclusions cannot justify dismissal, and that doubts should be resolved in favor of labor, consistent with social justice and the constitutional policy underlying labor law.

The Evidence Was Insufficient to Support Dismissal

The Court reviewed the specific accusations. The Sales Department division heads, led by Roa, alleged that petitioner intentionally delayed release of commissions unless sales agents paid “grease money,” and solicited “contributions” for various “causes” in exchange for commission releases. Elma Mendoza allegedly complained that to encash her disbursement voucher, petitioner required payment of P1,000. Carolyn “Bam” Gonzales, an accredited broker, allegedly protested that although company books showed a disbursement of P6,712.32 for her commissions, she did not receive that amount. Rufino Pahati alleged that petitioner caused him to sign a cash advance voucher for money given to another employee.

The labor arbiter had disbelieved these accusations because they surfaced for the first time only after petitioner filed her illegal dismissal complaint. It also reasoned that if there was truth to the allegations, petitioner should have been furnished with written notice of the acts or omissions constituting grounds and afforded the opportunity to be heard. When the case reached the NLRC, the private respondent submitted two notices requiring petitioner to respond, which the NLRC took as sufficient basis to find that the employer had lost trust and confidence.

The Court held that the NLRC’s conclusion lacked evidentiary support. It identified the private respondent’s relevant evidence as: Gonzales’ commission voucher (Exh. 3); the letter-complaint (Exh. 2); Pahati’s letter-complaint (Exh. 1); affidavits of Celeridad, Gonzales, and M

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