G.R. No. L-3580 - Melo vs. People

Case Summary (G.R. No. L-3580)

Petitioner’s Factual and Procedural Posture

Facts and initial procedure as alleged: Melo was charged on December 27, 1949 with frustrated homicide (wounds requiring >30 days’ medical attendance and incapacity). He pleaded not guilty on December 29, 1949 at 8:00 a.m. The injured person, Benjamin Obillo, died that same day at 10:15 p.m. Evidence of death became available to the prosecution on January 3, 1950. An amended information alleging consummated homicide was filed January 4, 1950. The accused moved to quash the amended information for double jeopardy; the trial court denied the motion.

Respondent Action and Relief Sought

Respondent court: Court of First Instance of Rizal denied the motion to quash and permitted the filing of the amended information. Relief sought by petitioner: prohibition to enjoin the respondent court from proceeding on the amended information for consummated homicide, on the ground that such prosecution would constitute double jeopardy.

Key Dates

Initial charge filed: December 27, 1949
Arraignment and plea (not guilty): December 29, 1949 at 8:00 a.m.
Death of injured person: December 29, 1949 at 10:15 p.m.
Evidence of death available to prosecution: January 3, 1950
Amended information filed (consummated homicide): January 4, 1950
Decision date of the Supreme Court: March 22, 1950

Applicable Law and Rules Referenced

Constitutional protection against double jeopardy: “No person shall be twice put in jeopardy of punishment for the same offense,” as provided by the Constitution applicable at the time (the 1935 Constitution). The Constitution also contained the exception regarding acts punished by both a law and an ordinance.
Rules of Court provisions cited: Rule 106, sec. 13 (second paragraph) permitting dismissal of an original information and filing of a new one when a mistake in charging the proper offense appears before judgment, provided the defendant is not placed in double jeopardy; Rule 113, sec. 9 and Rule 116, sec. 5 addressing identity of offenses, attempts, and necessary inclusion.
Doctrinal sources invoked: the non bis in idem principle; the “same-evidence” or identity test (as articulated in prior jurisprudence such as U.S. v. Lim Suco, U.S. v. Ledesma, People v. Martinez); the Diaz v. United States doctrine (and its application in People v. Espino) that a subsequent supervening fact creating a new, greater offense does not constitute double jeopardy.

Procedural and Substantive Issue Presented

Whether permitting the prosecution to amend an information charging frustrated homicide to charge consummated homicide after the victim’s death—when the death occurred after arraignment but before judgment—violates the constitutional prohibition against double jeopardy.

Court’s Legal Reasoning and Analysis

Rule 106, sec. 13 authorized dismissal of the original information and the filing of a new information charging the proper offense if a mistake in charging appears before judgment, provided no double jeopardy results. The Court found the amendment proper because the original information did not charge the proper offense (consummated homicide) and because the amended information did not subject the accused to a second jeopardy for the same offense.
The Court explained the constitutional protection against double jeopardy as prohibiting second prosecution for the same or identical offense; historically this protection meant one could not be tried again after termination of a case by acquittal or conviction or otherwise without the accused’s consent. The maxim non bis in idem and related common-law and civil-law principles underpin the rule.
The identity or “same-evidence” test requires that the second offense be exactly the same or identical as the first; identity exists when evidence sufficient to convict for one offense would also suffice to convict for the other. The Rules of Court further clarified identity to include attempts, frustrations, or when one offense necessarily includes the other.
Crucially, the Court distinguished offenses that existed at the time of the first prosecution from offenses that did not yet exist. If the second offense did not exist during the pendency of the first prosecution—because a new fact supervened (e.g., death of the injured party)—there was no possibility of convicting the accused of that inexistent offense during the first prosecution; hence a subsequent prosecution is not a second jeopardy for the same offense. The Court relied on Diaz v. U.S. and People v. Espino for this principle.
The Court held that where, after the first prosecution, a new fact for which the defendant is responsible supervenes and changes the character of the offense (thus constituting a new and distinct offense), prosecution for that new offense does not offend double jeopardy. The Court reasoned that the Rules of Court were not intended to abrogate the Diaz doctrine, and the reiteration of that doctrine in Espino after the Rules’ approval supported its continued validity.
The Court expressly overruled People v. Tarok and People v. Villasis as contrary to the proper meaning of double jeopardy and as detrimental to the administration of justice. The opinion explained policy reasons: adherence to the Tarok line could prevent proper punishment when new facts later show a more serious offense and could foster suspicions of collusion or procedural abuse by prosecutors.

Holding and Disposition

The petition for prohibition was denied. The Supreme Court held that the amended information charging consummated homicide was properly allowed to stand and that permitting prosecution for the greater offense (which came into existence only after the victim’s death) did not consti

Case Syllabus (G.R. No. L-3580)

Facts of the Case

Petitioner Conrado Melo was charged in the Court of First Instance of Rizal on December 27, 1949, with frustrated homicide for allegedly inflicting upon Benjamin Obillo, with a kitchen knife and with intent to kill, several serious wounds on different parts of the body.
The wounds allegedly required medical attendance for a period of more than 30 days and incapacitated the victim from performing his habitual labor for the same period.
On December 29, 1949, at eight o’clock in the morning, the accused pleaded not guilty to the offense charged.
At 10:15 p.m. on December 29, 1949, Benjamin Obillo died from his wounds.
Evidence of death became available to the prosecution only on January 3, 1950.
On January 4, 1950, an amended information was filed charging the accused with consummated homicide.
The accused filed a motion to quash the amended information alleging double jeopardy; the respondent court denied the motion.
The petitioner then filed the instant petition for prohibition to enjoin the respondent court from further entertaining the amended information.

Procedural Posture and Relief Sought

The trial court denied the accused’s motion to quash the amended information on grounds of double jeopardy.
The petitioner sought prohibition from the Supreme Court to prevent the trial court from proceeding under the amended information.
The Supreme Court was called upon to determine whether allowing the amended information charging consummated homicide after the victim’s death constituted double jeopardy.

Rule and Statutory Provisions Invoked

Rule 106, section 13, second paragraph of the Rules of Court is quoted and invoked: where it appears before judgment that a mistake has been made in charging the proper offense, the court may dismiss the original complaint or information and order the filing of a new one charging the proper offense, provided the defendant would not be placed thereby in double jeopardy.
Article III, section 1 (20) of the Constitution is invoked as the constitutional prohibition: “No person shall be twice put in jeopardy of punishment for the same offense.”
Additional Rules of Court provisions referenced: Rule 113, section 9 and Rule 116, section 5 as clarifying the concept of identity of offenses for double jeopardy purposes.

Definition and Scope of “Double Jeopardy” as Stated

The constitutional protection is against a second jeopardy for the “same offense.”
At the time the Constitution was promulgated, “double jeopardy” meant that when a person is charged with an offense and the case is terminated by acquittal, conviction, or in any other manner without the consent of the accused, the accused cannot again be charged with the same or identical offense.
The principle is grounded in reason, justice, and conscience, expressed in the civil law maxim non bis in idem, present in common law and other jurisprudential systems, and embodied in prior Spanish law and the U.S. Constitution.
The protection applies only to the “same offense,” which is to be construed as the identical offense or one necessarily identical in its elements.

The “Same-Evidence” Test and Its Reformulation

Historically, identity was tested by whether the evidence sufficient to convict for the first offense would be sufficient to convict for the second (“same-evidence test”).
The “same-evidence test” was criticized as vague and deficient.
The Rules of Court restate identity more clearly: identity exists not only when the second offe