Title
Mancol, Jr. vs. Development Bank of the Philippines
Case
G.R. No. 204289
Decision Date
Nov 22, 2017
Petitioner claimed DBP breached a verbal agreement to transfer title and eject occupants, but the Supreme Court ruled testimonies inadmissible as hearsay and upheld the parol evidence rule, finding no breach as terms weren’t in the written deed.

Case Summary (G.R. No. 204289)

Factual Background

Petitioner negotiated to purchase a residential lot with a two-storey building covered by TCT No. 2041 located at Navarro Street, Calbayog City, which DBP offered for negotiated sale on October 13, 2004 with a purchase price of P1,326,000. Petitioner executed a Special Power of Attorney appointing his father, Fernando Mancol, Sr., to represent and negotiate the sale. By Official Receipt No. 3440018 dated October 13, 2004, an initial payment of P265,200 was made in the name of Fernando Mancol, Jr. and paid by his father.

Negotiation and Sale Transactions

Petitioner paid the balance of P1,060,800 evidenced by Official Receipt No. 3440451 dated December 10, 2004, and DBP, through its branch manager, executed a Deed of Absolute Sale in favor of Petitioner. On December 21, 2004, Petitioner deposited P99,450 with DBP for payment of capital gains tax and documentary stamp tax, acknowledged by Official Receipt No. 3440537. Sometime later DBP returned the pertinent sale documents and issued Manager’s Check No. 0000956475 for P99,450 to Petitioner, prompting dispute over whether DBP had agreed to effect transfer of the title and eject occupants.

Plaintiff’s Complaint and Relief Sought

On August 24, 2006 Petitioner filed a Complaint for damages for breach of contract before the RTC, alleging that DBP had verbally agreed to arrange and effect the transfer of the Torrens title in his name, including payment of CGT and DST, and to eject the occupants. Petitioner claimed BIR computations for taxes and surcharges totaling P160,700.88 and sought judgment holding DBP liable for those amounts, damages, attorney’s fees, and return of the Manager’s Check for P99,450.

DBP’s Answer and Counterclaim

Respondent denied that the Deed of Absolute Sale or the negotiated sale rules obligated it to effect registration or eject occupants and pleaded that bank policy did not require it to register instruments of sale. By counterclaim Respondent alleged that Petitioner breached the sale terms by failing to assume financial obligations related to writs of possession and sought damages, attorney’s fees, and costs of suit in the amount of P200,000.

Trial Proceedings and Testimony

The RTC declared Respondent in default on February 20, 2007 for failure of counsel to appear at pretrial. At trial Petitioner produced testimony from Rodel Villanueva, who stated that on the order of an attorney of DBP he delivered to BIR-Catbalogan a check for P99,450 and certain documents, and from Fernando Mancol, Sr., who testified that, by virtue of the SPA, he signed negotiation documents and that DBP verbally agreed to facilitate transfer of title, pay the CGT, and remove occupants, although he admitted the alleged oral undertaking contradicted the written negotiated rules.

RTC Decisions and Orders

The RTC initially rendered a decision on April 14, 2008 in favor of Petitioner, ordering DBP to return P99,450, to pay surcharges or interest on CGT and DST as determined by the BIR from June 12, 2005 until payment, and to pay attorney’s fees of P15,000, while dismissing DBP’s counterclaim. After reconsideration, on June 13, 2008 the RTC granted DBP’s motion and dismissed the complaint. Petitioner moved for reconsideration, renewing the claim of a contemporaneous verbal agreement through his father. On November 4, 2008 the RTC denied the motion but modified its prior order to direct DBP to return P99,450 with six percent interest per annum from December 21, 2004 until return. DBP’s subsequent motion for reconsideration was denied on April 17, 2009; the RTC noted that DBP had waived the right to contest the return of P99,450 by failing to refute it in the April 14, 2008 decision.

Appeals to the Court of Appeals and Ruling

Both parties appealed to the Court of Appeals. On February 22, 2012 the CA denied the appeals and affirmed the RTC Orders dated June 13, 2008, November 4, 2008, and April 17, 2009, ordering costs to be shared equally. Motions for partial reconsideration by Petitioner and for reconsideration by Respondent were denied by CA Resolution dated September 27, 2012.

Issues on Parol Evidence and Hearsay

The sole contested issue before the Supreme Court was factual: whether the testimonies of Villanueva and Mancol, Sr. established the alleged contemporaneous verbal agreement that Respondent would arrange and effect transfer of the Torrens title in Petitioner’s name and eject occupants. The Court identified the parol evidence rule as central to the dispute and examined whether any exception under Rule 130, Section 9, Rules of Court applied and whether Respondent waived objections to parol evidence by failing to timely object at trial.

Court’s Analysis on Admissibility and Probative Value

The Court agreed with the CA that although Respondent had been declared in default and thus waived the right to interpose timely objections to the testimony, admissibility did not equate to persuasive weight. The Court reiterated that admissible evidence must still satisfy relevance and competence and that probative weight depends on the witness’s personal knowledge. Citing Section 36, Rule 130, the Court held that a witness may testify only to facts of which he has personal knowledge and that testimony based on what a witness has heard from others constitutes hearsay and lacks probative value for proving the truth of the matter asserted.

Evaluation of Witness Testimony

Applying these principles, the Court found Villanueva’s testimony to be hearsay and devoid of personal knowledge regarding any verbal agreement between Petitioner and DBP because his testimony concerned orders he received to deliver documents and not to the actual perfection of a contemporaneous agreement. The Court similarly found Mancol, Sr.’s testimony insufficient to prove a binding oral agreement personally made with DBP on behalf of Petitioner, noting the absence of evidence that Mancol, Sr. personally negotiated or witnessed the alleged oral undertaking and emphasizing that statements recounting such absent personal participation amounted to hearsay.

Authority of Attorney-in-Fac

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