Title
Mancol, Jr. vs. Development Bank of the Philippines
Case
G.R. No. 204289
Decision Date
Nov 22, 2017
Petitioner claimed DBP breached a verbal agreement to transfer title and eject occupants, but the Supreme Court ruled testimonies inadmissible as hearsay and upheld the parol evidence rule, finding no breach as terms weren’t in the written deed.

Case Digest (G.R. No. 204289)

Facts:

Fernando Mancol, Jr. v. Development Bank of the Philippines, G.R. No. 204289, November 22, 2017, Supreme Court First Division, Tijam, J., writing for the Court. Petitioner Fernando Mancol, Jr. sued respondent Development Bank of the Philippines (DBP) after a negotiated sale of a residential lot and two-storey building (TCT No. 2041) in Calbayog City.

DBP scheduled an Invitation to Bid for Negotiated Sale on October 13, 2004. Petitioner executed a Special Power of Attorney (SPA) appointing his father, Fernando Mancol, Sr., to represent and negotiate the purchase; Mancol, Sr. signed the Negotiated Offer to Purchase and related rules, and paid the initial amount. Petitioner later paid the balance and DBP executed a Deed of Absolute Sale in his favor. Petitioner deposited P99,450 with DBP for capital gains tax (CGT) and documentary stamp tax (DST).

Petitioner alleged that, contemporaneous with the sale, DBP orally agreed to (1) arrange and effect the transfer of title in petitioner’s name and to pay the CGT, and (2) remove the occupants of the property. DBP later returned documents and issued a manager’s check for P99,450; DBP denied any obligation to eject occupants or to effect registration. BIR computations showed increasing penalties, and petitioner demanded DBP’s compliance.

On August 24, 2006 petitioner filed a Complaint for damages for breach of contract before the Regional Trial Court (RTC), Calbayog City, Branch 31. DBP answered and filed a counterclaim averring petitioner breached the deed and the negotiated rules, and claiming damages. The RTC declared DBP in default for failure to appear at pre-trial, and trial proceeded.

At trial petitioner presented witnesses including Rodel Villanueva and Mancol, Sr. The RTC initially ruled in petitioner’s favor on April 14, 2008, ordering DBP to return the P99,450, to pay BIR surcharges and attorney’s fees, and dismissing DBP’s counterclaim. DBP moved for reconsideration, arguing among other things that the testimonies were hearsay; on June 13, 2008 the RTC granted DBP’s motion and dismissed petitioner’s complaint. Petitioner moved for reconsideration, again asserting his father (as attorney-in-fact) had personal knowledge of the verbal agreement; the RTC denied relief but modified its June 13, 2008 order on November 4, 2008 to direct DBP to return P99,450 with 6% interest from December 21, 2004 until return. DBP’s reconsideration was denied on April 17, 2009.

Both parties appealed to the Court of Appeals (CA). The CA, in a Decision dated February 22, 2012, denied both appeals and affirmed the RTC orders; its Resol...(Subscriber-Only)

Issues:

  • May this Court review and overturn the CA’s factual findings on the admissibility and probative weight of witnesses’ testimony where the CA’s findings are based on credibility and personal-knowledge determinations?
  • Were the testimonies of Villanueva and Mancol, Sr. admissible and sufficiently probative to establish a contemporaneous verbal agreement that DBP would effect transfer of title, pay CGT/DST, and eject occupants, notwithstanding the written Deed and negotiated sale rules?
  • Did the SPA authorize Mancol, Sr., as attorney-in-fact, to enter into a verbal agreement binding petitioner to oblige DBP to effect transfer of title and eject occupants?
  • Is petitioner entitled to...(Subscriber-Only)

Ruling:

  • (Subscriber-Only)

Ratio:

  • (Subscriber-Only)

Doctrine:

  • (Subscriber-Only)

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