Title
Magis Young Achievers' Learning Center vs. Manalo
Case
G.R. No. 178835
Decision Date
Feb 13, 2009
Teacher resigned, employer terminated citing position abolition; SC ruled illegal dismissal, probationary status, awarded backwages and 13th month pay.
illegal dismissal
probationary employees
valid resignation
A

Case Summary (G.R. No. 175914)

Factual Background

Respondent began working as a teacher and acting principal on April 18, 2002. In a letter dated March 29, 2003, she wrote to petitioner’s directress, tendering what she described as an irrevocable resignation effective April 1, 2003 for personal and family reasons. She expressed gratitude for the opportunity and service as acting principal.

On March 31, 2003, however, petitioner served respondent a termination letter stating that the Board of Trustees had convened to impose a cost-cutting scheme that involved systematic reorganization, including the abolition of the position of principal for the next school year. Petitioner informed respondent it could no longer renew her contract, which was said to expire on March 31, 2003, and stated that the function of the principal position would be delegated to other staff members.

Complaint and Parties’ Theories

On April 4, 2003, respondent filed a complaint against petitioner for illegal dismissal and non-payment of 13th month pay, praying for reinstatement, full backwages, and moral and exemplary damages, as well as 13th month pay. She argued that her termination violated her employment contract and that the alleged abolition of the position of principal was not among the grounds for termination under Article 282 of the Labor Code. She further asserted that Article 283 was violated because the required written notice to the Department of Labor and Employment (DOLE) and to the employee, and the payment of separation pay, were not complied with. Respondent also contended that her contract did not provide for a fixed term or period. Finally, she claimed entitlement to 13th month pay under PD No. 851.

Petitioner, in turn, insisted that respondent’s termination was legally justified. It argued that respondent was still in a one-year probationary period, allegedly from April 1, 2002 to March 3, 2003, and that she failed to meet the criteria set by the school under the Manual of Regulations for Private Schools, particularly paragraph seventy-five, on the conversion of full-time teachers to permanent status after three years of satisfactory service. Petitioner’s position also reflected the school’s stance that it could lawfully end the probationary employment based on its evaluation.

Labor Arbiter’s Ruling

On December 3, 2003, Labor Arbiter Renell Joseph R. dela Cruz dismissed the illegal dismissal aspect and other claims for lack of merit, while ordering the payment of respondent’s 13th month pay in the amount of P3,750.00. The Labor Arbiter held that respondent had resigned, not been dismissed. He found it implausible that respondent would agree to sign a resignation letter as a precondition to her hiring. In the Labor Arbiter’s view, there was no evidence of coercion, and therefore the resignation had to be upheld.

The Labor Arbiter also treated the employment agreement as a fixed-period contract. He considered it a contract of employment with a specified duration from April 1, 2002 to March 31, 2003, and he treated a blank space in one party’s version as an oversight. He further reasoned that the notification requirement in the contract—pertaining to termination before the expiration of the period—confirmed the presence of a definite term.

NLRC and Court of Appeals Disposition

On appeal, the NLRC Third Division reversed the Labor Arbiter on October 28, 2005, ordering petitioner to reinstate respondent as a teacher and to credit her with one year of probationary employment, while awarding P3,750.00 for 13th month pay and P325,000.00 representing backwages. Petitioner moved for reconsideration, but the NLRC denied it in a resolution dated January 31, 2006.

Petitioner thereafter filed a certiorari petition before the CA, which on January 31, 2007 affirmed the NLRC and dismissed petitioner’s petition. The CA denied the motion for reconsideration in its Resolution dated June 29, 2007, thereby sustaining the NLRC’s findings. Petitioner then elevated the matter to the Supreme Court.

Issues Raised by Petitioner

Petitioner anchored its Supreme Court petition on alleged errors by the CA, including: whether the resignation was ineffective due to alleged lack of acceptance; whether respondent was improperly declared a permanent employee; and whether the employment contract validly stipulated a period of employment. These grounds framed the core dispute over the true character of respondent’s employment and the legality of petitioner’s action.

Legal Framework on Probationary Employment of Private School Teachers

The Supreme Court first restated the governing principles for probationary employment of academic personnel in private schools. Probationary employment is described as a period during which the employer tests the employee’s fitness and determines qualification for permanent employment. The law regulates the employer’s prerogative to fix a probationary period. Under Article 281 of the Labor Code, the general maximum trial period is six months, unless apprenticeship agreements stipulate a longer period. Yet the Labor Code regime recognizes a special rule for private school academic personnel. For such academic personnel, probation is governed by Section 92 of the 1992 Manual of Regulations for Private Schools, which limits probationary periods for elementary and secondary levels to not more than three (3) consecutive years of satisfactory service.

The Court further noted that DOLE-DECS-CHED-TESDA Order No. 1 (s. 1996) clarified that, for academic personnel in elementary and secondary levels, the probationary period must be counted in terms of school years, not calendar years. The Court also explained that probationary academic personnel attain permanent status only after satisfactorily completing the probationary period and meeting the conditions for regularity under Section 93 of the Manual. The Court cited prior rulings, including Escudero v. Office of the President of the Philippines and Labajo v. Alejandro, to underscore that no vested right to permanent appointment accrues until the prerequisite three-year probationary period is completed, subject to satisfactory service and the requirement that the employee is a full-time teacher.

The Court also emphasized that teachers who are under probation retain security of tenure during the probationary period, meaning they cannot be removed except for cause provided by law or if, at the end of every yearly contract during the probationary period, the employee fails to meet the reasonable standards set by the employer at the time of engagement. Once the probationary period expires, constitutional protection cannot be invoked if the relationship had lawfully ended at the proper time.

The Court’s Determination on Respondent’s Employment Status

Applying these principles, the Court ruled that respondent’s employment from April 18, 2002 to March 31, 2003 remained within probation. The Court held that respondent had not completed the requisite three-year probationary employment under the Manual. Thus, respondent had no right to permanent status as a matter of law at the time of petitioner’s termination.

The Court also addressed respondent’s appointment as acting principal. It held that such appointment was temporary, revocable at will, and did not grant fixed tenure of office. The Court relied on the settled notion that a temporary appointee has no fixed tenure and can be removed at the pleasure of the appointing power without cause. It also recognized that private schools may rotate administrative positions among employees without granting security of tenure over the administrative post itself.

Resignation: Lack of Acceptance and Inconsistency with Illegal Dismissal

The Supreme Court agreed with the CA that respondent’s resignation was not valid. It reasoned that resignation had not been shown to be operative, not only due to the lack of clear acceptance by the employer, but also because the record reflected a cloud of doubt as to the voluntariness of respondent’s act. The Court reiterated that resignation is effective only when it is a voluntary act made with the intention to relinquish employment, accompanied by abandonment. It also restated the rule that resignation is inconsistent with the filing of a complaint for illegal dismissal. Because respondent actively pursued her illegal dismissal case against petitioner, the Court held that she could not be treated as one who had voluntarily resigned from her job.

The Contractual Dispute Over the Period of Employment

The Court then addressed the most contentious aspect: whether the employment contract was for a fixed period of one year or had no fixed term. It observed that the parties presented two versions of the employment agreement with discrepancies. In one version, the space for the period of effectivity was left blank. In the other, petitioner’s copy purportedly contained a one-year period from April 1, 2002 to March 31, 2003, which was inconsistent with the stated hiring date of April 18, 2002. The handwriting used for the filled-in terms differed from the handwriting used for other entries, which led to suspicion regarding the authenticity or reliability of the filled portion.

The Court ruled in favor of the version that supported the absence of an express period because the evidence presented a true doubt as to which version should control. It invoked Article 1702 of the Civil Code on the construction of ambiguous labor contracts in favor of the laborer and the rule that ambiguities must be read against the party who drafted the contract. The Court also treated the employment agreement as akin to a contract of adhesion, since petitioner insisted on a fixed one-year term using its own copy as proof while the other version left the period blank. Where the employee’s very employment was at stake, the Court held that the doubt on the period of employment must be construed in respondent’s favor.

Illegal Dismissal of a Probationary Teacher

Having determined that resp

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