Case Summary (G.R. No. 27818)
Relevant Dates and Procedural Milestones
Offense alleged: May 13, 2001 (checkpoint seizure). Initial quashal order by RTC: November 22, 2001 (ordered return of seized items). Reopening order by RTC: March 13, 2003. CA decision denying petition: September 19, 2005; CA resolution granting reconsideration: July 6, 2006. Supreme Court decision under review: G.R. No. 173588, April 22, 2009.
Factual Background
Pedro was stopped at a Boac, Marinduque checkpoint and, when asked, opened a gun case revealing a loaded Revolver .357 Magnum Ruger GP100 (serial no. 173-56836) with six rounds, an ammunition box (100 bullets), two speed loaders, and ear protectors. Pedro lacked a Comelec authorization at the checkpoint; he later attached to his motion to quash a Comelec certification allegedly exempting him from the gun ban.
Criminal Charge and Basis
The provincial prosecutor filed an Information charging Pedro with violating Article XXII, Section 261(q) of the Omnibus Election Code (carrying firearms outside residence or place of business during the election period without Comelec authorization), in relation to Section 264 (penalty of imprisonment of one to six years). The Information recited the ultimate facts of the offense, specifying time, place, and the weapon.
Trial Court Proceedings and Motions
Pedro filed a Motion for Preliminary Investigation (granted but not conducted) and then a Motion to Quash under Rule 117, alleging: (a) the facts charged do not constitute an offense (Section 3(a)), and (h) the Information contains averments which, if true, would constitute a legal excuse or justification (Section 3(h)) — relying on a Comelec Certification dated September 24, 2001, purporting to exempt him. The RTC initially granted the motion and ordered return of the seized articles. The private prosecutor, Los BaAos, moved to reopen the case alleging the Comelec certification was forged; the RTC reopened the case (Pedro did not object), but later Pedro invoked Section 8, Rule 117 to argue that the dismissal had become permanent.
Court of Appeals Actions
Pedro petitioned the CA for certiorari and prohibition to nullify the RTC’s reopening. The CA initially concluded Section 8 applies to provisional dismissals on motion of the accused but denied extraordinary relief because it found no grave abuse of discretion by the RTC; it also held that proof of service of the dismissal order on the public prosecutor was lacking, so the State could not be declared time-barred. After Pedro indicated the exact date/time the provincial prosecutor received the quashal order (December 10, 2001, 2:35 p.m.), the CA granted reconsideration and ruled the provisional dismissal became permanent after one year from service, thus barring revival. The CA therefore rendered the dismissal permanent.
Legal Issue Presented
Whether Section 8, Rule 117 (provisional dismissal and its time-bar) applies to an order quashing an Information under Section 3 of Rule 117, and whether the trial court committed grave abuse of discretion in reopening the case.
Governing Rule — Motion to Quash (Rule 117, Section 3)
A motion to quash attacks the complaint or information on its face for legal insufficiency or defects apparent on the document. Section 3 enumerates specific grounds (including that the facts charged do not constitute an offense (3(a)), that the information contains averments constituting a legal excuse or justification (3(h)), extinction of criminal liability (3(g)), prior conviction or acquittal or dismissal without express consent (3(i)), etc.). The motion hypothetically admits the truth of the averments in the information, and — except in limited jurisprudential exceptions (People v. Navarro and People v. De la Rosa) where matters aliunde admitted by the prosecution may be considered — the court must resolve the motion based on the face of the information.
Governing Rule — Provisional Dismissal (Rule 117, Section 8)
Section 8 provides for provisional dismissal (sin perjuicio) only with the accused’s express consent and with notice to the offended party. It prescribes when such provisional dismissals become permanent: after one year (for offenses punishable by imprisonment not exceeding six years) or two years (for heavier penalties) from issuance of the order without revival. The section sets forth four sine qua non requirements for the time-bar to operate: (1) motion for provisional dismissal by prosecution with accused’s express conformity, or by accused alone, or both moving; (2) offended party notified; (3) court issues order granting provisional dismissal; and (4) public prosecutor is served with a copy of the order.
Distinction Between Quashal and Provisional Dismissal
The Supreme Court emphasized that a quashal under Section 3 and a provisional dismissal under Section 8 are conceptually and functionally distinct. Key distinctions include:
- Grounds: Section 3 lists specific grounds for quashal; Section 8 does not enumerate grounds for provisional dismissal.
- Parties who move: Motions to quash are filed by the accused; provisional dismissals may be moved by prosecution, accused, or both (with required consent).
- Timing and scope: A motion to quash is resolved before arraignment and adjudicates defects apparent on the face of the information; provisional dismissal may occur even after trial has begun (if consents exist).
- Legal consequences: Section 6 specifically provides when re-filing is barred (double jeopardy or extinction of liability), and does not incorporate Section 8’s time-bar for dismissals under Section 3. Section 8 creates a separate time-bar intended for provisional dismissals other than those grounded on Section 3.
- Evidentiary basis: A quashal is generally decided on the information itself (hypothetical admission); matters aliunde supporting a legal excuse are not ordinarily appropriate grounds for quashal unless admitted or otherwise properly presented in an evidentiary hearing.
These distinctions led the Court to conclude that the framers did not intend Section 8’s time-bar to apply to dismissals resulting from motions to quash.
Jurisprudential Principles on Time-Bar and Refiling
The Court reiterated that the time-bar in Section 8 is a special procedural limitation qualifying the State’s right to prosecute; in People v. Lacson it is treated as extinguishing the State’s right to prosecute when the statutory conditions are met. But the prerequisites for Section 8 must be satisfied exactly — including service on the public prosecutor — before the time-bar can operate. Even so, the Court held that those principles are inapplicable where the dismissal is by quashal under Section 3.
Application to the Case — Merits of the Motion to Quash
The Supreme Court examined the content of the Information and concluded that:
- The Information properly alleged the essential elements of the offense (specific weapon, time, place, lack of authorization), so Section 3(a) (facts charged do not constitute an offense) had no merit.
- The Section 3(h) ground (averments constituting a legal excuse or justification) relied on a Comelec Certification attached to the motion to quash. That certification is a matter aliunde and not an appropriate basis for quashal under Section 3(h) unless admitted by the prosecution or properly established in a hearing — which did not occur. No hearing
Case Syllabus (G.R. No. 27818)
Case Identification and Procedural Posture
- Reported at 604 Phil. 215; En Banc; G.R. No. 173588; Decision dated April 22, 2009; penned by Justice Brion.
- Petition for review on certiorari under Rule 45 seeking review of the Court of Appeals’ September 19, 2005 decision and July 6, 2006 resolution in CA-G.R. SP No. 80223.
- Petitioner: Ariel M. Los BaAos, acting on behalf of the checkpoint officers and in his personal capacity.
- Respondent: Joel R. Pedro (Pedro), accused of violating the election gun ban.
- Relief sought in the Supreme Court: remand to the RTC for arraignment and trial, or refiling/reinstatement of the Information against Pedro.
Factual Background
- Date and place: On or about 13 May 2001, at about 4:00 p.m., Sitio Bantauyan, Barangay Bantad, Municipality of Boac, Province of Marinduque.
- Circumstances of apprehension: A Boac PNP checkpoint team stopped a silver-gray Toyota Hi-Ace (plate WHT-371) on the national highway coming from Boac proper; Pedro was seated in the rear portion of the vehicle.
- Observation at the scene: When Pedro opened the window, Police Senior Inspector Victor V. Arevalo observed a gun carry case beside him.
- Request for authority: Pedro could not produce written authorization from the Commission on Elections (Comelec) when asked by the checkpoint team; Pedro opened the case upon request.
- Items seized from the case:
- One Revolver .357 Magnum Ruger GP100, serial no. 173-56836, loaded with six (6) ammunitions;
- One ammunition box containing 100 bullets;
- Two speed loaders with six ammunitions each;
- One set ear protector.
- Other persons: Pedro was accompanied by three other men; all were taken to the Boac police station for investigation.
- Charging authority and law invoked: The Boac election officer filed a criminal complaint; information later filed by the provincial prosecutor for violation of Batas Pambansa Bilang 881 (Omnibus Election Code), Article XXII, Section 261(q), in relation to Section 264.
The Information (Substance of the Charge)
- Allegation as pleaded in the Information: That on or about 13 May 2001, at about 4:00 p.m., in Sitio Bantauyan, Barangay Bantad, Municipality of Boac, Province of Marinduque, respondent wilfully, unlawfully and feloniously carried a Revolver Cal. 357, Magnum Ruger 100 loaded with six (6) ammunitions, serial no. 173-56836, outside his residence during the election period without authorization in writing from the Commission on Elections, contrary to law.
- Penal provision referenced: Section 261(q) of the Omnibus Election Code (prohibiting carrying firearms outside residence or place of business during the election period unless authorized in writing by Comelec) and Section 264 (penalty: imprisonment of not less than one year but not more than six years).
Trial Court Proceedings and Early Orders
- Preliminary steps: An inquest was conducted and the provincial prosecutor filed the Information with the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Marinduque.
- Motion for preliminary investigation: Pedro moved for a preliminary investigation which the RTC granted, but the investigation did not materialize.
- Motion to quash by Pedro: Prior to arraignment, Pedro filed a Motion to Quash under Rule 117, alleging the Information “contains averments which, if true, would constitute a legal excuse or justification” and/or the facts charged do not constitute an offense; he attached a Comelec Certification dated 24 September 2001 stating he was “exempted” from the gun ban.
- RTC action on the motion to quash: The RTC initially quashed the Information and ordered the police and prosecutors to return the seized articles to Pedro (order dated 22 November 2001, issued by Judge Alejandro Arenas).
- Motion to reopen by petitioner: Ariel Los BaAos moved to reopen the case, alleging the Comelec Certification was falsified and that the prosecution was deprived of due process when the judge quashed the Information without a hearing; Los BaAos attached two Comelec certifications: (1) Pedro was not exempted from the firearm ban; and (2) the signatures on the Comelec Certification of 24 September 2001 were forged.
- RTC reopening: The RTC reopened the case for further proceedings because Pedro did not object to Los BaAos’ motion; subsequently set arraignment date.
- Pedro’s reconsideration and invocation of Section 8, Rule 117: Pedro argued Section 8 (provisional dismissal/time-bar) rendered the case permanently dismissed and cited the public prosecutor’s lack of express approval of the motion to reopen; the public prosecutor manifested express conformity with Los BaAos’ motion.
Proceedings in the Court of Appeals
- Petition to the CA: Pedro sought relief by filing a petition for certiorari and prohibition in the Court of Appeals (docketed CA-G.R. SP No. 80223).
- CA initial ruling (9 September 2005):
- The CA held Section 8, Rule 117 does apply to provisional dismissals on motion of the accused; nothing in the Rule proscribes its application to dismissals on motion of the accused.
- However, the CA denied issuance of extraordinary writs because it found no grave abuse of discretion by the RTC; the CA explained the elements required to invoke the time-bar under Section 8 and emphasized that the order of dismissal becomes permanent one year after service on the public prosecutor.
- The CA noted absence of proof as to when the public prosecutor was served the quashal order dated 22 November 2001; thus it could not declare the State barred from reviving the case.
- CA modification/reconsideration (July