G.R. No. L-18202 - People vs. Gilo

Respondent Joel R. Pedro was charged for carrying a loaded firearm without the required written authorization from the Commission on Elections (COMELEC) on or about May 13, 2001, a day preceding the national and local elections.
The charge stemmed from an incident at Sitio Bantauyan, Barangay Bantad, Boac, Marinduque, where Pedro, seated in a silver-gray Toyota Hi-Ace, was observed by a checkpoint team carrying a firearm.
The checkpoint team—composed of Police Senior Inspector Victor V. Arevalo, SPO2 Marshal Olympia, SPO1 Rocky Mercene, and PO1 Raul Adlawan—stopped the vehicle and, upon request, had Pedro open a gun case that revealed a loaded revolver, an ammunition box, speed loaders, and an ear protector.
Pedro was accompanied by three other individuals when the incident occurred, and all were brought in for investigation.

The Boac election officer filed a criminal complaint against Pedro for violating the election gun ban based on Batas Pambansa Bilang 881 (the Omnibus Election Code).
Following the official filing, the Marinduque provincial prosecutor initiated proceedings in the Regional Trial Court (RTC) by filing an Information charging Pedro under Article XXII, Section 261(q) (in relation to Section 264 of the Code).
Pedro filed a Motion for Preliminary Investigation, which was granted by the RTC, but the investigation did not materialize as expected.

Pedro subsequently filed a Motion to Quash the Information, arguing that the averments alleged would, if true, either constitute a legal excuse or fail to establish an offense. Attached to his motion was a COMELEC Certification dated September 24, 2001, purportedly exempting him from the gun ban.
The RTC granted Pedro’s motion and quashed the Information, ordering the return of the seized firearms and related articles.
Private prosecutor Ariel Los BaAos, representing the checkpoint team, moved to reopen the case, contending that Pedro’s COMELEC Certification was a falsification and that his motion to quash deprived the prosecution of due process.
The RTC, noting the lack of objection from Pedro regarding the reopening motion, allowed further proceedings by reopening the case.
Pedro sought reconsideration, arguing that under Section 8, Rule 117 of the Rules of Court the dismissal had become permanent (invoking issues on the timeliness of serving the dismissal order to the public prosecutor).

The CA initially denied Pedro’s petition for certiorari and prohibition, asserting that while the trial court erred by improperly excluding Section 8, Rule 117 from provisional dismissal on motion of the accused, there was no grave abuse of discretion.
On reconsideration, the CA reversed its position by ruling that:

Section 8, Rule 117 did apply to dismissals when the public prosecutor had been served with the order.
In Pedro’s case, the necessary proof of service was lacking, though later evidence indicated that the motion to reopen was filed after more than one year from the service of the dismissal order.

Consequently, Pedro’s motion for reconsideration was granted, and Los BaAos’ motion for modification of judgment was denied, effectively barring the state from reviving the case based on the time-bar provision.

Los BaAos, in his petition, prayed that the case be remanded for arraignment and trial or that appropriate charge sheets be refashioned, arguing that an order granting a motion to quash does not bar re-prosecution unless based on specific grounds.
Pedro contended that the RTC’s reopening of the case violated Section 8, Rule 117, as his motion to quash should have permanently dismissed the case.
The Supreme Court eventually granted the petition, modified and reversed the CA decisions, and remanded the case to the RTC for arraignment and trial, after correcting the Information to reflect the amendment introduced in Section 261(q) by Republic Act No. 7166.

Whether Section 8, Rule 117, which governs provisional dismissals, applies to the dismissal effected through Pedro’s motion to quash.
Whether the conditions for a provisional dismissal—such as the express consent of the accused, notification to the offended party, issuance of an order, and proper service to the public prosecutor—were properly met in this case.

Whether the dismissal of the Information by virtue of a motion to quash (based on alleged legal excuses or insufficient allegations) automatically subjects the case to the time-bar under Section 8, Rule 117.
The implications of treating a quashal dismissal as provisional and its effect on the possibility of re-filing the case.

Whether the lapse of the prescribed period (one year from service of the dismissal order) should bar the state from reviving the case.
Whether the trial court and the CA properly observed due process in handling the successive motions and orders regarding the reopening of the case.