A.M. No. 2124-MJ - Lopez vs. Ferdez

Case Summary (A.M. No. 2124-MJ)

Factual Background

A criminal action for grave threats under Article 282 of the Revised Penal Code was filed against Carlos Lopez, the complainant, in the Municipal Court of Digos, Davao del Sur, docketed as Criminal Case No. 3418. After trial, respondent judge Augusto H. Fernandez rendered a decision dated January 8, 1979 convicting the accused and imposing the penalty of 1 month and 21 days of arresto mayor, together with a fine of P50.00 and the costs.

Motion for Reconsideration and Modification of the Judgment

A motion for reconsideration dated January 17, 1979 was filed by private prosecutor Hermenegildo Cabreros. The motion prayed for the award of P2,300.00 as attorney’s fees, alleging that in accordance with Article 64 of the Revised Penal Code the penalty imposable upon the accused was arresto mayor in its medium period, given that there were no mitigating or aggravating circumstances. The motion was heard on January 22, 1979.

On the same date, the respondent judge issued the questioned order modifying the decision by increasing the penalty by ten days, from 1 month and 21 days to 2 months and 1 day of arresto mayor. The order also denied the prayer for damages. The respondent judge reasoned that, in the absence of any aggravating or mitigating circumstance, the penalty should be imposed in its medium period, and he accordingly modified the dispositive portion to impose 2 months and 1 day of arresto mayor, plus the fine of P50.00 and the costs.

Filing of Notice of Appeal and Receipt of the Modified Order

The records showed that on January 22, 1979, the same day the questioned order was issued, the complainant filed a notice of appeal informing the court that he was appealing to the Court of Appeals, Manila, from the January 8, 1979 decision convicting him. The complainant received the modified order on January 25, 1979.

The Administrative Complaint and Allegations

On February 22, 1979, Carlos Lopez filed the instant administrative complaint against respondent judge Augusto H. Fernandez. The complaint charged that the respondent judge committed grave abuse of discretion amounting to ignorance of the law by modifying the judgment and increasing the penalty after the accused had allegedly perfected his appeal. The complainant maintained that the appeal was duly filed on the same day, before the hearing and submission of the motion for reconsideration, and that the respondent therefore acted in gross disregard of the rule that the trial court loses jurisdiction upon perfection of the appeal. The complainant prayed for the removal of the respondent from office.

In his comment, respondent judge did not dispute that he issued the order modifying the decision on January 22, 1979, the same day the notice of appeal was filed. However, he asserted that the complainant’s appeal was perfected only on January 29, 1979, contending that “it is the court that determines the date of the perfection of the appeal and not the accused-complainant.”

Controlling Procedural Rules on Perfection of Criminal Appeals

The Supreme Court framed the central inquiry as a question of fact: whether the issuance of the respondent judge’s order actually preceded the perfection of the complainant’s appeal. It invoked Section 7 of Rule 120 of the Revised Rules of Court, under which a judgment of conviction may be modified or set aside by the court rendering it before finality or before the appeal has been perfected.

The Court also invoked Section 3 of Rule 122, under which an appeal in criminal cases is perfected upon the filing of the notice of appeal and the serving of a copy thereof on the adverse party or his attorney. The Court emphasized the settled rule that upon perfection of the appeal in conformity with the requirements of Rule 122, Section 3, the trial court loses jurisdiction over the case. It cited Director of Prisons, et al. vs. Judge Teodoro, et al., L-9043 (July 30, 1955), 97 Phil. 391, where the Court held that upon perfection of the appeal in a criminal case, the court loses jurisdiction over the record and the person of the accused-appellant.

Supreme Court’s Assessment of Proof and the Failure to Establish the Charge

The Supreme Court noted that there was “no clear showing” that the filing of the notice of appeal with the Municipal Court of Digos preceded in fact the hearing of the motion for reconsideration and the subsequent order modifying the judgment. The Court further addressed the alternative assumption that the notice of appeal was indeed filed before the modification. Even then, it held that the record did not show that the notice of appeal was served upon the adverse party or his attorney, as required by Rule 122, Section 3 for perfection. The Court likewise observed the absence of publication under Rule 122, Section 4 where personal service cannot be made, and the absence of waiver of notice under Rule 122, Section 5.

On this basis, the Court concluded that it would not dismiss the charge merely because it alleged a jurisdictional error; rather, it required proof of the administrative charge. It held that the act complained of was not established by reliable evidence to show total disregard of the rule carried out whimsically, capriciously, or maliciously. It applied the doctrinal standard that for serious misconduct to exist, there must be reliable evidence showing the judicial acts were corrupt or inspired by an intention to violate the law, or that they involved persistent disregard of well-known legal rules. The Court quoted Ludovico Ajeno vs. Hon. Inserto on the requirement that administrative liability for ignorance of the law demands reliable evidence of ill-motivation, corruption, intention to violate the law, or persistent disregard of rules.

The Court also reiterated the caution against administrative liability for every erroneous ruling. It relied on the emphasis attributed to then Justice, later Chief Justice, Makalintal, that to hold a judge administratively accountable for every erroneous decision would amount to harassment and would make the judge’s position unbearable. The Court characterized any error by the respondent at most as an erroneous judgment correctible through remedies provided under the Revised Rules of Court, not through administrative complaint.

Standard of Proof and the Constitutional Frame During the Relevant Period

The Court stressed that numerous administrative cases against judges were treated with utmost care because administrative proceedings were penal in nature and were governed by the rules applicable to criminal cases. It therefore required that the charges be proved beyond reasonable doubt. It cited this point by referencing In re Horrilleno, which had been adhered to in subsequent decisions.

Given the evidence submitted by the complainant, the Court held that the charge of grave abuse of discretion amounting to ignorance of the law was not sufficiently substantiated. It therefore determined that the complainant failed to meet the burden of proof required to warrant disciplinary action.

Reprimand for Ignorance of the Basic Rule on Appeal Perfection

While the Court refused to impose removal, it nonetheless found a ground for admonition. It observed that the respondent judge’s statements showed ignorance of a basic rule governing jurisdiction. Specifically, the respondent judge asserted in his comment that perfection of the appeal occurred only after January 29, 1979, and that the court determined the date of perfection, not the accused. The Court treated this position as an express indication of ignorance of the procedural rule that in criminal cases an appeal is deemed perfected upon filing of the notice of appeal in court and serving a c

Case Syllabus (A.M. No. 2124-MJ)

The case arose from an administrative complaint against Municipal Judge Augusto H. Fernandez of the Municipal Court of Digos, Davao del Sur.
The complainant Carlos Lopez charged the respondent judge with grave abuse of discretion amounting to ignorance of the law.
The complaint stemmed from the respondent judge’s modification of a judgment of conviction in a prior criminal case.
The Court treated the dispute as an administrative matter requiring proof of the alleged wrongdoing by reliable evidence.

Parties and Procedural Posture

Carlos Lopez appeared as the complainant and also as the accused in the earlier criminal case titled “People vs. Carlos Lopez.”
Hon. Augusto H. Fernandez, as Municipal Judge, appeared as the respondent.
The complainant filed an administrative complaint on February 22, 1979.
The administrative complaint prayed for the respondent judge’s removal from office.
The respondent judge filed a comment and did not dispute the factual timeline he issued the questioned order on the same day the notice of appeal was filed.
The Court ultimately dismissed the complaint but issued a reprimand to the respondent judge.

Key Factual Allegations

The prior criminal action was for grave threats under Article 282 of the Revised Penal Code and was docketed as Criminal Case No. 3418 in the Municipal Court of Digos.
After trial, the respondent judge rendered a decision dated January 8, 1979, convicting Carlos Lopez.
The January 8, 1979 decision imposed one month and twenty-one days of arresto mayor, plus a fine of P50.00 and costs.
A motion for reconsideration dated January 17, 1979 was filed by the private prosecutor Hermenegildo Cabreros.
The motion for reconsideration sought damages in P2,300.00 by way of attorney’s fees, and it argued that Article 64 of the Revised Penal Code required imposing the penalty in the medium period.
On January 22, 1979, the respondent judge held a hearing on the motion for reconsideration.
On the same day, the respondent judge issued the questioned order dated January 22, 1979.
The questioned order modified the earlier decision by increasing the penalty to two months and one day of arresto mayor, described as an increase of 10 days, and it denied the damages.
The questioned order stated that in the absence of neither aggravating nor mitigating circumstance, the penalty should be imposed in its medium period.
On January 22, 1979, the complainant filed a notice of appeal to the Court of Appeals, Manila, from the January 8, 1979 decision.
The complainant received the order amending the decision on January 25, 1979.
The administrative complaint alleged that the respondent judge modified the judgment increasing the penalty after the accused had perfected his appeal.
The complainant asserted that by doing so, the respondent judge acted in gross disregard of the rule that he had lost jurisdiction upon perfection of the appeal.

Core Legal Issues

The principal issue involved a question of fact: whether the respondent judge’s order of modification actually preceded the perfection of the complainant’s appeal.
The case required application of the rule that the trial court may modify or set aside a judgment before the judgment becomes final or the appeal is perfected.
The case also required determination of when a criminal appeal is deemed perfected under the then-applicable Revised Rules of Court.
The Court needed to decide whether the alleged jurisdictional error amounted to grave abuse of discretion or ignorance of the law.
The Court also addressed the evidentiary threshold applicable to administrative complaints against judges, particularly the requirement of reliable evidence.

Applicable Rules and Doctrines

Article 282 of the Revised Penal Code provided the penalty scheme for grave threats involving a threat not made subject to a condition.
Under Article 282, paragraph 2, the penalty included arresto mayor and a fine not exceeding 500 pesos if the threat was not conditioned.
Under the Revised Rules of Court, Rule 120, Section 7 allowed the judgment of conviction to be modified or set aside by the court rendering it before the judgment became final or before the appeal was perfected.
Under the Revised Rules of Court, Rule 122, Section 3 specified that an appeal is perfected upon the filing of the notice of appeal in court and the service of a copy thereof on the adverse party or his attorney.
The Court reiterated the doctrine that upon perfection of the appeal in conformity with Rule 122, Section 3, the trial court loses jurisdiction over the case.
The Court relied on the principle stated in Director of Prisons, et al. vs. Judge Teodoro, et al., L-9043 (July 30, 1955), 97 Phil. 391, that perfection of appeal divests the trial court of jurisdiction over both the record and the person of the accused-appellant.
The Court also cited Evaristo, et al. vs. Hon. Olegario Lastrilla, et al., G.R. No. L-14682 (November 29, 1960), 110 Phil. 181, and Alama vs. Abbas, G.R. No. L-19616 (November 29, 1966), 18 SCRA 836, in support of the governing rules on perfection of appeal.
For administrative liability, the Court invoked standards requiring more than an error of judgment.
The Court cited Administrative Matter No. 1098-CFI, May 31, 1976, 71 SCRA 166,