A.M. No. 2124-MJ - Lopez vs. Ferdez

A criminal action for grave threats under Article 282 of the Revised Penal Code was instituted against Carlos Lopez in the Municipal Court of Digos, Davao del Sur, docketed as Criminal Case No. 3418.
After trial, on January 8, 1979, Judge Augusto H. Fernandez rendered a decision convicting Lopez and imposing a sentence of 1 month and 21 days of arresto mayor, a fine of P50.00, and the costs.

A motion for reconsideration was filed on January 17, 1979, by private prosecutor Hermenegildo Cabreros. In this motion, damages of P2,300.00 for attorney’s fees were requested, citing that under Article 64 of the Revised Penal Code, the appropriate penalty should be that of arresto mayor in its medium period.
On January 22, 1979, during the hearing of the motion, Judge Fernandez modified his earlier decision by increasing the penalty to 2 months and 1 day of arresto mayor, while still denying the award of damages. The modified order explicitly stated that in the absence of aggravating or mitigating circumstances, the penalty should be imposed in its medium period.

On January 22, 1979, the very day the modified order was issued, Carlos Lopez filed a notice of appeal challenging the decision rendered on January 8, 1979.
Carlos Lopez received the modified order on January 25, 1979, thereby learning of the adjustment in his sentence.
On February 22, 1979, Lopez filed the administrative complaint against Judge Fernandez, charging him with "grave abuse of discretion amounting to ignorance of the law" for modifying the judgment after the appeal was supposedly perfected and requesting his removal from office.

The complaint asserted that Judge Fernandez improperly modified the judgment to increase the penalty after Carlos Lopez had perfected his appeal, thereby violating the rule that once an appeal is filed and perfected, the trial court loses jurisdiction over further modifications.
In his comment, Judge Fernandez contended that perfection of the appeal occurred only on January 29, 1979, declaring that it was the court’s prerogative to determine the date of perfection rather than that of the accused.
Relevant judicial rules cited include Section 7, Rule 120 (allowing modification of a conviction before the appeal is perfected) and Section 3, Rule 122 (which sets the requirements for perfection of an appeal through filing and proper service).

Whether the issuance of the judge’s order modifying the judgment actually preceded the perfection of the notice of appeal.

Was the notice of appeal, as required under Section 3, Rule 122 (including the mandatory service on the adverse party or his attorney), effectively perfected before the modification of the judgment on January 22, 1979?
Does the timing of these events grant the trial court continued jurisdiction to modify its decision?

Whether the act of modifying the judgment amounts to "grave abuse of discretion amounting to ignorance of the law."

Is there reliable evidence demonstrating that the judge intentionally disregarded well-established legal rules by modifying the judgment post the filing of the notice of appeal?
Can this error, if determined to have occurred, warrant an administrative disciplinary action as severe as removal from office?