G.R. No. L-33352 - Lerma vs. Court of Appeals

Case Summary (G.R. No. L-33352)

Key Dates and Procedural Timeline

Aug. 22, 1969: Petitioner Lerma filed a criminal complaint for adultery against respondent Diaz and Teodoro Ramirez (Crim. Case No. 0519, CFI Rizal).
Nov. 18, 1969: Diaz filed in the Juvenile and Domestic Relations Court a complaint for legal separation (grounds: concubinage and attempt against her life), custody and support, with an urgent petition for support pendente lite for herself and youngest son Gregory.
Dec. 24, 1969: Lower court issued an order granting support pendente lite.
Feb. 15, 1970: Lower court amended its order reducing monthly support from P2,250 to P1,820 and declared support due from date of complaint.
Mar. 12, 1970: Lerma petitioned the Court of Appeals for certiorari and prohibition with preliminary injunction to annul the lower court orders.
Oct. 8, 1970: Court of Appeals decision set aside the lower court orders and directed opportunity for petitioner to present evidence before the lower court.
Jan. 20, 1971: Court of Appeals, on respondent’s motion for reconsideration, set aside its Oct. 8 decision and dismissed the petition.
Mar. 21, 1971: Petitioner filed petition for review by certiorari to the Supreme Court.
Jan.–Mar. 1974: Petitioner sought injunctive relief from the Supreme Court; a temporary restraining order was issued Jan. 28, 1974, later denied Feb. 8, 1974, and reinstated Mar. 6, 1974 pending further orders; hearings and memoranda followed through May 20, 1974.
Dec. 20, 1974: Supreme Court rendered the decision set out below.

Applicable Law and Governing Rules

Rule 61, Section 5, Revised Rules of Court (support pendente lite): court must provisionally determine pertinent facts and render such order as equity and justice may require, considering necessities of applicant, means of adverse party, probable outcome of the case, and other relevant circumstances.
Civil Code provisions cited: Article 292 (support from conjugal partnership during pendency of legal separation), Article 100 (legal separation claimed only by innocent spouse; no claim where both spouses are offenders), Article 104 (entitlement to live separately after petitioning for legal separation), Article 303 (obligation to give support ceases upon acts giving rise to disinheritance), Article 921 (disinheritance where spouse has given cause for legal separation).
Relevant jurisprudence (as relied upon and discussed): Quintana v. Lerma, Sanchez v. Zulueta, Mangoma v. Macadaeg, and Olayvar v. Olayvar — holdings recognizing adultery as a defense to a claim for personal support.

Core Procedural Issue Presented

Whether the Court of Appeals erred when it affirmed the Juvenile and Domestic Relations Court’s grant of support pendente lite to Diaz, by (a) failing to find grave abuse of discretion in the lower court’s procedural handling (i.e., allegedly issuing support orders without provisionally determining pertinent facts or giving petitioner opportunity to present evidence), and (b) applying Article 292 of the Civil Code to conclude that support from conjugal partnership property is mandatory during the pendency of legal separation proceedings even where the wife is guilty of adultery.

Facts Relevant to Substantive Defense

Petitioner had criminally charged the respondent for adultery; on Sept. 26, 1972 the Court of First Instance of Rizal convicted Diaz and her co-accused (Teodoro Ramirez) of adultery, a conviction then pending appeal in the Court of Appeals. This conviction and related facts (premature birth in March 1970 linked to adulterous relations, falsified hospital/death records, subsequent alleged paramour Jose Gochangco with supporting photographs, and pending adultery charges against Diaz and Gochangco) were presented to the Supreme Court and not denied by Diaz in the proceedings before the Court. These proffered facts bear on the proposition that Diaz was not an “innocent spouse.”

Legal Analysis — Procedural Aspect (Rule 61, Sec. 5)

Rule 61, Section 5 requires a provisional determination of pertinent facts, including an assessment of the probable outcome of the main action, when granting support pendente lite. The petitioner contended the lower court issued its orders based on the complaint's bare allegations without such provisional fact-finding and without affording him the opportunity to present evidence in support of his adultery defense. The Court held that the question whether petitioner should have been allowed to present such evidence became moot in light of the subsequent conviction and related facts which supplied a sufficient provisional showing of respondent’s guilt, satisfying the standard of Rule 61 for a provisional determination and supporting denial of support pendente lite.

Legal Analysis — Substantive Aspect (Adultery as Defense; Article 292)

The Court examined whether Article 292’s statement that spouses and children shall be supported from the conjugal partnership property during pendency of legal separation precludes adultery as a defense to support pendente lite. The Court concluded:

Article 292 merely designates the source of support during the pendency of a legal separation action (conjugal partnership property); it is not itself a substantive grant insulating an otherwise groundless application for support from defenses.
The right to support presupposes a justifiable cause for separate living; if the petition for legal separation is groundless or filed in bad faith by a spouse who is guilty of acts giving rise to legal separation, that spouse may lose the substantive right to such support.
Article 100 bars a guilty spouse from claiming legal separation and, inferentially, undermines the basis for support pendente lite where the spouse seeking separation is guilty. Rule 61’s requirement to consider the “probable outcome of the case” supports refusing support pendente lite when preliminary evidence indicates the separation petition will not prosper because the petitioner is not an innocent spouse.
Civil Code provisions dealing with cessation of support and disinheritance (Arts. 303 and 921) buttress the principle that wrongful acts (including acts giving rise to legal separation) can deprive a spouse of support rights.

Thus, the Court held adultery remains a valid defense to a petition for support pendente lite, including claims to support from conjugal partnership property, when preliminary facts (such as a conviction) render the legal separation claim unlikely to succeed.

Holding and Disposition

The Supreme Court set aside: (1) the Co

Case Syllabus (G.R. No. L-33352)

Citation and Procedural Posture

Reported at 158 Phil. 1076, First Division, G.R. No. L-33352, decided December 20, 1974; decision penned by Chief Justice Makalintal.
Before the Supreme Court for resolution:
- (1) Petitioner Teodoro E. Lerma's petition for review by certiorari filed March 21, 1971 to set aside the Court of Appeals' resolution in CA-G.R. No. 44906-R that dismissed his petition for certiorari and prohibition with preliminary injunction; and
- (2) Petitioner’s motion for reconsideration of the Supreme Court’s resolution dated February 8, 1974 denying his urgent motion for issuance of a writ of preliminary injunction and/or restraining order to enjoin enforcement of certain orders of the Juvenile and Domestic Relations Court of Quezon City.
Acting Justices and disposition notation:
- Opinion by Makalintal, C.J.; Justices Castro (Chairman), Teehankee, Makasiar, and Munoz Palma concur.
- Justice Esguerra took no part.
- Final disposition: the January 20, 1971 resolution of the Court of Appeals and the orders of the Juvenile and Domestic Relations Court dated December 24, 1969 and February 15, 1970 were set aside and their enforcement enjoined; no pronouncement as to costs.

Parties and Relationship

Petitioner: Teodoro E. Lerma.
Respondents: The Honorable Court of Appeals and Concepcion Diaz (private respondent).
Marital relationship:
- Petitioner and respondent Diaz were husband and wife, married on May 19, 1951.
- They are parties to pending legal separation proceedings instituted by respondent Diaz in the Juvenile and Domestic Relations Court, Quezon City.
Children of the parties (names and ages at time of filing of the complaint):
- Gerardo (17), George (16), Gelacio (14), Gilbert (11), Gregory (9), and Ma. Victoria (8).

Underlying Facts Relevant to the Dispute

Criminal proceeding parallel to marital dispute:
- On August 22, 1969, petitioner Lerma filed a complaint for adultery against respondent Diaz and one Teodoro Ramirez (Crim. Case No. 0519, Court of First Instance of Rizal).
Civil proceeding by respondent Diaz:
- On November 18, 1969, respondent Diaz filed before the Juvenile and Domestic Relations Court (presided by Judge Leonor Ines Luciano) a complaint for legal separation and/or separation of properties, for custody of children, and for support.
- The complaint was based on grounds of concubinage and attempt against her life.
- An urgent petition for support pendente lite for respondent and the youngest son Gregory (then in respondent’s custody) was included.
Facts concerning alleged adultery and related incidents (as set out in the record and not denied by respondent):
- March 30, 1970: respondent gave birth prematurely to a baby boy who died the same day; she had entered the hospital under the assumed name “Gloria Santos.”
- The dead child’s death certificate falsely identified the mother as Rosario E. Salita; Rosario E. Salita was criminally charged and convicted for the falsification; respondent was acquitted on reasonable doubt.
- September 26, 1972: the Court of First Instance of Rizal convicted respondent Diaz and co-accused Teodoro Ramirez for adultery and sentenced them to imprisonment; that judgment was on appeal to the Court of Appeals.
- After Teodoro Ramirez, respondent allegedly had another paramour, a Manila policeman, Jose Gochangco, and criminal adultery charges were later filed against them before the City Fiscal of Manila; photographs of respondent and Jose Gochangco in an intimate pose were submitted to the Supreme Court and their veracity was not disputed in the record.

Orders of the Juvenile and Domestic Relations Court (Lower Court)

Initial order granting support pendente lite: dated December 24, 1969.
Amended order (as stated in the record):
- The amended order was dated February 15, 1979 in one part of the source (but later referred to as February 15, 1970); the amended terms provided:
  - (1) Respondent was declared entitled to support pendente lite from the date of filing of the complaint; and
  - (2) Monthly support was reduced from P2,250.00 to P1,820.00.
Subsequent order dated January 19, 1974 (issued by Judge Luciano per petitioner’s urgent motion) ordered the petitioner to pay the awarded support pendente lite within 15 days (as recounted in the petitioner’s urgent motion allegations).

Proceedings in the Court of Appeals

March 12, 1970: Petitioner filed a petition for certiorari and prohibition with preliminary injunction in the Court of Appeals, seeking annulment of the Juvenile Court’s orders on the ground of grave abuse of discretion.
March 13, 1970: The Court of Appeals gave due course to the petition and issued a writ of preliminary injunction to enjoin Judge Luciano from enforcing the orders.
Decision of Court of Appeals, October 8, 1970:
- Set aside the assailed orders of the Juvenile Court.
- Granted petitioner an opportunity to present evidence before the lower court in support of his defense against the application for support pendente lite.
Respondent Diaz moved for reconsideration, arguing petitioner had not requested opportunity to present evidence.
Resolution of the Court of Appeals, January 20, 1971:
- Set aside the October 8, 1970 decision and rendered another decision dismissing the petition for certiorari and prohibition. That resolution is the subject of Lerma’s petition for review before the Supreme Court.

Reliefs and Urgent Motions Before the Supreme Court

March 21, 1971: Petitioner Lerma filed the present petition for review by certiorari before the Supreme Court to set aside the Court of Appeals’ January 20, 1971 resolution.
January 23, 1974: Petitioner filed an urgent motion for a writ of preliminary injunction and/or restraining order before the Supreme Court alleging:
- Respondent had not sought enforcement of the Juvenile Court orders during the pendency of the appeal until December 5, 1973;
- On December 5, 1973 respondent filed in the Juvenile Court an urgent motion to have the petitioner ordered to pay current and arrear support pendente lite, on the ground the orders were immediately executory in absence of an injunction;
- Petitioner opposed that motion in the Juvenile Court, asserting respondent’s belated move was made after petitioner filed new adultery charges against her and her second paramour and after petitioner sought custody of Gregory;
- The petitioner asserted that unless the Juvenile Court was enjoined from enforcing its orders, the petition before the Supreme Court would be rendered moot and academic.
January 28, 1974: Acting on petitioner’s motion, the Supreme Court issued an ex parte temporary restraining order effective immediately until further orders, addressed to Judge Luciano, her agents and representatives.
Respondent filed opposition to petitioner’s urgent motion and prayed for immediate lifting of the ex parte TRO, reiterating:
- An order granting support pendente lite is immediately executory although interlocutory, even if appealed, unless enjoined;
- That dismissal of petitioner’s CA petition rendered functus officio the prior writ of preliminary injunction issued by the Court of Appeals; and
- That Article 292 of the New Civil Code mandates support from conjugal partnership property during proceedings for legal separation or annulment, and such support is mandatory even if the wife is guilty of adultery.
February 8, 1974: The Supreme Court issued a minute resolution denying petitioner’s urgent motion for a writ of preliminary injunction.
February 28, 1974: Petitioner filed a motion for reconsideration of the Supreme Court’s denial.
March 6, 1974: The Supreme Court issued another resolution setting aside its February 8, 1974 resolution and reinstated the temporary restraining order until further or