G.R. No. L-33352 - Lerma vs. Court of Appeals

Petitioner Teodoro E. Lerma and respondent Concepcion Diaz are husband and wife, married on May 19, 1951.
The case involves separate actions initiated by both parties: Lerma filed a complaint for adultery against Diaz while Diaz filed a complaint for legal separation (or separation of properties) together with custody and support claims for their children.

On August 22, 1969, Lerma initiated a criminal complaint for adultery against Diaz and another, Teodoro Ramirez, in the Court of First Instance of Rizal.
On November 18, 1969, Diaz filed her complaint with the Juvenile and Domestic Relations Court of Quezon City alleging legal separation on grounds of concubinage and an attempt against her life, while also seeking support pendente lite for herself and their youngest son, Gregory.
Judge Leonor Ines Luciano of the lower court granted Diaz’s application for support pendente lite on December 24, 1969, later amending it on February 15, 1970 by reducing the monthly support amount from ₱2,250.00 to ₱1,820.00.
Lerma opposed the support claim, basing his defense on the very adultery claim he had previously filed against his wife.

On March 12, 1970, Lerma filed a petition for certiorari and prohibition with a request for a preliminary injunction in the Court of Appeals, seeking annulment of the lower court’s orders on the ground of grave abuse of discretion.
The Court of Appeals initially gave due course by issuing a writ of preliminary injunction against Judge Luciano’s enforcement of the support orders, and later on October 8, 1970, set aside the challenged orders, allowing Lerma to present evidence in the lower court.
However, on January 20, 1971, the Court of Appeals reversed its earlier decision by dismissing the petition on the ground that Lerma had not asked to present evidence in the lower court.

On January 23, 1974, Lerma filed an urgent motion for a writ of preliminary injunction and/or restraining order against the execution of the support orders, asserting several arguments:

That for three years the respondent had not sought enforcement of the support orders until she moved to enforce them on December 5, 1973.
That her belated move came only after new allegations and actions by Lerma regarding adultery and the custody of their son.
That the respondent’s earlier criminal conviction for adultery (with the conviction pending appeal) should negatively impact her claim.
That Judge Luciano’s order on January 19, 1974 required him to pay within 15 days.

On January 28, 1974, the Court issued a temporary restraining order in Lerma’s favor.
After opposing Lerma’s motion and asking for the lifting of the restraining order, the Court denied the urgent motion in a minute resolution dated February 8, 1974.
Lerma filed a motion for reconsideration on February 28, 1974, to which the Court responded on March 6, 1974 by setting aside its February 8 decision and reinstating the temporary restraining order, pending further directions.

The petitioner underscored the relevancy of the criminal conviction of the respondent for adultery by the Court of First Instance on September 26, 1972, including the submission of photographs showing her with a second paramour.
Additional factual issues, such as the occurrence of a premature birth following an adulterous relationship and a falsified death certificate, were introduced to reinforce the petitioner’s defense.
The factual matrix also involved the timing and nature of both actions—civil and criminal—establishing a backdrop for the central issues regarding support and legal separation.

Whether the lower court, in granting support pendente lite, committed a grave abuse of discretion by issuing the orders without provisionally determining all pertinent facts in conformity with Section 5 of Rule 61 of the Revised Rules of Court.
Whether the petitioner was unduly deprived of the opportunity to present evidence in the lower court in support of his defense based on the adultery allegations.

Whether adultery constitutes a good defense against a claim for support pendente lite, particularly when the support is to be drawn from the conjugal partnership property as contemplated under Article 292 of the Civil Code.
Whether filing a suit for legal separation on a ground where the petitioner is guilty (as indicated by the criminal conviction for adultery) negates the claimant’s right to receive support pendente lite.

The scope and application of Article 292 of the Civil Code in the context of support pendente lite during legal separation proceedings.
How the provisional determination of the “probable outcome of the case” under Rule 61 should affect the granting or withholding of support, especially when one party has been found to be at fault.