G.R. No. 137256-58 - People vs. Ernas

Case Summary (G.R. No. 137256-58)

Factual Background

The information alleged that on February 27, 1963 petitioner, while lawfully married to Elvira Makatangay, wilfully, unlawfully and feloniously contracted a second marriage with Fe Lourdes Pasia. On March 15, 1963 Fe Lourdes Pasia filed a civil action in the same court to have her marriage to petitioner declared null and void ab initio on the ground of force, threats and intimidation and by reason of its alleged bigamous character. On June 15, 1963 petitioner, then defendant in the civil action, filed a third-party complaint against Elvira Makatangay praying that his marriage with her be declared null and void on the ground of duress. The chronology thus placed the criminal information before the third-party complaint.

Trial Court Proceedings

Petitioner moved on October 7, 1963 to suspend the criminal proceedings pending resolution of the civil annulment litigation. Respondent Judge denied the motion on November 19, 1963 and denied the motion for reconsideration on March 2, 1964. Petitioner sought relief by petition for certiorari and prohibition with preliminary injunction, which this Court admitted and on March 17, 1964 required the respondent Judge to answer and issued a preliminary injunction restraining further proceedings in the bigamy case. The petition was later amended to include the People of the Philippines, and the respondent answered on May 14, 1964.

The Parties' Contentions

Petitioner contended that the pendency of the civil action for annulment raised a prejudicial question that had to be decided before the criminal prosecution for bigamy could proceed. Petitioner relied on the contention that a determination of the validity of the marriages would be determinative of his criminal liability. Respondents denied that the civil proceedings automatically raised a prejudicial question. The respondent Judge and the People argued that parties to a marriage may not adjudge its nullity for themselves and that, as explained in authoritative authorities, a marriage is presumed valid until judicially declared void; therefore the mere pendency of annulment actions did not bar or suspend the criminal prosecution for bigamy.

Issues Presented

The principal issue was whether the existence of a civil action for annulment of marriage, and petitioner's later filing of a third-party complaint to annul the first marriage, constituted a prejudicial question that required suspension of the criminal prosecution for bigamy pending final determination of the civil controversies.

Ruling of the Supreme Court

The Court, through Justice Fernando, denied the petition for certiorari and dissolved the writ of preliminary injunction. The Court held that respondent Judge did not abuse, much less gravely abuse, his discretion in refusing to suspend the criminal proceedings. Costs were imposed. Chief Justice Concepcion and Justices Reyes, J.B.L., Dizon, Makalintal, Bengzon, J.P., Zaldivar, Sanchez, Ruiz Castro and Angeles concurred. Justice Castro reserved his vote.

Legal Basis and Reasoning

The Court reviewed the doctrine governing prejudicial question as articulated in prior decisions such as Merced v. Dlez (L-15315, August 26, 1960) and Zapanta v. Mendoza (L-14534, February 28, 1962). Those authorities held that a prejudicial question exists when the resolution of a civil issue is a logical antecedent to, and determinative of, the criminal issue and when jurisdiction to resolve that issue lies in another tribunal; in such cases the civil issue must be decided first. The Court distinguished those cases from the present facts. Here, at the time the information was filed the fact of two marriages was indisputable. The civil action filed on March 15, 1963 was by the second spouse to annul the second marriage. Petitioner’s third-party complaint, filed on June 15, 1963, sought later to annul the first marriage. The Court relied on 3 Viada, Penal Code for the principle that parties to a marriage should not be permitted to pronounce its nullity for themselves and that the marriage is presumed valid until a competent court declares otherwise. The Court explained that a party who contracts a se

Case Syllabus (G.R. No. 137256-58)

Parties and Posture

Rolando Landicho was the petitioner who sought certiorari and prohibition with preliminary injunction to restrain further prosecution of a criminal case for bigamy.
Hon. Lorenzo Relova, in his capacity as Judge of the Court of First Instance of Batangas, Branch I, and the People of the Philippines were the respondents.
The petition challenged the respondent judge’s denial of petitioner’s motion to suspend the bigamy prosecution pending determination of civil actions for annulment of the marriages involved.

Key Facts

The petitioner was indicted for bigamy on February 27, 1963, on the allegation that he was lawfully married to Elvira Makatangay and thereafter contracted a second marriage with Fe Lourdes Pasia.
On March 15, 1963, Fe Lourdes Pasia filed a civil action for annulment seeking to declare her marriage to petitioner null and void because of alleged force, threats and intimidation and because of its alleged bigamous character.
On June 15, 1963, petitioner, as defendant in the civil annulment action, filed a third-party complaint against Elvira Makatangay seeking declaration of nullity of the first marriage on the ground of alleged force, threats and intimidation.
Petitioner moved on October 7, 1963 to suspend the criminal proceedings pending the civil determination of the validity of the marriages, and the respondent judge denied the motion on November 19, 1963.
A motion for reconsideration was denied on March 2, 1964, and the petitioner filed the present petition on March 13, 1964.

Procedural History

The Supreme Court required an answer from the respondent judge by resolution of March 17, 1964, and issued a preliminary injunction restraining further proceedings in the bigamy prosecution.
An amended petition adding the People of the Philippines as respondent was admitted on April 3, 1964.
The respondents filed an answer on May 14, 1964, admitting the factual allegations with qualifications and asserting as a special affirmative defense that the civil annulment actions did not automatically raise a prejudicial question warranting suspension of the criminal case.

Issues Presented

Whether the pendency of a civil action for annulment filed by the second spouse and a subsequently filed third-party complaint by the accused against the first spouse constituted a prejudicial question that required suspension of the pending criminal prosecution for bigamy.
Whether th