G.R. No. L-22579 - Landicho vs. Relova

On February 27, 1963, petitioner Rolando Landicho was charged and indicted for bigamy before the Court of First Instance of Batangas, Branch I, under the supervision of Judge Lorenzo Relova.
The information alleged that although petitioner was lawfully married to Elvira Makatangay, he subsequently contracted a second marriage with Fe. Lourdes Pasia without legal dissolution of the first marriage.

On March 15, 1963, Fe. Lourdes Pasia initiated a civil suit before the same court, seeking to declare her marriage to the petitioner null and void ab initio.

The suit was based on allegations that the petitioner had employed force, threats, and intimidation, rendering the marriage bigamous and void.

On June 15, 1963, petitioner, who was a defendant in the civil suit, filed a third-party complaint against his first spouse, Elvira Makatangay.

He sought a judicial declaration of nullity for his marriage with her on the ground that she had allegedly compelled him through force, threats, and intimidation during the marriage ceremony.

On October 7, 1963, petitioner moved to suspend the criminal proceedings for bigamy pending the resolution of the civil suits questioning the validity of his marriages.
Judge Relova rendered a decision denying the motion on November 19, 1963, basing his determination on the premise that the existence of civil actions questioning the validity of the marriages did not automatically constitute a prejudicial question sufficient to suspend the criminal case.
A subsequent motion for reconsideration was likewise denied on March 2, 1964.

Petitioner filed a petition for certiorari and prohibition on March 13, 1964, challenging the lower court’s decision.
A resolution dated March 17, 1964, mandated that Judge Relova answer the petition within ten days and issued a preliminary injunction to refrain from further prosecuting the bigamy case.
An amended petition was later filed, adding the People of the Philippines as a respondent, which was admitted on April 3, 1964.
On May 14, 1964, an answer was submitted that, while admitting the facts as detailed, stressed that:

The filing of actions for annulment by the second wife or the filing of a third-party complaint by petitioner did not automatically raise a prejudicial question.
Even if the first marriage were declared null and void, such a declaration would not materially affect the criminal prosecution for bigamy.
Reliance was placed on the legal principle, as contained in Viada, that the nullity of a marriage can only be determined by competent courts.

The answer referenced Viada, explaining that parties to a marriage are not in a position to unilaterally judge its nullity.
The case also cited Merced v. Dlez and Zapanta v. Mendoza to underscore that:

The validity of a second marriage must first be determined in a civil suit before the criminal action for bigamy can proceed.
The declaratory process concerning the nullity of the marriage is a logical antecedent to the prosecution of bigamy.

The court emphasized that until a judicial declaration of nullity is rendered, the presumption remains that the marriage is valid.
Petitioner, by contracting a second marriage without first obtaining such declaration, presumed the risk of criminal liability for bigamy.
There was no evidence to support the claim that the third-party complaint against the first spouse was filed to manipulate or invoke a prejudicial question.

Whether the existence of concurrent civil actions—the annulment suit filed by the second spouse and the third-party complaint filed by petitioner—constituted a prejudicial question that warranted the suspension of the criminal bigamy proceedings.

Determining if the pending civil actions calling into question the validity of the marriages are interdependent with the criminal prosecution.
Assessing whether the judicial declaration on the nullity of the marriages is a necessary antecedent before the prosecution for bigamy can continue.