Title
Lambino vs. Commission on Elections
Case
G.R. No. 174153
Decision Date
Oct 25, 2006
Petitioners sought to amend the 1987 Constitution via a people's initiative, proposing a shift to a Unicameral-Parliamentary system. The Supreme Court dismissed the petition, ruling it failed to meet constitutional requirements, reaffirmed *Santiago v. COMELEC*, and held the changes constituted a revision, not an amendment.

Case Summary (G.R. No. 174153)

COMELEC’s ruling and rationale

On 31 August 2006 COMELEC denied due course to the petition, relying on this Court’s ruling in Santiago v. COMELEC that RA 6735 was “incomplete, inadequate or wanting in essential terms and conditions” to implement initiative on amendments to the Constitution and that COMELEC was enjoined from entertaining such petitions until a sufficient enabling law was enacted. COMELEC applied Santiago and dismissed the initiative petition without making a merits determination on the sufficiency of signatures or the petition’s contents.

Parties’ positions before the Court

Petitioners sought writs of certiorari and mandamus to set aside COMELEC’s denial and compel it to give due course and call a plebiscite. They argued Santiago is not binding precedent or did not apply to them and urged that RA 6735 and COMELEC rules sufficiently implement the initiative clause. Opposing intervenors argued Santiago is binding, raised standing and verification challenges, contended the petition lacked the required form and substance (the signature sheets lacked the full text), alleged fraud and defective signature verification in many districts, argued the petition proposed a constitutional revision rather than an amendment, and invoked RA 6735’s single‑subject rule (Section 10(a)) and other defects.

Issues presented to the Court

The consolidated petitions raised three principal issues:

  1. Whether the Lambino Group’s petition complied with Section 2, Article XVII of the 1987 Constitution and RA 6735 (i.e., the people’s initiative requirements and how they must be satisfied in practice);
  2. Whether this Court should revisit Santiago v. COMELEC and the Court’s conclusion that RA 6735 is inadequate to implement initiative on constitutional amendments; and
  3. Whether COMELEC committed grave abuse of discretion in denying due course to the petition.

Governing constitutional standard on people’s initiative (Section 2, Article XVII)

The Court emphasized that Section 2, Article XVII allows amendments “directly proposed by the people through initiative upon a petition,” and that the Constitution’s framers expressly envisioned the people signing a petition that contains the full text of the proposed amendments (or a clearly stated attachment showing the full text). The framers’ deliberations, and comparative U.S. state jurisprudence cited by the Court, require that signatories be shown the full text before they sign so their assent is truly informed and to guard against fraud, deception and logrolling.

Full‑text and petition‑form requirement; application to the Lambino petition

The Court found as an indisputable factual and legal defect that the signature sheets submitted did not contain the full text of the proposed constitutional amendments, nor did they indicate that the full text was attached to the signature sheets. The only document showing the full proposal filed with COMELEC was not the paper that the people signed; petitioners admitted they printed only 100,000 copies of the petition text while claiming over 6.3 million signatures were collected, and could not prove wide distribution. The Court held that an initiative isValid only if signatories sign a petition that contains or incorporates the full text (either on the face or properly attached and noted), so the people have seen the full text before signing. Because the Lambino Group’s signature sheets were limited to an abstract question and omitted the text, the Court concluded the initiative did not satisfy Section 2, Article XVII’s requirement that the amendment be “directly proposed by the people through initiative upon a petition.”

Full‑text requirement: reasons, authorities, and risks (fraud/logrolling)

The Court explained rationale and supporting authorities: signatories must see the full text to make an intelligent choice, prevent fraud by promoters who might misrepresent the proposal, and prevent logrolling (combining unrelated subjects in one proposition so voters are forced to accept undesirable measures to obtain desired ones). The Lambino petition included transitory provisions authorizing the interim parliament to propose further amendments within 45 days, a provision materially unrelated to the basic institutional change; that provision looked like logrolling and further demonstrated why the people must sign a petition showing the complete text.

Amendment versus revision; qualitative and quantitative tests; application to the proposed changes

The Court reiterated the distinction between amendment and revision under Article XVII: Section 1 (Congress/Constitutional Convention) applies to “any amendment to, or revision of, this Constitution,” while Section 2 (people’s initiative) applies only to “amendments.” Drawing on comparative jurisprudence and commentary, the Court described two tests: a quantitative test (how many provisions/articles are affected) and a qualitative test (whether the basic structure/framework of government is altered). The Lambino Group’s proposal would eliminate the presidential executive and merge the legislative and executive powers into a unicameral parliament, abolish a chamber of Congress, and make sweeping structural changes. The Court held those changes are a revision — a fundamental alteration of the Constitution’s basic plan and separation of powers — and therefore outside the scope of a people’s initiative under Section 2, Article XVII.

RA 6735’s adequacy and Santiago; whether the Court should revisit Santiago

The Court explained that even assuming arguendo RA 6735 were adequate (contrary to Santiago), the Lambino petition would still be constitutionally defective for the independent reasons above (lack of full‑text petition and the petition sought a revision). Thus the Court declined to revisit Santiago because doing so would not change the outcome. The Court also reiterated the principle that courts should avoid constitutional adjudication when a case can be resolved on other grounds.

COMELEC’s denial of due course and grave abuse of discretion

Because COMELEC followed this Court’s controlling ruling in Santiago and refused to give due course, the Court held there was no grave abuse of discretion attributable to COMELEC. The Court reaffirmed that COMELEC’s action mirrored this Court’s prior decisions on the adequacy of RA 6735 and the limits on ente

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