The life of the law is not logic but experience.
Our collective experience as a nation breathes life to our system of laws, especially to the Constitution. These cases promise to significantly contribute to our collective experience as a nation. Fealty to the primary constitutional principle that the Philippines is not merely a republican State but a democratic one as well behooves this Court to affirm the right of the people to participate directly in the process of introducing changes to their fundamental law. These petitions present such an opportunity. Thus, this is an opportune time for this Court to uphold the sovereign rights of the people.
I agree with the opinion of Mr. Justice Reynato Puno who has sufficiently explained the rationale for upholding the people's initiative. However, I wish to share my own thoughts on certain matters I deem material and significant.
The COMELEC denied the petition for initiative filed by petitioners purportedly on the basis of this Court's ruling in
that: (1) RA 6753 was inadequate to cover the system of initiative regarding amendments to the Constitution and (2) the COMELEC was permanently enjoined from entertaining or taking cognizance of any petition for initiative regarding amendments to the Constitution until a sufficient law was validly enacted to provide for the implementation of the initiative provision.
should not apply to this case but only to the petition of Delfin in 1997. It would be unreasonable to make it apply to all petitions which were yet unforeseen in 1997. The fact is that
was focused on the Delfin petition alone.
Those who oppose the exercise of the people's right to initiate changes to the Constitution via initiative claim that
barred any and all future petitions for initiative by virtue of the doctrines of
. The argument is flawed.
of Mr. Justice Puno has amply discussed the arguments relating to
. Hence, I will address the argument from the viewpoint of
.
is the rule that a final judgment rendered by a court of competent jurisdiction on the merits is conclusive as to the rights of the parties and their privies and, as to them, constitutes an absolute bar to a subsequent action involving the same claim, demand or cause of action.
It has the following requisites: (1) the former judgment or order must be final; (2) it must have been rendered by a court having jurisdiction of the subject matter and of the parties; (3) it must be a judgment or order on the merits and (4) there must be identity of parties, of subject matter, and of cause of action between the first and second actions.
and the instant case. While the COMELEC was also the respondent in
, the petitioners in that case and those in this case are different. More significantly, there is no identity of causes of action in the two cases.
involved amendments to Sections 4 and 7 of Article VI, Section 4 of Article VII and Section 8 of Article X of the Constitution while the present petition seeks to amend Sections 1to 7 of Article VI and Sections 1 to 4 of the 1987 Constitution. Clearly, therefore, the COMELEC committed grave abuse of discretion when it ruled that the present petition for initiative was barred by
and, on that ground, dismissed the petition.
are materially different from each other. They are not based on the same facts. There is thus no cogent reason to frustrate and defeat the present direct action of the people to exercise their sovereignty by proposing changes to their fundamental law.
People's initiative is an option reserved by the people for themselves exclusively. Neither Congress nor the COMELEC has the power to curtail or defeat this exclusive power of the people to change the Constitution. Neither should the exercise of this power be made subject to any conditions, as some would have us accept.
that RA 6735 was inadequate to cover the system of initiative on amendments to the Constitution and, thus, no law existed to enable the people to directly propose changes to the Constitution. This reasoning is seriously objectionable.
The pronouncement on the insufficiency of RA 6735 was, to my mind, out of place. It was unprecedented and dangerously transgressed the domain reserved to the legislature.
While the legislature is authorized to establish procedures for determining the validity and sufficiency of a petition to amend the constitution,
that procedure cannot unnecessarily restrict the initiative privilege.
In the same vein, this Court cannot unnecessarily and unreasonably restrain the people's right to directly propose changes to the Constitution by declaring a law inadequate simply for lack of a sub-heading and other grammatical but insignificant omissions. Otherwise, the constitutional intent to empower the people will be severely emasculated, if not rendered illusory.
If Congress and a constitutional convention, both of which are mere representative bodies, can propose changes to the Constitution, there is no reason why the supreme body politic itself - the people - may not do so directly.
Resort to initiative to amend the constitution or enact a statute is an exercise of "direct democracy" as opposed to "representative democracy." The system of initiative allows citizens to directly propose constitutional amendments for the general electorate to adopt or reject at the polls, particularly in a plebiscite. While representative government was envisioned to "refine and enlarge the public views, by passing them through the medium of a chosen body of citizens, whose wisdom may best discern the true interest of their country, and whose patriotism and love of justice will be least likely to sacrifice it to temporary or partial considerations,"
the exercise of "direct democracy" through initiative reserves direct lawmaking power to the people by providing them a method to make new laws via the constitution, or alternatively by enacting statutes.
Efforts of the represented to control their representatives through initiative have been described as curing the problems of democracy with more democracy.
The Constitution celebrates the sovereign right of the people and declares that "sovereignty resides in the people and all government authority emanates from them."
Unless the present petition is granted, this constitutional principle will be nothing but empty rhetoric, devoid of substance for those whom it seeks to empower.
The right of the people to pass legislation and to introduce changes to the Constitution is a fundamental right and must be jealously guarded.
The people should be allowed to directly seek redress of the problems of society and representative democracy with the constitutional tools they have reserved for their use alone.
Accordingly, I vote to GRANT the petition in G.R. No. 174513.
, 250 U.S. 616.
336 Phil. 848 (1997).
, G.R. No. 134787, 15 November 2005, 475 SCRA 1.
Feria and Noche, CIVIL PROCEDURE ANNOTATED, vol. I, 2001 edition, p. 419.
Sec. 30, Petitions and initiatives by the people, 16 Am Jur 2d 380, citing
, 240 Neb. 754, 485 N.W. 2d 151 (1992).
Id. citing
, 83 Ill. 2d 236, 47 Ill. Dec. 363, 415 N.E. 2d 368 (1980).
, The California Roundtable 13 (1981). The American Founding Fathers recognized that direct democracy posed a profound threat to individual rights and liberty. The U.S. Constitution was "designed to provide a system of government that would prevent either a tyranny of the majority or a tyranny of the few." James Madison "warned against the power of a majority or a minority of the population `united and actuated by some common impulse of passion, or of interest, adverse to the rights of other citizens, or to the permanent and aggregate interest of the community.'
Gilbert Hahn & Steven C. Morton,
5 FLA. ST. U. L. REV. 925, 927 (1977).
Florida Advisory Council on Intergovernmental Relations, Initiatives and Referenda: Issues in Citizen Lawmaking (1986).
Sec. 1, Article II, Constitution.
, 899 P.2d 1145 (Okla. 1995).
SEPARATE CONCURRING OPINION
CALLEJO, SR.,
J.:
I am convinced beyond cavil that the respondent Commission on Elections (COMELEC) did not commit an abuse of its discretion in dismissing the amended petition before it. The proposals of petitioners incorporated in said amended petition are for the revision of the 1987 Constitution. Further, the amended petition before the respondent COMELEC is insufficient in substance.
The Antecedents
On August 25, 2006, petitioners Raul L. Lambino and Erico B. Aumentado filed with the COMELEC a petition entitled "IN THE MATTER OF PROPOSING AMENDMENTS TO THE 1987 CONSTITUTION THROUGH A PEOPLE'S INITIATIVE: A SHIFT FROM A BICAMERAL PRESIDENTIAL TO A UNICAMERAL PARLIAMENTARY GOVERNMENT BY AMENDING ARTICLES VI AND VII; AND PROVIDING TRANSITORY PROVISIONS FOR THE ORDERLY SHIFT FROM THE PRESIDENTIAL TO THE PARLIAMENTARY SYSTEM." The case was docketed as EM (LD)-06-01. On August 30, 2006, petitioners filed an amended petition. For brevity, it is referred to as the petition for initiative.
Petitioners alleged therein,
inter alia, that they filed their petition in their own behalf and together with those who have affixed their signatures to the signature sheets appended thereto who are Filipino citizens, residents and registered voters of the Philippines, and they constitute at least twelve percent (12%) of all the registered voters in the country, wherein each legislative district is represented by at least three percent (3%) of all the registered voters therein.
Petitioners further alleged therein that the filing of the petition for initiative is based on their constitutional right to propose amendments to the 1987 Constitution by way of people's initiative, as recognized in Section 2, Article XVII thereof, which provides:
SEC. 2. Amendments to this Constitution may likewise be directly proposed by the people through initiative upon a petition of at least twelve
per centum of the total number of registered voters, of which every legislative district must be represented by at least three
per centum of the registered voters therein. No amendment under this section shall be authorized within five years following the ratification of this Constitution nor oftener than once every five years thereafter.
The Congress shall provide for the implementation of the exercise of this right."
According to petitioners, while the above provision states that "(T)he Congress shall provide for the implementation of the exercise of this right," the provisions of Section 5(b) and (c), along with Section 7 of Republic Act (RA) 6735,
1 are sufficient enabling details for the people's exercise of the power. The said sections of RA 6735 state:
Sec. 5.
Requirements. - (a) To exercise the power x x x
(b) A petition for an initiative on the 1987 Constitution must have at least twelve per centum (12%) of the total number of registered voters as signatories, of which every legislative district must be represented by at least three per centum (3%) of the registered voters therein. Initiative on the Constitution may be exercised only after five (5) years from the ratification of the 1987 Constitution and only once every five (5) years thereafter.
(c) The petition shall state the following:
c.1. | contents or text of the proposed law sought to be enacted, approved or rejected, amended or repealed, as the case may be; |
c.2. | the proposition; |
c.3. | the reason or reasons therefor; |
c.4. | that it is not one of the exceptions provided herein; |
c.5.
| signatures of the petitioners or registered voters; and |
c.6. | an abstract or summary in not more than one hundred (100) words which shall be legibly written or printed at the top of every page of the petition.
|
| ... |
Sec. 7.
Verification of Signatures. - The Election Registrar shall verify the signatures on the basis of the registry list of voters, voters' affidavits and voters identification cards used in the immediately preceding election.
They also alleged that the COMELEC has the authority, mandate and obligation to give due course to the petition for initiative, in compliance with the constitutional directive for the COMELEC to "enforce and administer all laws and regulations relative to the conduct of an election, plebiscite, initiative, referendum and recall."
2Petitioners incorporated in their petition for initiative the changes they proposed to be incorporated in the 1987 Constitution and prayed that the COMELEC issue an order:
- Finding the Petition to be sufficient pursuant to Section 4, Article XVII of the 1987 Constitution;
- Directing the publication of the Petition in Filipino and English at least twice in newspapers of general and local circulation; and
- Calling a plebiscite to be held not earlier than sixty nor later than ninety days after the Certification by this Honorable Commission of the sufficiency of this Petition, to allow the Filipino people to express their sovereign will on the proposition.
Petitioners pray for such other reliefs deemed just and equitable in the premises.
The Ruling of the respondent COMELEC
On August 31, 2006, the COMELEC promulgated the assailed Resolution denying due course and dismissing the petition for initiative. The COMELEC ruled that:
We agree with the petitioners that this Commission has the solemn Constitutional duty to enforce and administer all laws and regulations relative to the conduct of, as in this case, initiative.
This mandate, however, should be read in relation to the other provisions of the Constitution particularly on initiative.
Section 2, Article XVII of the 1987 Constitution provides:
"Sec. 2. Amendments to this Constitution may, likewise, be directly proposed by the people through initiative, upon a petition of at least twelve per centum of the total number of registered voters, of which every legislative district must be represented by at least three per centum of the registered voters therein. x x x.
The Congress shall provide for the implementation of the exercise of this right."
The aforequoted provision of the Constitution being a non-self-executory provision needed an enabling law for its implementation. Thus, in order to breathe life into the constitutional right of the people under a system of initiative to directly propose, enact, approve or reject, in whole or in part, the Constitution, laws, ordinances, or resolution, Congress enacted RA 6735.
However, the Supreme Court, in the landmark case of
Santiago v. Commission on Elections struck down the said law for being incomplete, inadequate, or wanting in essential terms and conditions insofar as initiative on amendments to the Constitution is concerned
The Supreme Court, likewise, declared that this Commission should be permanently enjoined from entertaining or taking cognizance of any petition for initiative on amendments to the Constitution until a sufficient law shall have been validly enacted to provide for the implementation of the system.
Thus, even if the signatures in the instant Petition appear to meet the required minimum per centum of the total number of registered voters, of which every legislative district is represented by at least three per centum of the registered voters therein, still the Petition cannot be given due course since the Supreme Court categorically declared RA 6735 as inadequate to cover the system of initiative on amendments to the Constitution.
This Commission is not unmindful of the transcendental importance of the right of the people under a system of initiative. However, neither can we turn a blind eye to the pronouncement of the High Court that in the absence of a valid enabling law, this right of the people remains nothing but an "empty right," and that this Commission is permanently enjoined from entertaining or taking cognizance of any petition for initiative on amendments to the Constitution. (Citations omitted.)
Aggrieved, petitioners elevated the case to this Court on a petition for
certiorari and
mandamus under Rule 65 of the Rules of Court.
The Petitioners' Case
In support of their petition, petitioners alleged,
inter alia, that:
I.
THE HONORABLE PUBLIC RESPONDENT COMELEC COMMITTED GRAVE ABUSE OF DISCRETION IN REFUSING TO TAKE COGNIZANCE OF, AND TO GIVE DUE COURSE TO THE PETITION FOR INITIATIVE, BECAUSE THE CITED SANTIAGO RULING OF 19 MARCH 1997 CANNOT BE CONSIDERED THE MAJORITY OPINION OF THE SUPREME COURT
EN BANC, CONSIDERING THAT UPON ITS RECONSIDERATION AND FINAL VOTING ON 10 JUNE 1997, NO MAJORITY VOTE WAS SECURED TO DECLARE REPUBLIC ACT NO. 6735 AS INADEQUATE, INCOMPLETE AND INSUFFICIENT IN STANDARD.
II.
THE 1987 CONSTITUTION, REPUBLIC ACT NO. 6735, REPUBLIC ACT NO. 8189 AND EXISTING APPROPRIATION OF THE COMELEC PROVIDE FOR SUFFICIENT DETAILS AND AUTHORITY FOR THE EXERCISE OF PEOPLE'S INITIATIVE, THUS, EXISTING LAWS TAKEN TOGETHER ARE ADEQUATE AND COMPLETE.
III.
THE HONORABLE PUBLIC RESPONDENT COMELEC COMMITTED GRAVE ABUSE OF DISCRETION IN REFUSING TO TAKE COGNIZANCE OF, AND IN REFUSING TO GIVE DUE COURSE TO THE PETITION FOR INITIATIVE, THEREBY VIOLATING AN EXPRESS CONSTITUTIONAL MANDATE AND DISREGARDING AND CONTRAVENING THE WILL OF THE PEOPLE.
A.
THE
SANTIAGO RULING OF 19 MARCH 1997 IS NOT APPLICABLE TO THE INSTANT PETITION FOR INITIATIVE FILED BY THE PETITIONERS.
1.
THE FRAMERS OF THE CONSTITUTION INTENDED TO GIVE THE PEOPLE THE POWER TO PROPOSE AMENDMENTS AND THE PEOPLE THEMSELVES ARE NOW GIVING VIBRANT LIFE TO THIS CONSTITUTIONAL PROVISION
2.
PRIOR TO THE QUESTIONED
SANTIAGO RULING OF 19 MARCH 1997, THE RIGHT OF THE PEOPLE TO EXERCISE THE SOVEREIGN POWER OF INITIATIVE AND RECALL HAS BEEN INVARIABLY UPHELD
3.
THE EXERCISE OF THE INITIATIVE TO PROPOSE AMENDMENTS IS A POLITICAL QUESTION WHICH SHALL BE DETERMINED SOLELY BY THE SOVEREIGN PEOPLE.
4.
BY SIGNING THE SIGNATURE SHEETS ATTACHED TO THE PETITION FOR INITIATIVE DULY VERIFIED BY THE ELECTION OFFICERS, THE PEOPLE HAVE CHOSEN TO PERFORM THIS SACRED EXERCISE OF THEIR SOVEREIGN POWER.
B.
THE
SANTIAGO RULING OF 19 MARCH 1997 IS NOT APPLICABLE TO THE INSTANT PETITION FOR INITIATIVE FILED BY THE PETITIONERS
C.
THE PERMANENT INJUNCTION ISSUED IN
SANTIAGO V. COMELEC ONLY APPLIES TO THE DELFIN PETITION.
1.
IT IS THE DISPOSITIVE PORTION OF THE DECISION AND NOT OTHER STATEMENTS IN THE BODY OF THE DECISION THAT GOVERNS THE RIGHTS IN CONTROVERSY.
IV.
THE HONORABLE PUBLIC RESPONDENT FAILED OR NEGLECTED TO ACT OR PERFORM A DUTY MANDATED BY LAW.
A.
THE MINISTERIAL DUTY OF THE COMELEC IS TO SET THE INITIATIVE FOR PLEBISCITE.
3Petitioners Failed to Allege and
Demonstrate All the Essential
Facts To Establish the Right
to a Writ of
CertiorariSection 1, Rule 65 of the Rules of Court reads:
Sec. 1.
Petition for certiorari. - When any tribunal, board or officer exercising judicial or quasi-judicial functions has acted without or in excess of its or his jurisdiction, or with grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction, and there is no appeal, or any plain, speedy, and adequate remedy in the ordinary course of law, a person aggrieved thereby may file a verified petition in the proper court, alleging the facts with certainty and praying that judgment be rendered annulling or modifying the proceedings of such tribunal, board or officer, and granting such incidental reliefs as law and justice may require.
The petition shall be accompanied by a certified true copy of the judgment, order or resolution subject thereof, copies of all pleadings and documents relevant and pertinent thereto, and a sworn certification of non-forum shopping as provided in the third paragraph of Section 3, Rule 46.
A writ for
certiorari may issue only when the following requirements are set out in the petition and established:
(1) the writ is directed against a tribunal, a board or any officer exercising judicial or quasi-judicial functions;
(2) such tribunal, board or officer has acted without or in excess of jurisdiction, or with grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction; and
(3) there is no appeal or any plain, speedy and adequate remedy in the ordinary course of law. x x x
4The Court has invariably defined "grave abuse of discretion," thus:
By grave abuse of discretion is meant such capricious and whimsical exercise of judgment as is equivalent to lack of jurisdiction, and it must be shown that the discretion was exercised arbitrarily or despotically. For
certiorari to lie, there must be a capricious, arbitrary and whimsical exercise of power, the very antithesis of the judicial prerogative in accordance with centuries of both civil law and common law traditions.
5There is thus grave abuse of discretion on the part of the COMELEC when it acts in a capricious, whimsical, arbitrary or despotic manner in the exercise of its judgment amounting to lack of jurisdiction. Mere abuse of discretion is not enough.
6 The only question involved is jurisdiction, either the lack or excess thereof, and abuse of discretion warrants the issuance of the extraordinary remedy of
certiorari only when the same is grave, as when the power is exercised in an arbitrary or despotic manner by reason of passion, prejudice or personal hostility. A writ of
certiorari is a remedy designed for the correction of errors of jurisdiction and not errors of judgment.
7 An error of judgment is one in which the court may commit in the exercise of its jurisdiction, which error is reversible only by an appeal.
8In the present case, it appears from the assailed Resolution of the COMELEC that it denied the petition for initiative solely in obedience to the mandate of this Court in
Santiago v. Commission on Elections.
9 In said case, the Court
En Banc permanently enjoined the COMELEC
from entertaining or taking cognizance of any petition for initiative on amendments to the Constitution until a sufficient law shall have been validly enacted to provide for the implementation of the system. When the COMELEC denied the petition for initiative, there was as yet no valid law enacted by Congress to provide for the implementation of the system.
It is a travesty for the Court to declare the act of the COMELEC in denying due course to the petition for initiative as "capricious, despotic, oppressive or whimsical exercise of judgment as is equivalent to lack of jurisdiction." In fact, in so doing, the COMELEC merely followed or applied, as it ought to do, the Court's ruling in
Santiago to the effect that Section 2, Article XVII of the Constitution on the system of initiative is a non self-executory provision and requires an enabling law for its implementation. In relation thereto, RA 6735 was found by the Court to be "incomplete, inadequate, or wanting in essential terms and conditions" to implement the constitutional provision on initiative. Consequently, the COMELEC was "permanently enjoined from entertaining or taking cognizance of
any petition for initiative on amendments to the Constitution until a sufficient law shall have been validly enacted to provide for the implementation of the system." The decision of the Court
En Banc interpreting RA 6735 forms part of the legal system of the Philippines.
10 And no doctrine or principle laid down by the Court
En Banc may be modified or reversed except by the Court
En Banc,
11 certainly not by the COMELEC. Until the Court
En Banc modifies or reverses its decision, the COMELEC is bound to follow the same.
12 As succinctly held in
Fulkerson v. Thompson:
13Whatever was before the Court, and is disposed of, is considered as finally settled. The inferior court is bound by the judgment or decree as the law of the case, and must carry it into execution according to the mandate. The inferior court cannot vary it, or judicially examine it for any other purpose than execution. It can give no other or further relief as to any matter decided by the Supreme Court even where there is error apparent; or in any manner intermeddle with it further than to execute the mandate and settle such matters as have been remanded, not adjudicated by the Supreme Court....
The principles above stated are, we think, conclusively established by the authority of adjudged cases. And any further departure from them would inevitably mar the harmony of the whole judiciary system, bring its parts into conflict, and produce therein disorganization, disorder, and incalculable mischief and confusion. Besides, any rule allowing the inferior courts to disregard the adjudications of the Supreme Court, or to refuse or omit to carry them into execution would be repugnant to the principles established by the constitution, and therefore void.
14At this point, it is well to recall the factual context of
Santiago as well as the pronouncement made by the Court therein. Like petitioners in the instant case, in
Santiago, Atty. Jesus Delfin, the People's Initiative for Reforms, Modernization and Action (PIRMA), et al., invoked Section 2, Article XVII of the Constitution as they filed with the COMELEC a "Petition to Amend the Constitution, to Lift Term Limits of Elective Officials, By People's Initiative" (the Delfin petition). They asked the COMELEC to issue an order fixing the time and date for signature gathering all over the country; causing the necessary publications of said order and their petition in newspapers of general and local circulation and instructing municipal election registrars in all regions all over the country and to assist petitioners in establishing signing stations. Acting thereon, the COMELEC issued the order prayed for.
Senator Miriam Santiago,
et al. forthwith filed with this Court a petition for prohibition to enjoin the COMELEC from implementing its order. The Court, speaking through Justice Hilario G. Davide, Jr. (later Chief Justice), granted the petition as it declared:
- RA 6735 "incomplete, inadequate, or wanting in essential terms and conditions insofar as initiative on amendments to the Constitution is concerned";
- COMELEC Resolution No. 230015 invalid insofar as it prescribed rules and regulations on the conduct of initiative on amendments to the Constitution because the COMELEC is without authority to promulgate the rules and regulations to implement the exercise of the right of the people to directly propose amendments to the Constitution through the system of initiative; and
- The Delfin petition insufficient as it did not contain the required number of signatures of registered voters.
The Court concluded in
Santiago that "the COMELEC should be permanently enjoined from entertaining or taking cognizance of
any petition for initiative on amendments to the Constitution until a sufficient law shall have been validly enacted to provide for the implementation of the system." The dispositive portion of the decision reads:
WHEREFORE, judgment is hereby rendered:
a) | GRANTING the instant petition; |
|
|
b) | DECLARING RA 6735 inadequate to cover the system of initiative on amendments to the Constitution, and to have failed to provide sufficient standard for subordinate legislation; |
|
|
c) | DECLARING void those parts of Resolution No. 2300 of the Commission on Elections prescribing rules and regulations on the conduct of initiative or amendments to the Constitution; and |
|
|
d) | ORDERING the Commission on Elections to forthwith DISMISS the Delfin petition (UND-96-037).
|
The Temporary Restraining Order issued on December 18, 1996 is made permanent as against the Commission on Elections, but is LIFTED as against private respondents.
16The Court reiterated its ruling in
Santiago in another petition which was filed with the Court by PIRMA and the spouses Alberto and Carmen Pedrosa (who were parties in
Santiago) docketed as
PIRMA v. Commission on Elections.
17 The said petitioners, undaunted by
Santiago and claiming to have gathered 5,793,213 signatures, filed a petition with the COMELEC praying,
inter alia, that COMELEC officers be ordered to verify all the signatures collected in behalf of the petition and, after due hearing, that it (COMELEC) declare the petition sufficient for the purpose of scheduling a plebiscite to amend the Constitution. Like the Delfin petition in
Santiago, the PIRMA petition proposed to submit to the people in a plebiscite the amendment to the Constitution on the lifting of the term limits of elected officials.
The opinion of the minority that there was no doctrine enunciated by the Court in PIRMA has no basis. The COMELEC, in its Resolution dated July 8, 1997, dismissed the PIRMA petition citing the permanent restraining order issued against it by the Court in
Santiago. PIRMA and the spouses Pedrosa forthwith elevated the matter to the Court alleging grave abuse of discretion on the part of the COMELEC in refusing to exercise jurisdiction over, and thereby dismissing, their petition for initiative to amend the Constitution.
The Court dismissed outright,
by a unanimous vote, the petition filed by PIRMA and the spouses Albert Pedrosa. The Court declared that the COMELEC merely complied with the dispositions in the decision of the Court in
Santiago and, hence, cannot be held to have committed a grave abuse of its discretion in dismissing the petition before it:
The Court ruled, first, by a unanimous vote, that no grave abuse of discretion could be attributed to the public respondent COMELEC in dismissing the petition filed by PIRMA therein, it appearing that it only complied with the dispositions in the Decision of this Court in G.R. No. 127325, promulgated on March 19, 1997, and its Resolution of June 10, 1997.
The Court next considered the question of whether there was need to resolve the second issue posed by the petitioners, namely, that the Court re-examine its ruling as regards R.A. 6735. On this issue, the Chief Justice and six (6) other members of the Court, namely, Regalado, Davide, Romero, Bellosillo, Kapunan and Torres,
JJ., voted that there was no need to take it up. Vitug,
J., agreed that there was no need for re-examination of said second issue since the case a bar is not the proper vehicle for that purpose. Five (5) other members of the Court, namely, Melo, Puno, Francisco, Hermosisima and Panganiban,
JJ., opined that there was need for such a re-examination. x x x
WHEREFORE, the petition is DISMISSED.
18 (Underscoring supplied.)
In the present case, the Office of the Solicitor General (OSG) takes the side of petitioners and argues that the COMELEC should not have applied the ruling in
Santiago to the petition for initiative because the permanent injunction therein referred only to the Delfin petition. The OSG buttresses this argument by pointing out that the Temporary Restraining Order dated December 18, 1996 that was made permanent in the dispositive portion referred only to the Delfin petition.
The OSG's attempt to isolate the dispositive portion from the body of the Court's decision in
Santiago is futile. It bears stressing that the dispositive portion must not be read separately but in connection with the other portions of the decision of which it forms a part. To get to the true intent and meaning of a decision, no specific portion thereof should be resorted to but the same must be considered in its entirety. Hence, a resolution or ruling may and does appear in other parts of the decision and not merely in the
fallo thereof.
19The pronouncement in the body of the decision in
Santiago permanently enjoining the COMELEC "from entertaining or taking cognizance of
any petition for initiative on amendments to the Constitution until a sufficient law shall have been validly enacted to provide for the implementation of the system" is thus as much a part of the Court's decision as its dispositive portion. The ruling of this Court is of the nature of an
in rem judgment barring any and all Filipinos from filing a petition for initiative on amendments to the Constitution until a sufficient law shall have been validly enacted. Clearly, the COMELEC, in denying due course to the present petition for initiative on amendments to the Constitution conformably with the Court's ruling in
Santiago did not commit grave abuse of discretion. On the contrary, its actuation is in keeping with the salutary principle of hierarchy of courts. For the Court to find the COMELEC to have abused its discretion when it dismissed the amended petition based on the ruling of this Court in
Santiago would be sheer judicial apostasy.
As eloquently put by Justice J.B.L. Reyes, "there is only one Supreme Court from whose decisions all other courts should take their bearings."
20 This truism applies with equal force to the COMELEC as a quasi-judicial body for, after all, judicial decisions applying or interpreting laws or the Constitution "assume the same authority as the statute itself and, until authoritatively abandoned, necessarily become, to the extent that they are applicable, the criteria which must control the actuations not only of those called upon to abide thereby but also of those duty bound to enforce obedience thereto."
21Petitioners Cannot Ascribe
Grave Abuse of Discretion on
the COMELEC Based on the
Minority Opinion in
SantiagoIt is elementary that the opinion of the majority of the members of the Court, not the opinion of the minority, prevails. As a corollary, the decision of the majority cannot be modified or reversed by the minority of the members of the Court.
However, to eschew the binding effect of
Santiago, petitioners argue, albeit unconvincingly, that the Court's declaration therein on the inadequacy, incompleteness and insufficiency of RA 6735 to implement the system of initiative to propose constitutional amendments did not constitute the majority opinion. This contention is utterly baseless.
Santiago was concurred in, without any reservation, by eight Justices,
22 or the majority of the members of the Court, who actually took part in the deliberations thereon. On the other hand, five Justices,
23 while voting for the dismissal of the Delfin petition on the ground of insufficiency, dissented from the majority opinion as they maintained the view that RA 6735 was sufficient to implement the system of initiative.
Given that a clear majority of the members of the Court, eight Justices, concurred in the decision in
Santiago, the pronouncement therein that RA 6735 is "incomplete, inadequate, or wanting in essential terms and conditions insofar as initiative on amendments to the Constitution is concerned" constitutes a definitive ruling on the matter.
In the Resolution dated June 10, 1997, the motions for reconsideration of the
Santiago decision were denied with finality as only six Justices, or less than the majority, voted to grant the same. The Resolution expressly stated that the motion for reconsideration failed "to persuade the requisite majority of the Court to modify or reverse the Decision of 19 March 1977."
24 In fine, the pronouncement in
Santiago as embodied in the Decision of March 19, 1997 remains the definitive ruling on the matter.
It bears stressing that in
PIRMA, petitioners prayed for the Court to resolve the issue posed by them and to re-examine its ruling as regards RA 6735. By a vote of seven members of the Court, including Justice Justo P. Torres, Jr. and Justice Jose C. Vitug, the Court voted that there was no need to resolve the issue. Five members of the Court opined that there was a need for the re-examination of said ruling. Thus, the pronouncement of the Court in
Santiago remains the law of the case and binding on petitioners.
If, as now claimed by the minorty, there was no doctrine enunciated by the Court in
Santiago, the Court should have resolved to set aside its original resolution dismissing the petition and to grant the motion for reconsideration and the petition. But the Court did not. The Court positively and unequivocally declared that the COMELEC merely followed the ruling of the Court in
Santiago in dismissing the petition before it. No less than Senior Justice Reynato S. Puno concurred with the resolution of the Court. It behooved Justice Puno to dissent from the ruling of the Court on the motion for reconsideration of petitioners precisely on the ground that there was no doctrine enunciated by the Court in
Santiago. He did not. Neither did Chief Justice Artemio V. Panganiban, who was a member of the Court.
That RA 6735 has failed to validly implement the people's right to directly propose constitutional amendments through the system of initiative had already been conclusively settled in
Santiago as well as in
PIRMA. Heeding these decisions, several lawmakers, including no less than Solicitor General Antonio Eduardo Nachura when he was then a member of the House of Representatives,
25 have filed separate bills to implement the system of initiative under Section 2, Article XVII of the Constitution.
In the present Thirteenth (13
th) Congress, at least seven (7) bills are pending. In the Senate, the three (3) pending bills are: Senate Bill No. 119 entitled An Act Providing for People's Initiative to Amend the Constitution introduced by Senator Luisa "Loi" P. Ejercito Estrada; Senate Bill No. 2189 entitled An Act Providing for People's Initiative to Amend the Constitution introduced by Senator Miriam Defensor Santiago; and Senate Bill No. 2247 entitled An Act Providing for a System of People's Initiative to Propose Amendments to the Constitution introduced by Senator Richard Gordon.
In the House of Representatives, there are at least four (4) pending bills: House Bill No. 05281 filed by Representative Carmen Cari, House Bill No. 05017 filed by Representative Imee Marcos, House Bill No. 05025 filed by Representative Roberto Cajes, and House Bill No. 05026 filed by Representative Edgardo Chatto. These House bills are similarly entitled An Act Providing for People's Initiative to Amend the Constitution.
The respective explanatory notes of the said Senate and House bills uniformly recognize that there is, to date, no law to govern the process by which constitutional amendments are introduced by the people directly through the system of initiative. Ten (10) years after
Santiago and absent the occurrence of any compelling supervening event,
i.e., passage of a law to implement the system of initiative under Section 2, Article XVII of the Constitution, that would warrant the re-examination of the ruling therein, it behooves the Court to apply to the present case the salutary and well-recognized doctrine of
stare decisis. As earlier shown, Congress and other government agencies have, in fact, abided by
Santiago.
The Court can do no less with respect to its own ruling.
Contrary to the stance taken by petitioners, the validity or constitutionality of a law cannot be made to depend on the individual opinions of the members who compose it - the Supreme Court, as an institution, has already determined RA 6735 to be "incomplete, inadequate, or wanting in essential terms and conditions insofar as initiative on amendments to the Constitution is concerned" and therefore the same remains to be so regardless of any change in the Court's composition.
26 Indeed, it is vital that there be stability in the courts in adhering to decisions deliberately made after ample consideration.
Parties should not be encouraged to seek re-examination of determined principles and speculate on fluctuation of the law with every change in the expounders of it.
27Proposals to
Revise the Constitution,
As in the Case of the Petitioners'
Proposal to Change the Form of
Government,
Cannot be Effected
Through the System of Initiative,
Which by Express Provision of
Section 2, Article XVII of the
Constitution, is Limited to Amendments
Even granting
arguendo the Court, in the present case, abandons its pronouncement in
Santiago and declares RA 6735, taken together with other extant laws, sufficient to implement the system of initiative, still, the amended petition for initiative cannot prosper. Despite the denomination of their petition, the proposals of petitioners to change the form of government from the present bicameral-presidential to a unicameral-parliamentary system of government are actually for the
revision of the Constitution.
Petitioners propose to "amend" Articles VI and VII of the Constitution in this manner:
A. Sections 1, 2, 3, 4, 5, 6 and 7 of Article VI shall be amended to read as follows:
"Section 1. (1) The legislative and executive powers shall be vested in a unicameral Parliament which shall be composed of as many members as may be provided by law, to be apportioned among the provinces, representative districts, and cities in accordance with the number of their respective inhabitants, with at least three hundred thousand inhabitants per district, and on the basis of a uniform and progressive ratio. Each district shall comprise, as far as practicable, contiguous, compact and adjacent territory, and each province must have at least one member.
"(2) Each Member of Parliament shall be a natural-born citizen of the Philippines, at least twenty-five years old on the day of the election, a resident of his district for at least one year prior thereto, and shall be elected by the qualified voters of his district for a term of five years without limitation as to the number thereof, except those under the party-list system which shall be provided for by law and whose number shall be equal to twenty per centum of the total membership coming from the parliamentary districts."
B. Sections 1, 2, 3 and 4 of Article VII of the 1987 Constitution are hereby amended to read, as follows:
"Section 1. There shall be a President who shall be the Head of State. The executive power shall be exercised by a Prime Minister, with the assistance of the Cabinet. The Prime Minister shall be elected by a majority of all the Members of Parliament from among themselves. He shall be responsible to the Parliament for the program of government.
C. For the purpose of insuring an orderly transition from the bicameral-Presidential to a unicameral-Parliamentary form of government, there shall be a new Article XVIII, entitled "Transitory Provisions," which shall read as follows:
Section 1. (1) The incumbent President and Vice President shall serve until the expiration of their term at noon on the thirtieth day of June 2010 and shall continue to exercise their powers under the 1987 Constitution unless impeached by a vote of two thirds of all the members of the interim parliament.,
(2) In case of death, permanent disability, resignation or removal from office of the incumbent President, the incumbent Vice President shall succeed as President. In case of death, permanent disability, resignation or removal from office of both the incumbent President and Vice President, the interim Prime Minister shall assume all the powers and responsibilities of Prime Minister under Article VII as amended.
Section 2. "Upon the expiration of the term of the incumbent President and Vice President, with the exception of Sections 1, 2, 3, 4, 5, 6 and 7 of Article VI of the 1987 Constitution which shall hereby be amended and Sections 18 and 24 which shall be deleted, all other Sections of Article VI are hereby retained and renumbered sequentially as Section 2, ad seriatim up to 26, unless they are inconsistent with the Parliamentary system of government, in which case, they shall be amended to conform with a unicameral parliamentary form of government; provided, however, that any and all references therein to "Congress," "Senate," "House of Representatives" and "House of Congress," "Senator[s] or "Member[s] of the House of Representatives" and "House of Congress" shall be changed to read "Parliament"; that any and all references therein to "Member[s] of the House of Representatives" shall be changed to read as "Member[s] of Parliament" and any and all references to the "President" and or "Acting President" shall be changed to read "Prime Minister."
Section 3. "Upon the expiration of the term of the incumbent President and Vice President, with the exception of Sections 1, 2, 3 and 4 of Article VII of the 1987 Constitution which are hereby amended and Sections 7, 8, 9, 10, 11 and 12 which are hereby deleted, all other Sections of Article VII shall be retained and renumbered sequentially as Section 2, ad seriatim up to 14, unless they shall be inconsistent with Section 1 hereof, in which case they shall be deemed amended so as to conform to a unicameral Parliamentary System of government; provided, however, that any and all references therein to "Congress," "Senate," "House of Representatives" and "Houses of Congress" shall be changed to read "Parliament"; that any and all references therein to "Member[s] of Congress," "Senator[s]" or "Member[s] of the House of Parliament" and any and all references to the "President" and of "Acting President" shall be changed to read "Prime Minister."
Section 4. (1) There shall exist, upon the ratification of these amendments, an interim Parliament which shall continue until the Members of the regular Parliament shall have been elected and shall have qualified. It shall be composed of the incumbent Members of the Senate and the House of Representatives and the incumbent Members of the Cabinet who are heads of executive departments.
(2) The incumbent Vice President shall automatically be a Member of Parliament until noon of the thirtieth day of June 2010. He shall also be a member of the cabinet and shall head a ministry. He shall initially convene the interim Parliament and shall preside over its session for the election of the interim Prime Minister and until the Speaker shall have been elected by a majority vote of all the members of the interim Parliament from among themselves.
(3) Senators whose term of office ends in 2010 shall be Members of Parliament until noon of the thirtieth day of June 2010.
(4) Within forty-five days from ratification of these amendments, the interim Parliament shall convene to propose amendments to, or revisions of, this Constitution consistent with the principles of local autonomy, decentralization and a strong bureaucracy.
"Section 5. (1) The incumbent President, who is the Chief Executive, shall nominate, from among the members of the interim Parliament, an interim Prime Minister, who shall be elected by a majority vote of the members thereof. The interim Prime Minister shall oversee the various ministries and shall perform such powers and responsibilities as may be delegated to him by the incumbent President."
(2) The interim Parliament shall provide for the election of the members of Parliament, which shall be synchronized and held simultaneously with the election of all local government officials.
[Thereafter, the Vice President, as Member of Parliament, shall immediately convene the Parliament and shall initially preside over its session for the purpose of electing the Prime Minister, who shall be elected by a majority vote of all its members, from among themselves.] The duly-elected Prime Minister shall continue to exercise and perform the powers, duties and responsibilities of the interim Prime Minister until the expiration of the term of the incumbent President and Vice President.
28Petitioners claim that the required number of signatures of registered voters have been complied with, i.e., the signatories to the petition constitute twelve percent (12%) of all the registered voters in the country, wherein each legislative district is represented by at least three percent (3%) of all the registered voters therein. Certifications allegedly executed by the respective COMELEC Election Registrars of each municipality and city verifying these signatures were attached to the petition for initiative. The verification was allegedly done on the basis of the list of registered voters contained in the official COMELEC list used in the immediately preceding election.
The proposition, as formulated by petitioners, to be submitted to the Filipino people in a plebiscite to be called for the said purpose reads:
DO YOU APPROVE THE AMENDMENT OF ARTICLES VI AND VII OF THE 1987 CONSTITUTION, CHANGING THE FORM OF GOVERNMENT FROM THE PRESENT BICAMERAL-PRESIDENTIAL TO A UNICAMERAL-PARLIAMENTARY SYSTEM, AND PROVIDING ARTICLE XVIII AS TRANSITORY PROVISIONS FOR THE ORDERLY SHIFT FROM ONE SYSTEM TO THE OTHER?
29According to petitioners, the proposed amendment of Articles VI and VII would effect a more efficient, more economical and more responsive government. The parliamentary system would allegedly ensure harmony between the legislative and executive branches of government, promote greater consensus, and provide faster and more decisive governmental action.
Sections 1 and 2 of Article XVII pertinently read:
Article XVII
SECTION 1. Any
amendment to, or revision of, this Constitution may be proposed by:
(1) | The Congress, upon a vote of three-fourths of all its Members; or |
(2) | A constitutional convention. |
SECTION 2.
Amendments to this Constitution may likewise be directly proposed by the people through initiative upon a petition of at least twelve
per centum of the total number of registered voters, of which every legislative district must be represented by at least three
per centum of the registered voters therein. No amendment under this section shall be authorized within five years following the ratification of this Constitution nor oftener than once every five years thereafter.
The Congress shall provide for the implementation of the exercise of this right.
It can be readily gleaned that the above provisions set forth different modes and procedures for proposals for the amendment and revision of the Constitution:
- Under Section 1, Article XVII, any amendment to, or revision of, the Constitution may be proposed by -
- Congress, upon a vote of three-fourths of all its members; or
- A constitutional convention.
- Under Section 2, Article XVII, amendments to the Constitution may be likewise directly proposed by the people through initiative.
The framers of the Constitution deliberately adopted the terms "amendment" and "revision" and provided for their respective modes and procedures for effecting changes of the Constitution fully cognizant of the distinction between the two concepts. Commissioner Jose E. Suarez, the Chairman of the Committee on Amendments and Transitory Provisions, explained:
MR. SUAREZ. One more point, and we will be through.
We mentioned the possible use of only one term and that is, "amendment." However, the Committee finally agreed to use the terms - "amendment" or "revision" when our attention was called by the honorable Vice-President to the substantial difference in the connotation and significance between the said terms. As a result of our research, we came up with the observations made in the famous - or notorious - Javellana doctrine, particularly the decision rendered by Honorable Justice Makasiar, wherein he made the following distinction between "amendment" and "revision" of an existing Constitution: "Revision" may involve a rewriting of the whole Constitution. On the other hand, the act of amending a constitution envisages a change of specific provisions only. The intention of an act to amend is not the change of the entire Constitution, but only the improvement of specific parts or the addition of provisions deemed essential as a consequence of new conditions or the elimination of parts already considered obsolete or unresponsive to the needs of the times.
The 1973 Constitution is not a mere amendment to the 1935 Constitution. It is a completely new fundamental Charter embodying new political, social and economic concepts.
So, the Committee finally came up with the proposal that these two terms should be employed in the formulation of the Article governing amendments or revisions to the new Constitution.
30Further, the framers of the Constitution deliberately omitted the term "revision" in Section 2, Article XVII of the Constitution because it was their intention to reserve the power to propose a revision of the Constitution to Congress or the constitutional convention. Stated in another manner, it was their manifest intent that revision thereof shall not be undertaken through the system of initiative. Instead, the revision of the Constitution shall be done either by Congress or by a constitutional convention.
It is significant to note that, originally, the provision on the system of initiative was included in Section 1 of the draft Article on Amendment or Revision proposed by the Committee on Amendments and Transitory Provisions. The original draft provided:
SEC. 1. Any amendment to, or revision of, this Constitution may be proposed:
(a) | by the National Assembly upon a vote of three-fourths of all its members; or |
(b) | by a constitutional convention; or |
(c) | directly by the people themselves thru initiative as provided for in Article __ Section __ of the Constitution.31 |
However, after deliberations and interpellations, the members of the Commission agreed to remove the provision on the system of initiative from Section 1 and, instead, put it under a separate provision, Section 2. It was explained that the removal of the provision on initiative from the other "traditional modes" of changing the Constitution was precisely to limit the former (system of initiative) to amendments to the Constitution. It was emphasized that the system of initiative should
not extend to revision.
MR. SUAREZ. Thank you, Madam President.
May we respectfully call the attention of the Members of the Commission that pursuant to the mandate given to us last night, we submitted this afternoon a complete Committee Report No. 7 which embodies the proposed provision governing the matter of initiative. This is now covered by Section 2 of the complete committee report. With the permission of the Members, may I quote Section 2:
The people may, after five years from the date of the last plebiscite held, directly propose amendments to this Constitution thru initiative upon petition of at least ten percent of the registered voters.
This completes the blanks appearing in the original Committee Report No. 7. This proposal was suggested on the theory that this matter of initiative, which came about because of the extraordinary developments this year,
has to be separated from the traditional modes of amending the Constitution as embodied in Section 1. The committee members felt that this system of initiative should be limited to amendments to the Constitution and should not extend to the revision of the entire Constitution, so we removed it from the operation of Section 1 of the proposed Article on Amendment or Revision. x x x32
The intention to exclude "revision" of the Constitution as a mode that may be undertaken through the system of initiative was reiterated and made clear by Commissioner Suarez in response to a suggestion of Commissioner Felicitas Aquino:
MR. SUAREZ. Section 2 must be interpreted together with the provisions of Section 4, except that in Section 4, as it is presently drafted, there is no take-off date for the 60-day and 90-day periods.
MS. AQUINO. Yes. In other words, Section 2 is another alternative mode of proposing amendments to the Constitution which would further require the process of submitting it in a plebiscite, in which case it is not self-executing.
MR. SUAREZ. No, not unless we settle and determine the take-off period.
MS. AQUINO. In which case, I am seriously bothered by providing this process of initiative as a separate section in the Article on Amendment. Would the sponsor be amenable to accepting an amendment in terms of realigning Section 2 as another subparagraph (c) of Section 1, instead of setting it up as another separate section as if it were a self-executing provision?
MR SUAREZ. We would be amenable except that, as we clarified a while ago, this process of initiative is limited to the matter of amendment and should not expand into a revision which contemplates a total overhaul of the Constitution. That was the sense conveyed by the Committee.
MS. AQUINO. In other words, the Committee was attempting to distinguish the coverage of modes (a) and (b) in Section 1 to include the process of revision; whereas, the process of initiation to amend, which is given to the public, would only apply to amendments?
MR. SUAREZ. That is right. Those were the terms envisioned by the Committee.33
Then Commissioner Hilario P. Davide, Jr. (later Chief Justice) also made the clarification with respect to the observation of Commissioner Regalado Maambong:
MR. MAAMBONG. My first question: Commissioner Davide's proposed amendment on line 1 refers to "amendments." Does it not cover the word "revision" as defined by Commissioner Padilla when he made the distinction between the words "amendments" and "revision"?
MR. DAVIDE. No, it does not, because "amendments" and "revision" should be covered by Section 1. So insofar as initiative is concerned, it can only relate to "amendments" not "revision."34
After several amendments, the Commission voted in favor of the following wording of Section 2:
AMENDMENTS TO THIS CONSTITUTION MAY LIKEWISE BE DIRECTLY PROPOSED BY THE PEOPLE THROUGH INITIATIVE UPON A PETITION OF AT LEAST TWELVE PERCENT OF THE TOTAL NUMBER OF REGISTERED VOTERS OF WHICH EVERY LEGISLATIVE DISTRICT MUST BE REPRESENTED BY AT LEAST THREE PERCENT OF THE REGISTERED VOTERS THEREOF. NO AMENDMENT UNDER THIS SECTION SHALL BE AUTHORIZED WITHIN FIVE YEARS FOLLOWING THE RATIFICATION OF THIS CONSTITUTION NOR OFTENER THAN ONCE EVERY FIVE YEARS THEREAFTER.
THE NATIONAL ASSEMBLY SHALL BY LAW PROVIDE FOR THE IMPLEMENTATION OF THE EXERCISE OF THIS RIGHT.
Sections 1 and 2, Article XVII as eventually worded read:
Article XVII
SECTION 1. Any amendment to, or revision of, this Constitution may be proposed by:
(3) | The Congress, upon a vote of three-fourths of all its Members; or |
(4) | A constitutional convention. |
SEC. 2. Amendments to this Constitution may likewise be directly proposed by the people through initiative, upon a petition of at least twelve per centum of the total number of registered voters, of which every legislative district must be represented by at least three per centum of the registered voters therein. No amendment under this section shall be authorized within five years following the ratification of this Constitution nor oftener than once every five years thereafter.
The Congress shall provide for the implementation of the exercise of this right.
The final text of Article XVII on Amendments or Revisions clearly makes a substantial differentiation not only between the two terms but also between two procedures and their respective fields of application. Ineluctably, the system of initiative under Section 2, Article XVII as a mode of effecting changes in the Constitution is strictly limited to amendments - not to a revision - thereof.
As opined earlier, the framers of the Constitution, in providing for "amendment" and "revision" as different modes of changing the fundamental law, were cognizant of the distinction between the two terms. They particularly relied on the distinction made by Justice Felix Antonio in his concurring opinion in Javellana v. Executive Secretary,35 the controversial decision which gave imprimatur to the 1973 Constitution of former President Ferdinand E. Marcos, as follows:
There is clearly a distinction between revision and amendment of an existing constitution. Revision may involve a rewriting of the whole constitution. The act of amending a constitution, on the other hand, envisages a change of only specific provisions. The intention of an act to amend is not the change of the entire constitution, but only the improvement of specific parts of the existing constitution of the addition of provisions deemed essential as a consequence of new conditions or the elimination of parts already considered obsolete or unresponsive to the needs of the times. The 1973 Constitution is not a mere amendment to the 1935 Constitution. It is a completely new fundamental charter embodying new political, social and economic concepts.36Other elucidation on the distinction between "amendment" and "revision" is enlightening. For example, Dean Vicente G. Sinco, an eminent authority on political law, distinguished the two terms in this manner:
Strictly speaking, the act of revising a constitution involves alterations of different portions of the entire document. It may result in the rewriting either of the whole constitution, or the greater portion of it, or perhaps only some of its important provisions. But whatever results the revisions may produce, the factor that characterizes it as an act of revision is the original intention and plan authorized to be carried out. That intention and plan must contemplate a consideration of all the provisions of the constitution to determine which one should be altered or suppressed or whether the whole document should be replaced with an entirely new one.
The act of amending a constitution, on the other hand, envisages a change of only a few specific provisions. The intention of an act to amend is not to consider the advisability of changing the entire constitution or of considering that possibility. The intention rather is to improve the specific parts of the existing constitution or to add to it provisions deemed essential on account of changed conditions or to suppress portions of it that seemed obsolete, or dangerous, or misleading in their effect.37
In the United States, the Supreme Court of Georgia in Wheeler v. Board of Trustees38 had the occasion to make the distinction between the two terms with respect to Ga.L. 1945, an instrument which "amended" the 1877 Constitution of Georgia. It explained the term "amendment:"
"Amendment" of a statute implies its survival and not destruction. It repeals or changes some provision, or adds something thereto. A law is amended when it is in whole or in part permitted to remain, and something is added to or taken from it, or it is in some way changed or altered to make it more complete or perfect, or to fit it the better to accomplish the object or purpose for which it was made, or some other object or purpose.39
On the other hand, the term "revision" was explained by the said US appellate court:
x x x When a house is completely demolished and another is erected on the same location, do you have a changed, repaired and altered house, or do you have a new house? Some of the materials contained in the old house may be used again, some of the rooms may be constructed the same, but this does not alter the fact that you have altogether another or a new house. We conclude that the instrument as contained in Ga.L. 1945, pp. 8 to 89, inclusive, is not an amendment to the constitution of 1877; but on the contrary it is a completely revised or new constitution.40
Fairly recently, Fr. Joaquin Bernas, SJ, a member of the Constitutional Commission, expounded on the distinction between the two terms thus:
An amendment envisages an alteration of one or a few specific and separable provisions. The guiding original intention of an amendment is to improve specific parts or to add new provisions deemed necessary to meet new conditions or to suppress specific portions that may have become obsolete or that are judged to be dangerous. In revision, however, the guiding original intention and plan contemplate a re-examination of the entire document - or of provisions of the document (which have overall implications for the entire document or for the fundamental philosophical underpinnings of the document) - to determine how and to what extent it should be altered. Thus, for instance, a switch from the presidential system to a parliamentary system would be a revision because of its overall impact on the entire constitutional structure. So would a switch from a bicameral system to a unicameral system because of its effect on other important provisions of the Constitution.
It is thus clear that what distinguishes revision from amendment is not the quantum of change in the document. Rather, it is the fundamental qualitative alteration that effects revision. Hence, I must reject the puerile argument that the use of the plural form of "amendments" means that a revision can be achieved by the introduction of a multiplicity of amendments!41
Given that revision necessarily entails a more complex, substantial and far-reaching effects on the Constitution, the framers thereof wisely withheld the said mode from the system of initiative. It should be recalled that it took the framers of the present Constitution four months from June 2, 1986 until October 15, 1986 to come up with the draft Constitution which, as described by the venerable Justice Cecilia MuAoz Palma, the President of the Constitutional Commission of 1986, "gradually and painstakingly took shape through the crucible of sustained sometimes passionate and often exhilarating debates that intersected all dimensions of the national life."42
Evidently, the framers of the Constitution believed that a revision thereof should, in like manner, be a product of the same extensive and intensive study and debates. Consequently, while providing for a system of initiative where the people would directly propose amendments to the Constitution, they entrusted the formidable task of its revision to a deliberative body, the Congress or Constituent Assembly.
The Constitution is the fundamental law of the state, containing the principles upon which the government is founded, and regulating the division of sovereign powers, directing to what persons each of those powers is to be confided and the manner in which it is to be exercised.43 The Philippines has followed the American constitutional legal system in the sense that the term constitution is given a more restricted meaning, i.e., as a written organic instrument, under which governmental powers are both conferred and circumscribed.44
The Constitution received its force from the express will of the people. An overwhelming 16,622,111, out of 21,785,216 votes cast during the plebiscite, or 76.30% ratified the present Constitution on February 2, 1987.45 In expressing that will, the Filipino people have incorporated therein the method and manner by which the same can be amended and revised, and when the electorate have incorporated into the fundamental law the particular manner in which the same may be altered or changed, then any course which disregards that express will is a direct violation of the fundamental law.46
Further, these provisions having been incorporated in the Constitution, where the validity of a constitutional amendment or revision depends upon whether such provisions have been complied with, such question presents for consideration and determination a judicial question, and the courts are the only tribunals vested with power under the Constitution to determine such question.47
Earlier, it was mentioned that Article XVII, by the use of the terms "amendment" and "revision," clearly makes a differentiation not only between the two terms but also between two procedures and their respective fields of application. On this point, the case of McFadden v. Jordan48 is instructive. In that case, a "purported initiative amendment" (referred to as the proposed measure) to the State Constitution of California, then being proposed to be submitted to the electors for ratification, was sought to be enjoined. The proposed measure, denominated as "California Bill of Rights," comprised a single new article with some 208 subsections which would repeal or substantially alter at least 15 of the 25 articles of the California State Constitution and add at least four new topics. Among the likely effects of the proposed measure were to curtail legislative and judicial functions, legalize gaming, completely revise the taxation system and reduce the powers of cities, counties and courts. The proposed measure also included diverse matters as ministers, mines, civic centers, liquor control and naturopaths.
The Supreme Court of California enjoined the submission of the proposed measure to the electors for ratification because it was not an "amendment" but a "revision" which could only be proposed by a convention. It held that from an examination of the proposed measure itself, considered in relation to the terms of the California State Constitution, it was clear that the proposed initiative enactment amounted substantially to an attempted revision, rather than amendment, thereof; and that inasmuch as the California State Constitution specifies (Article XVIII A2 thereof) that it may be revised by means of constitutional convention but does not provide for revision by initiative measure, the submission of the proposed measure to the electorate for ratification must be enjoined.
As piercingly enunciated by the California State Supreme Court in McFadden, the differentiation required (between amendment and revision) is not merely between two words; more accurately it is between two procedures and between their respective fields of application. Each procedure, if we follow elementary principles of statutory construction, must be understood to have a substantial field of application, not to be a mere alternative procedure in the same field. Each of the two words, then, must be understood to denote, respectively, not only a procedure but also a field of application appropriate to its procedure.49
Provisions regulating the time and mode of effecting organic changes are in the nature of safety-valves - they must not be so adjusted as to discharge their peculiar function with too great facility, lest they become the ordinary escape-pipes of party passion; nor, on the other hand, must they discharge it with such difficulty that the force needed to induce action is sufficient also to explode the machine. Hence, the problem of the Constitution maker is, in this particular, one of the most difficult in our whole system, to reconcile the requisites for progress with the requisites for safety.50
Like in McFadden, the present petition for initiative on amendments to the Constitution is, despite its denomination, one for its revision. It purports to seek the amendment only of Articles VI and VII of the Constitution as well as to provide transitory provisions. However, as will be shown shortly, the amendment of these two provisions will necessarily affect other numerous provisions of the Constitution particularly those pertaining to the specific powers of Congress and the President. These powers would have to be transferred to the Parliament and the Prime Minister and/or President, as the case may be. More than one hundred (100) sections will be affected or altered thereby:
- Section 19 of Article III (Bill of Rights) on the power of Congress to impose the death penalty for compelling reasons involving heinous crimes;
- Section 2 of Article V (Suffrage) on the power of Congress to provide for securing the secrecy and sanctity of the ballot as well as a system for absentee voting;
- All 32 Sections of Article VI on the Legislative Department;
- All 23 Sections of Article VII on the Executive Department;
- The following Sections of Article VIII (Judicial Department):
- | Section 2 on power of Congress to define, prescribe and apportion the jurisdiction of various courts; |
- | Section 7 on the power of Congress to prescribe the qualifications of judges of lower courts; |
- | Section 8 on the composition of Judicial Bar Council (JBC) which includes representatives of Congress as ex officio members and on the power of the President to appoint the regular members of the JBC; |
- | Section 9 on the power of the President to appoint the members of the Supreme Court and judges of lower courts; |
- | Section 16 on duty of Supreme Court to make annual report to the President and Congress. |
- The following Sections of Article IX (Constitutional Commissions);
- | (B) Section 3 on duty of Civil Service Commission to make annual report to the President and Congress; |
- | (B) Section 5 on power of Congress to provide by law for the standardization of compensation of government officials; |
- | (B) Section 8 which provides in part that "no public officer shall accept, without the consent of Congress, any present, emolument, etc. x x x" |
- | (C) Section 1 on the power of the President to appoint the Chairman and Commissioners of the Commission on Elections with the consent of the Commission on Appointments; |
- | (C) Section 2 (7) on the power of the COMELEC to recommend to Congress measures to minimize election spending x x x; |
- | (C) Section 2 (8) on the duty of the COMELEC to recommend to the President the removal of any officer or employee it has deputized, or the imposition of any other disciplinary action x x x; |
- | (C) Section 2 (9) on the duty of the COMELEC to submit to the President and Congress a report on the conduct of election, plebiscite, etc.; |
- | (C) Section 5 on the power of the President, with the favorable recommendation of the COMELEC, to grant pardon, amnesty, parole, or suspension of sentence for violation of election laws, rules and regulations; |
- | (C) Section 7 which recognizes as valid votes cast in favor of organization registered under party-list system; |
- | (C) Section 8 on political parties, organizations or coalitions under the party-list system; |
- | (D) Section 1 (2) on the power of the President to appoint the Chairman and Commissioners of the Commission on Audit (COA) with the consent of the Commission of Appointments; |
- | Section 4 on duty of the COA to make annual report to the President and Congress. |
- The following Sections of Article X (Local Government):
- | Section 3 on the power of Congress to enact a local government code; |
- | Section 4 on the power of the President to exercise general supervision over local government units (LGUs); |
- | Section 5 on the power of LGUs to create their own sources of income x x x, subject to such guidelines as Congress may provide; |
- | Section 11 on the power of Congress to create special metropolitan political subdivisions; |
- | Section 14 on the power of the President to provide for regional development councils x x x; |
- | Section 16 on the power of the President to exercise general supervision over autonomous regions; |
- | Section 18 on the power of Congress to enact organic act for each autonomous region as well as the power of the President to appoint the representatives to the regional consultative commission; |
- | Section 19 on the duty of the first Congress elected under the Constitution to pass the organic act for autonomous regions in Muslim Mindanao and the Cordilleras. |
- The following Sections of Article XI (Accountability of Public Officers):
- | Section 2 on the impeachable officers (President, Vice-President, etc.); |
- | Section 3 on impeachment proceedings (exclusive power of the House to initiate complaint and sole power of the Senate to try and decide impeachment cases); |
- | Section 9 on the power of the President to appoint the Ombudsman and his deputies; |
- | Section 16 which provides in part that "x x x no loans or guaranty shall be granted to the President, Vice-President, etc. |
- | Section 17 on mandatory disclosure of assets and liabilities by public officials including the President, Vice-President, etc. |
- The following Sections of Article XII (National Economy and Patrimony):
- | Section 2 on the power of Congress to allow, by law, small-scale utilization of natural resources and power of the President to enter into agreements with foreign-owned corporations and duty to notify Congress of every contract; |
- | Section 3 on the power of Congress to determine size of lands of public domain; |
- | Section 4 on the power of Congress to determine specific limits of forest lands; |
- | Section 5 on the power of Congress to provide for applicability of customary laws; |
- | Section 9 on the power of Congress to establish an independent economic and planning agency to be headed by the President; |
- | Section 10 on the power of Congress to reserve to Filipino citizens or domestic corporations(at least 60% Filipino-owned) certain areas of investment; |
- | Section 11 on the sole power of Congress to grant franchise for public utilities; |
- | Section 15 on the power of Congress to create an agency to promote viability of cooperatives; |
- | Section 16 which provides that Congress shall not, except by general law, form private corporations; |
- | Section 17 on the salaries of the President, Vice-President, etc. and the power of Congress to adjust the same; |
- | Section 20 on the power of Congress to establish central monetary authority. |
- The following Sections of Article XIII (Social Justice and Human Rights):
- | Section 1 on the mandate of Congress to give highest priority to enactment of measures that protect and enhance the right of people x x x |
- | Section 4 on the power of Congress to prescribe retention limits in agrarian reform; |
- | Section 18 (6) on the duty of the Commission on Human Rights to recommend to Congress effective measures to promote human rights; |
- | Section 19 on the power of Congress to provide for other cases to fall within the jurisdiction of the Commission on Human Rights. |
- The following Sections of Article XIV (Education, Science and Technology, etc.):
- | Section 4 on the power of Congress to increase Filipino equity participation in educational institutions; |
- | Section 6 which provides that subject to law and as Congress may provide, the Government shall sustain the use of Filipino as medium of official communication; |
- | Section 9 on the power of Congress to establish a national language commission; |
- | Section 11 on the power of Congress to provide for incentives to promote scientific research.
|
- The following Sections of Article XVI (General Provisions):
- | Section 2 on the power of Congress to adopt new name for the country, new national anthem, etc.; |
- | Section 5 (7) on the tour of duty of the Chief of Staff which may be extended by the President in times of war or national emergency declared by Congress; |
- | Section 11 on the power of Congress to regulate or prohibit monopolies in mass media; |
- | Section 12 on the power of Congress to create consultative body to advise the President on indigenous cultural communities. |
- The following Sections of Article XVII (Amendments or Revisions):
- | Section 1 on the amendment or revision of Constitution by Congress; |
- | Section 2 on the duty of Congress to provide for the implementation of the system of initiative; |
- | Section 3 on the power of Congress to call constitutional convention to amend or revise the Constitution.
|
- All 27 Sections of Article XVIII (Transitory Provisions).
The foregoing enumeration negates the claim that "the big bulk of the 1987 Constitution will not be affected."51 Petitioners' proposition, while purportedly seeking to amend only Articles VI and VII of the Constitution and providing transitory provisions, will, in fact, affect, alter, replace or repeal other numerous articles and sections thereof. More than the quantitative effects, however, the revisory character of petitioners' proposition is apparent from the qualitative effects it will have on the fundamental law.
I am not impervious to the commentary of Dean Vicente G. Sinco that the revision of a constitution, in its strict sense, refers to a consideration of the entire constitution and the procedure for effecting such change; while amendment refers only to particular provisions to be added to or to be altered in a constitution.52
For clarity and accuracy, however, it is necessary to reiterate below Dean Sinco's more comprehensive differentiation of the terms:
Strictly speaking, the act of revising a constitution involves alterations of different portions of the entire document. It may result in the rewriting either of the whole constitution, or the greater portion of it, or perhaps only some of its important provisions. But whatever results the revisions may produce, the factor that characterizes it as an act of revision is the original intention and plan authorized to be carried out. That intention and plan must contemplate a consideration of all the provisions of the constitution to determine which one should be altered or suppressed or whether the whole document should be replaced with an entirely new one.
The act of amending a constitution, on the other hand, envisages a change of only a few specific provisions. The intention of an act to amend is not to consider the advisability of changing the entire constitution or of considering that possibility. The intention rather is to improve the specific parts of the existing constitution or to add to it provisions deemed essential on account of changed conditions or to suppress portions of it that seemed obsolete, or dangerous, or misleading in their effect.53
A change in the form of government from bicameral-presidential to unicameral-parliamentary, following the above distinction, entails a revision of the Constitution as it will involve "alteration of different portions of the entire document" and "may result in the rewriting of the whole constitution, or the greater portion of it, or perhaps only some of its important provisions."
More importantly, such shift in the form of government will, without doubt, fundamentally change the basic plan and substance of the present Constitution. The tripartite system ordained by our fundamental law divides governmental powers into three distinct but co-equal branches: the legislative, executive and judicial. Legislative power, vested in Congress which is a bicameral body consisting of the House of Representatives and the Senate, is the power to make laws and to alter them at discretion. Executive power, vested in the President who is directly elected by the people, is the power to see that the laws are duly executed and enforced. Judicial power, vested in the Supreme Court and the lower courts, is the power to construe and apply the law when controversies arise concerning what has been done or omitted under it. This separation of powers furnishes a system of checks and balances which guards against the establishment of an arbitrary or tyrannical government.
Under a unicameral-parliamentary system, however, the tripartite separation of power is dissolved as there is a fusion between the executive and legislative powers. Essentially, the President becomes a mere "symbolic head of State" while the Prime Minister becomes the head of government who is elected, not by direct vote of the people, but by the members of the Parliament. The Parliament is a unicameral body whose members are elected by legislative districts. The Prime Minister, as head of government, does not have a fixed term of office and may only be removed by a vote of confidence of the Parliament. Under this form of government, the system of checks and balances is emasculated.
Considering the encompassing scope and depth of the changes that would be effected, not to mention that the Constitution's basic plan and substance of a tripartite system of government and the principle of separation of powers underlying the same would be altered, if not entirely destroyed, there can be no other conclusion than that the proposition of petitioners Lambino, et al. would constitute a revision of the Constitution rather than an amendment or "such an addition or change within the lines of the original instrument as will effect an improvement or better carry out the purpose for which it was framed."54 As has been shown, the effect of the adoption of the petitioners' proposition, rather than to "within the lines of the original instrument" constitute "an improvement or better carry out the purpose for which it was framed," is to "substantially alter the purpose and to attain objectives clearly beyond the lines of the Constitution as now cast."55
To paraphrase McFadden, petitioners' contention that any change less than a total one is amendatory would reduce to the rubble of absurdity the bulwark so carefully erected and preserved. A case might, conceivably, be presented where the question would be occasion to undertake to define with nicety the line of demarcation; but we have no case or occasion here.
As succinctly by Fr. Joaquin Bernas, "a switch from the presidential system to a parliamentary system would be a revision because of its overall impact on the entire constitutional structure. So would a switch from a bicameral system to a unicameral system because of its effect on other important provisions of the Constitution. It is thus clear that what distinguishes revision from amendment is not the quantum of change in the document. Rather, it is the fundamental qualitative alteration that effects revision."56
The petition for initiative on amendments to the Constitution filed by petitioners Lambino, et al., being in truth and in fact a proposal for the revision thereof, is barred from the system of initiative upon any legally permissible construction of Section 2, Article XVII of the Constitution.
The Petition for Initiative on
Amendments to the Constitution
is, on its Face, Insufficient in
Form and Substance
Again, even granting arguendo RA 6735 is declared sufficient to implement the system of initiative and that COMELEC Resolution No. 2300, as it prescribed rules and regulations on the conduct of initiative on amendments to the Constitution, is valid, still, the petition for initiative on amendments to the Constitution must be dismissed for being insufficient in form and substance.
Section 5 of RA 6735 requires that a petition for initiative on the Constitution must state the following:
- Contents or text of the proposed law sought to be enacted, approved or rejected, amended or repealed, as the case may be;
- The proposition;
- The reason or reasons therefor;
- That it is not one of the exceptions provided herein;
- Signatures of the petitioners or registered voters; and
- An abstract or summary proposition in not more than one hundred (100) words which shall be legibly written or printed at the top of every page of the petition.
Section 7 thereof requires that the signatures be verified in this wise:
SEC. 7. Verification of Signatures. - The Election Registrar shall verify the signatures on the basis of the registry list of voters, voters' affidavits and voters' identification cards used in the immediately preceding election.
The law mandates upon the election registrar to personally verify the signatures. This is a solemn and important duty imposed on the election registrar which he cannot delegate to any other person, even to barangay officials. Hence, a verification of signatures made by persons other than the election registrars has no legal effect.
In patent violation of the law, several certifications submitted by petitioners showed that the verification of signatures was made, not by the election registrars, but by barangay officials. For example, the certification of the election officer in Lumbatan, Lanao del Sur reads in full:
LOCAL ELECTION OFFICER'S CERTIFICATION57
THIS IS TO CERTIFY that
based on the verifications made by the Barangay Officials in this City/Municipality, as attested to by two (2) witnesses from the same Barangays, which is part of the 2
nd Legislative District of the Province of Lanao del Sur, the names appearing on the attached signature sheets relative to the proposed initiative on Amendments to the 1987 Constitution, are those of
bonafide resident of the said
Barangays and correspond to the names found in the official list of registered voters of the Commission on Elections and/or voters' affidavit and/or voters' identification cards.
It is further certified that the total number of signatures of the registered voters for the City/Municipality of LUMBATAN, LANAO DEL SUR as appearing in the affixed signatures sheets is ONE THOUSAND ONE HUNDRED EIGHTY (1,180).
April 2, 2006
IBRAHIM M. MACADATO
Election Officer
(Underscoring supplied)The ineffective verification in almost all the legislative districts in the Autonomous Region of Muslim Mindanao (ARMM) alone is shown by the certifications, similarly worded as above-quoted, of the election registrars of Buldon, Maguindanao;
58 Cotabato City (Special Province);
59 Datu Odin Sinsuat, Maguindanao;
60 Matanog, Maguindanao;
61 Parang, Maguindanao;
62 Kabantalan, Maguindanao;
63 Upi, Maguinadano;
64 Barira, Maguindanao;
65 Sultan, Mastura;
66 Ampatuan, Maguindanao;
67 Buluan, Maguindanao;
68 Datu Paglas, Maguindanao;
69 Datu Piang, Maguindanao;
70 Shariff Aguak, Maguindanao;
71 Pagalungan, Maguindanao;
72 Talayan, Maguindanao;
73 Gen. S.K. Pendatun, Maguindanao;
74 Mamasapano, Maguindanao;
75 Talitay, Maguindanao;
76 Guindulungan, Maguindanao;
77 Datu Saudi Ampatuan, Maguindanao;
78 Datu Unsay, Maguindanao;
79 Pagagawan, Maguindanao;
80 Rajah Buayan, Maguindanao;
81 Indanan, Sulu;
82 Jolo, Sulu;
83 Maimbung, Sulu;
84 Hadji Panglima, Sulu;
85 Pangutaran, Sulu;
86 Parang, Sulu;
87 Kalingalan Caluang, Sulu;
88 Luuk, Sulu;
89 Panamao, Sulu;
90 Pata, Sulu;
91 Siasi, Sulu;
92 Tapul, Sulu;
93 Panglima Estino, Sulu;
94 Lugus, Sulu;
95 and Pandami, Sulu.
96Section 7 of RA 6735 is clear that the verification of signatures shall be done by the election registrar, and by no one else, including the
barangay officials. The foregoing certifications submitted by petitioners, instead of aiding their cause, justify the outright dismissal of their petition for initiative. Because of the illegal verifications made by
barangay officials in the above-mentioned legislative districts, it necessarily follows that the petition for initiative has failed to comply with the requisite number of signatures, i.e., at least twelve percent (12%) of the total number of registered voters, of which
every legislative district must be represented by at least three percent (3%) of the registered voters therein.
Petitioners cannot disclaim the veracity of these damaging certifications because they themselves submitted the same to the COMELEC and to the Court in the present case to support their contention that the requirements of RA 6735 had been complied with and that their petition for initiative is on its face sufficient in form and substance. They are in the nature of judicial admissions which are conclusive and binding on petitioners.
97 This being the case, the Court must forthwith order the dismissal of the petition for initiative for being, on its face, insufficient in form and substance. The Court should make the adjudication entailed by the facts here and now, without further proceedings, as it has done in other cases.
98It is argued by petitioners that, assuming
arguendo that the COMELEC is correct in relying on
Santiago that RA 6735 is inadequate to cover initiative to the Constitution, this cannot be used to legitimize its refusal to heed the people's will. The fact that there is no enabling law should not prejudice the right of the sovereign people to propose amendments to the Constitution, which right has already been exercised by 6,327,952 voters. The collective and resounding act of the particles of sovereignty must not be set aside. Hence, the COMELEC should be ordered to comply with Section 4, Article XVII of the 1987 Constitution via a writ of
mandamus. The submission of petitioners, however, is unpersuasive.
Mandamus is a proper recourse for citizens who act to enforce a public right and to compel the persons of a public duty most especially when mandated by the Constitution.
99 However, under Section 3, Rule 65 of the 1997 Rules of Court, for a petition for
mandamus to prosper, it must be shown that the subject of the petition is a ministerial act or duty and not purely discretionary on the part of the board, officer or person, and that petitioner has a well-defined, clear and certain right to warrant the grant thereof. A purely ministerial act or duty is one which an officer or tribunal performs in a given state of facts, in a prescribed manner, in obedience to the mandate of a legal authority, without regard to or the exercise of his own judgment upon the propriety or impropriety of the act done. If the law imposes a duty upon a public official and gives him the right to decide how or when the duty should be performed, such duty is discretionary and not ministerial. The duty is ministerial only when the discharge of the same requires neither the exercise of an official discretion nor judgment.
100To stress, in a petition for
mandamus, petitioner must show a well defined, clear and certain right to warrant the grant thereof.
101 In this case, petitioners failed to establish their right to a writ of
mandamus as shown by the foregoing disquisitions.
Remand of the Case to the
COMELEC is Not Authorized by
RA 6735 and COMELEC Resolution No. 2300
The dissenting opinion posits that the issue of whether or not the petition for initiative has complied with the requisite number of signatures of at least twelve percent (12%) of the total number of registered voters, of which every legislative district must be represented by at least three percent (3%) of the registered voters therein, involves contentious facts. The dissenting opinion cites the petitioners' claim that they have complied with the same while the oppositors-intervenors have vigorously refuted this claim by alleging,
inter alia, that the signatures were not properly verified or were not verified at all. Other oppositors-intervenors have alleged that the signatories did not fully understand what they have signed as they were misled into signing the signature sheets.
According to the dissenting opinion, the sufficiency of the petition for initiative and its compliance with the requirements of RA 6735 on initiative and its implementing rules is a question that should be resolved by the COMELEC at the first instance. It thus remands the case to the COMELEC for further proceedings.
To my mind, the remand of the case to the COMELEC is not warranted. There is nothing in RA 6735, as well as in COMELEC Resolution No. 2300, granting that it is valid to implement the former statute, that authorizes the COMELEC to conduct any kind of hearing, whether full-blown or trial-type hearing, summary hearing or administrative hearing, on a petition for initiative.
Section 41 of COMELEC Resolution No. 2300 provides that "[a]n initiative shall be conducted under the control and supervision of the Commission in accordance with Article III hereof." Pertinently, Sections 30, 31 and 32 of Article III of the said implementing rules provide as follows:
Sec. 30.
Verification of signatures. - The Election Registrar shall verify the signatures on the basis of the registry list of voters, voters' affidavits and voters' identification cards used in the immediately preceding election.
Sec. 31.
Determination by the Commission. - The Commission shall act on the findings of the sufficiency or insufficiency of the petition for initiative or referendum.
If it should appear that the required number of signatures has not been obtained, the petition shall be deemed defeated and the Commission shall issue a declaration to that effect.
If it should appear that the required number of signatures has been obtained, the Commission shall set the initiative or referendum in accordance with the succeeding sections.
Sec. 32.
Appeal. - The decision of the Commission on the findings of the sufficiency and insufficiency of the petition for initiative or referendum may be appealed to the Supreme Court within thirty (30) days from notice hereof.
Clearly, following the foregoing procedural rules, the COMELEC is not authorized to conduct any kind of hearing to receive any evidence for or against the sufficiency of the petition for initiative. Rather, the foregoing rules require of the COMELEC to determine the sufficiency or insufficiency of the petition for initiative on its face. And it has already been shown, by the annexes submitted by the petitioners themselves, their petition is, on its face, insufficient in form and substance. The remand of the case to the COMELEC for reception of evidence of the parties on the contentious factual issues is, in effect, an amendment of the abovequoted rules of the COMELEC by this Court which the Court is not empowered to do.
The Present Petition Presents a
Justiciable Controversy; Hence,
a Non-Political Question. Further,
the People, Acting in their Sovereign
Capacity, Have Bound Themselves
to Abide by the Constitution
Political questions refer to those questions which, under the Constitution, are to be decided by the people in their sovereign capacity, or in regard to which full discretionary authority has been delegated to the legislative or executive branch of government.
102 A political question has two aspects: (1) those matters that are to be exercised by the people in their primary political capacity; and (2) matters which have been specifically designated to some other department or particular office of the government, with discretionary power to act.
103In his concurring and dissenting opinion in
Arroyo v. De Venecia,
104 Senior Associate Justice Reynato S. Puno explained the doctrine of political question vis-A -vis the express mandate of the present Constitution for the courts to determine whether or not there has been a grave abuse of discretion on the part of any branch or instrumentality of the Government:
In the Philippine setting, there is more compelling reason for courts to categorically reject the political question defense when its interposition will cover up abuse of power. For Section 1, Article VIII of our Constitution was
intentionally cobbled to empower courts "... to determine whether or not there has been a grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction on the part of any branch or instrumentality of the government." This power is new and was not granted to our courts in the 1935 and 1972 Constitutions. It was also not xeroxed from the US Constitution or any foreign state constitution. The CONCOM [Constitutional Commission] granted this enormous power to our courts in view of our experience under martial law where abusive exercises of state power were shielded from judicial scrutiny by the misuse of the political question doctrine. Led by the eminent former Chief Justice Roberto Concepcion, the CONCOM expanded and sharpened the checking powers of the judiciary vis-A -vis the Executive and the Legislative departments of government. In cases involving the proclamation of martial law and suspension of the privilege of
habeas corpus, it is now beyond dubiety that the government can no longer invoke the political question defense.
...
To a great degree, it diminished its [political question doctrine] use as a shield to protect other abuses of government by allowing courts to penetrate the shield with new power to review acts of any branch or instrumentality of the government ". . . to determine whether or not there has been grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction."
Even if the present petition involves the act, not of a governmental body, but of purportedly more than six million registered voters who have signified their assent to the proposal to amend the Constitution, the same still constitutes a justiciable controversy, hence, a non-political question. There is no doubt that the Constitution, under Article XVII, has explicitly provided for the manner or method to effect amendments thereto, or revision thereof. The question, therefore, of whether there has been compliance with the terms of the Constitution is for the Court to pass upon.
105In the United States, in
In re McConaughy,
106 the State Supreme Court of Minnesota exercised jurisdiction over the petition questioning the result of the general election holding that "an examination of the decisions shows that the courts have almost uniformly exercised the authority to determine the validity of the proposal, submission, or ratification of constitutional amendments." The cases cited were
Dayton v. St. Paul,
107 Rice v. Palmer,
108 Bott v. Wurtz,
109 State v. Powell,
110 among other cases.
There is no denying that "the Philippines is a democratic and republican State. Sovereignty resides in the people and all government authority emanates from them."
111 However, I find to be tenuous the asseveration that "the argument that the people through initiative cannot propose substantial amendments to change the Constitution turns sovereignty in its head. At the very least, the submission constricts the democratic space for the exercise of the direct sovereignty of the people."
112 In effect, it is theorized that despite the unambiguous text of Section 2, Article XVII of the Constitution withholding the power to revise it from the system of initiative, the people, in their sovereign capacity, can conveniently disregard the said provision.
I strongly take exception to the view that the people, in their sovereign capacity, can disregard the Constitution altogether. Such a view directly contravenes the fundamental constitutional theory that while indeed "the ultimate sovereignty is in the people, from whom springs all legitimate authority"; nonetheless, "by the Constitution which they establish, they not only tie up the hands of their official agencies, but their own hands as well; and neither the officers of the state, nor the whole people as an aggregate body, are at liberty to take action in opposition to this fundamental law."
113 The Constitution, it should be remembered, "is the protector of the people, placed on guard by them to save the rights of the people against injury by the people."
114 This is the essence of constitutionalism:
Through constitutionalism we placed limits on both our political institutions and ourselves, hoping that democracies, historically always turbulent, chaotic and even despotic, might now become restrained, principled, thoughtful and just. So we bound ourselves over to a law that we made and promised to keep. And though a government of laws did not displace governance by men, it did mean that now men, democratic men, would try to live by their word.
115Section 2, Article XVII of the Constitution on the system of initiative is limited only to proposals to amend to the Constitution, and does not extend to its revision. The Filipino people have bound themselves to observe the manner and method to effect the changes of the Constitution. They opted to limit the exercise of the right to directly propose amendments to the Constitution through initiative, but did not extend the same to the revision
thereof. The petition for initiative, as it proposes to effect the revision thereof, contravenes the Constitution. The fundamental law of the state prescribes the limitations under which the electors of the state may change the same, and, unless such course is pursued, the mere fact that a majority of the electors are in favor of a change and have so expressed themselves, does not work a change. Such a course would be revolutionary, and the Constitution of the state would become a mere matter of form.
116The very term Constitution implies an instrument of a permanent and abiding nature, and the provisions contained therein for its revision indicated the will of the people that the underlying principles upon which it rests, as well as the substantial entirety of the instrument, shall be of a like permanent and abiding nature.
117The Filipino people have incorporated the safety valves of amendment and revision in Article XVII of the Constitution. The Court is mandated to ensure that these safety valves embodied in the Constitution to guard against improvident and hasty changes thereof are not easily trifled with. To be sure, by having overwhelmingly ratified the Constitution, the Filipino people believed that it is "a good Constitution" and in the words of the learned Judge Cooley:
x x x should be beyond the reach of temporary excitement and popular caprice or passion. It is needed for stability and steadiness; it must yield to the thought of the people; not to the whim of the people, or the thought evolved in excitement or hot blood, but the sober second thought, which alone, if the government is to be safe, can be allowed efficiency. Changes in government are to be feared unless the benefit is certain. As Montaign says: "All great mutations shake and disorder a state. Good does not necessarily succeed evil; another evil may succeed and worse.
118Indisputably, the issues posed in the present case are of transcendental importance. Accordingly, I have approached and grappled with them with full appreciation of the responsibilities involved in the present case, and have given to its consideration the earnest attention which its importance demands. I have sought to maintain the supremacy of the Constitution at whatever hazard. I share the concern of Chief Justice Day in
Koehler v. Hill:
119 "it is for the protection of minorities that constitutions are framed. Sometimes constitutions must be interposed for the protection of majorities even against themselves. Constitutions are adopted in times of public repose, when sober reason holds her citadel, and are designed to check the surging passions in times of popular excitement. But if courts could be coerced by popular majorities into a disregard of their provisions, constitutions would become mere `ropes of sand,' and there would be an end of social security and of constitutional freedom. The cause of temperance can sustain no injury from the loss of this amendment which would be at all comparable to the injury to republican institutions which a violation of the constitution would inflict. That large and respectable class of moral reformers which so justly demands the observance and enforcement of law, cannot afford to take its first reformatory step by a violation of the constitution. How can it consistently demand of others obedience to a constitution which it violates itself? The people can in a short time re-enact the amendment. In the manner of a great moral reform, the loss of a few years is nothing. The constitution is the palladium of republican freedom. The young men coming forward upon the stage of political action must be educated to venerate it; those already upon the stage must be taught to obey it. Whatever interest may be advanced or may suffer, whoever or whatever may be `voted up or voted down,' no sacrilegious hand must be laid upon the constitution."
120WHEREFORE, I vote to DISMISS the petition in G.R. No. 174153 and to GRANT the petition in G.R. No. 174299.
1 Entitled An Act Providing for a System of Initiative and Referendum and Appropriating Funds Therefor.
2 Section 2(1), Article IX-C, 1987 Constitution.
3 Petition, pp. 12-14.
4 Land Bank of the Philippines v. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 129368, August 25, 2003, 409 SCRA 455, 480.
5 Rodson Philippines, Inc. v. Court of Appears, G.R. No. 141857, June 9, 2004, 431 SCRA 469, 480.
6 People v. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 144332, June 10, 2004, 431 SCRA 610.
7 Philippine Rabbit Bus Lines, Inc. v. Galauran & Pilares Construction Co., G.R. No. L-35630, November 25, 1982, 118 SCRA 664.
8 People v. Court of Appeals, supra.
9 G.R. No. 127325, March 19, 1997, 270 SCRA 106.
10 Article 8, New Civil Code provides that "[j]udicial decisions applying or interpreting the laws or the Constitution shall form part of the legal system of the Philippines."
11 Suson v. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 126749, August 27, 1997, 278 SCRA 284.
12 Calderon v. Carale, G.R. No. 91636, April 23, 1992, 208 SCRA 254.
13 974 S.W.2d 451 (1998).
14 Id. at 453.
15 Entitled In Re: Rules and Regulations Governing the Conduct of Initiative in the Constitution, and Initiative and Referendum on National and Local Laws.
16 Supra note 10, p. 157.
17 G.R. No. 129754.
18 Minute Resolution, September 23, 1997, pp. 1-2.
19 Republic v. De los Angeles, No. L-26112, October 4, 1971, 41 SCRA 422.
20 Albert v. Court of First Instance of Manila, No. L-26364, May 29, 1968, 23 SCRA 948.
21 Philippine Constitution Association v. Enriquez, G.R. No. 113105, August 19, 1994, 235 SCRA 506.
22 Then Chief Justice Andres R. Narvasa, Justices Florenz D. Regalado, Flerida Ruth P. Romero, Josue N. Bellosillo, Santiago M. Kapunan and Justo P. Torres, Jr. fully concurred in the
ponencia of Justice Davide.
23 Justices Jose A.R. Melo, Vicente V. Mendoza, Reynato S. Puno, Ricardo J. Francisco, Jr. and Artemio V. Panganiban (now Chief Justice).
24 The voting on the motion for reconsideration was as follows: Six Justices, namely, Chief Justice Narvasa, and Justices Regalado, Davide, Jr., Romero, Bellosillo and Kapunan, voted to deny the motions for lack of merit; and six Justices, namely, Justices Melo, Puno, Mendoza, Francisco, Jr., Regino C. Hermosisima and Panganiban voted to grant the same. Justice Vitug maintained his opinion that the matter was not ripe for judicial adjudication. Justices Teodoro R. Padilla and Torres inhibited from participation in the deliberations.
25 House Bill No. 457 filed by then Rep. Nachura during the Twelfth Congress.
26 See
Pagdayawon v. Secretary of Justice, G.R. No. 154569, September 23, 2002, 389 SCRA 480.
27 London Street Tramways Co., Ltd. v. London County Council, [1898] A.C. 375, cited in COOLEY, A TREATISE ON THE CONSTITUTIONAL LIMITATIONS 117-118.
28 Amended Petition for Initiative, pp. 4-7.
29 Id. at 7.
30 I RECORDS OF THE CONSTITUTIONAL COMMISSION 373.
31 Id. at 371.
32 Id. at 386.
33 Id. at 392.
34 Id. at 402-403.
35 No. L-36142, March 31, 1973, 50 SCRA 30.
36 Id. at 367.
37 SINCO, PHILIPPINE POLITICAL LAW 43-44.
38 37 S.E.2d 322 (1946).
39 Id. at 330.
40 Id.
41 Sounding Board, Philippine Daily Inquirer, April 3, 2006.
42 Introduction to the Journal of the Constitutional Commission.
43 BLACK, CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 1-2, citing 1 BOUV. INST. 9.
44 SCHWARTZ, CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 1.
45 Proclamation No. 58, 83 O.G. No. 23, pp. 2703-2704, June 8, 1987.
46 See
McBee v. Brady, 15 Idaho 761, 100 P. 97 (1909).
47 Id.
48 196 P.2d 787 (1948).
49 Id. at 798.
50 Ellingham v. Dye, 99 N.E. 1 (1912).
51 Dissenting Opinion of Justice Puno, p. 36.
52 Id. at 39.
53 Supra note 38.
54 McFadden v. Jordan, supra note 48.
55 Id. at 799.
56 Supra note 41.
57 Annex "1363."
58 Annex "1368."
59 Annex "1369."
60 Annex "1370."
61 Annex "1371."
62 Annex "1372."
63 Annex "1374."
64 Annex "1375."
65 Annex "1376."
66 Annex "1377."
67 Annex "1378."
68 Annex "1379."
69 Annex "1380."
70 Annex "1381."
71 Annex "1382."
72 Annex "1383."
73 Annex "1385."
74 Annex "1387."
75 Annex "1388."
76 Annex "1389."
77 Annex "1391."
78 Annex "1392."
79 Annex "1393."
80 Annex "1395."
81 Annex "1396."
82 Annex "1397."
83 Annex "1398."
84 Annex "1399."
85 Annex "1400."
86 Annex "1401."
87 Annex "1402."
88 Annex "1404."
89 Annex "1405."
90 Annex "1406."
91 Annex "1407."
92 Annex "1408."
93 Annex "1409."
94 Annex "1410."
95 Annex "1411."
96 Annex "1412."
97 Arroyo, Jr. v. Taduran, G.R. No. 147012, January 29, 2004, 421 SCRA 423.
98 See, for example,
Mendoza v. Court of Appeals, No. L-62089, March 9, 1988, 158 SCRA 508.
99 Licaros v. Sandiganbayan, G.R. No. 145851, November 22, 2001, 370 SCRA 394.
100 Codilla, Sr. v. De Venecia, G.R. No. 150605, December 10, 2002, 393 SCRA 639.
101 Teope v. People, G.R. No. 149687, April 14, 2004, 427 SCRA 540.
102 TaAada v. Cuenco, 103 Phil. 1051 (1957).
103 Id.
104 G.R. No. 127255, August 14, 1997, 277 SCRA 268, 311-312.
105 Dissenting Opinion of Justice Fernando in
Javellana v. Executive Secretary, supra note 36.
106 119 N.W. 408 (1909).
107 22 Minn. 400 (1876).
108 96 S.W. 396 (1906).
109 63 N.J. Law 289.
110 77 Miss. 543 (1900).
111 Section 1, Article II, 1987 Constitution.
112 Dissenting Opinion of Justice Puno, p. 49.
113 COOLEY, A TREATISE ON THE CONSTITUTIONAL LIMITATIONS 56, cited in
Ellingham v. Dye, supra.
114 Hunter v. Colfax Consol. Coal. Co., 154 N.W. 1037 (1915).
115 ALTMAN, ARGUING ABOUT THE LAW 94 (2001), citing AGRESTO, THE SUPREME COURT AND CONSTITUTIONAL DEMOCRACY (1984)
116 McBee v. Brady, 100 P. 97 (1909).
117 McFadden v. Jordan, supra note 48.
118 Cooley, Am.Law.Rev. 1889, p. 311, cited in
Ellingham v. Dye, supra.
119 15 N.W. 609 (1883).
120 Id. at 630.
SEPARATE OPINION
AZCUNA,
J.:
"Why, friends, you go to do you know not what."
-- Shakespeare, Julius Caesar, Act III, Sc. 2.
Article XVII of the Constitution states:
AMENDMENTS OR REVISIONS
Section 1. Any amendment to, or revision of, this Constitution may be proposed by:
(1) | The Congress, upon a vote of three-fourths of all its members; or |
(2) | A constitutional convention. |
Sec. 2. Amendments to this Constitution may likewise be directly proposed by the people through initiative upon a petition of at least twelve
per centum of the total number of registered voters, of which every legislative district must be represented by at least three
per centum of the registered votes therein. No amendment under this section shall be authorized within five years following the ratification of this Constitution nor oftener than once every five years thereafter.
The Congress shall provide for the implementation of the exercise of this right.
Sec. 3. The Congress may, by a vote of two-thirds of all its Members, call a constitutional convention, or by a majority vote of all its Members, submit to the electorate the question of calling such a convention.
Sec. 4. Any amendment to, or revision of, this Constitution under Section 1 hereof shall be valid when ratified by a majority of the votes cast in a plebiscite which shall be held not earlier than sixty days nor later than ninety days after the approval of such amendment or revision.
Any amendment under Section 2 hereof shall be valid when ratified by a majority of the votes cast in a plebiscite which shall be held not earlier than sixty days nor later than ninety days after the certification by the Commission on Elections of the sufficiency of the petition.
This Article states the procedure for changing the Constitution.
Constitutions have three parts - the Constitution of Liberty, which states the fundamental rights of the people; the Constitution of Government, which establishes the structure of government, its branches and their operation; and the Constitution of Sovereignty, which provides how the Constitution may be changed.
Article XVII is the Constitution of Sovereignty.
As a result, the powers therein provided are called constituent powers. So when Congress acts under this provision, it acts not as a legislature exercising legislative powers. It acts as a constituent body exercising constituent powers.
The rules, therefore, governing the exercise of legislative powers do not apply, or do not apply strictly, to the actions taken under Article XVII.
Accordingly, since Article XVII states that Congress shall provide for the implementation of the exercise of the people's right directly to propose amendments to the Constitution through initiative, the act of Congress pursuant thereto is not strictly a legislative action but partakes of a constituent act.
As a result, Republic Act No. 6735, the act that provides for the exercise of the people of the right to propose a law or amendments to the Constitution is, with respect to the right to propose amendments to the Constitution, a constituent measure, not a mere legislative one.
The consequence of this special character of the enactment, insofar as it relates to proposing amendments to the Constitution, is that the requirements for statutory enactments, such as sufficiency of standards and the like, do not and should not strictly apply. As long as there is a sufficient and clear intent to provide for the implementation of the exercise of the right, it should be sustained, as it is simply a compliance of the mandate placed on Congress by the Constitution.
Seen in this light, the provisions of Republic Act No. 6735 relating to the procedure for proposing amendments to the Constitution, can and should be upheld, despite shortcomings perhaps in legislative headings and standards.
For this reason, I concur in the view that
Santiago v. Comelec1 should be re-examined and, after doing so, that the pronouncement therein regarding the insufficiency or inadequacy of the measure to sustain a people's initiative to amend the Constitution should be reconsidered in favor of allowing the exercise of this sovereign right.
And applying the doctrine stated in
Senarillos v. Hermosisima,
2 penned by Justice J.B.L. Reyes, in relation to Article 8 of the Civil Code, that a decision of this Court interpreting a law forms part of the law interpreted as of the time of its enactment, Republic Act No. 6735 should be deemed sufficient and adequate from the start.
This next point to address, there being a sufficient law, is whether the petition for initiative herein involved complies with the requirements of that law as well as those stated in Article XVII of the Constitution.
True it is that ours is a democratic state, as explicitated in the Declaration of Principles, to emphasize precisely that there are instances recognized and provided for in the Constitution where our people directly exercise their sovereign powers, new features set forth in this People Power Charter, namely, the powers of recall, initiative and referendum.
Nevertheless, this democratic nature of our polity is that of a democracy
under the rule of law. This equally important point is emphasized in the very Preamble to the Constitution, which states:
". . . the blessings of . . . democracy under the rule of law . . . ."
Such is the case with respect to the power to initiate changes in the Constitution. The power is subject to limitations under the Constitution itself, thus: The power could not be exercised for the first five years after the Constitution took effect and thereafter can only be exercised once every five years; the power only extends to proposing amendments but not revisions; and the power needs an act of Congress providing for its implementation, which act is directed and mandated.
The question, therefore, arises whether the proposed changes in the Constitution set forth in the petition for initiative herein involved are mere amendments or rather are revisions.
Revisions are changes that affect the entire Constitution and not mere parts of it.
The reason why revisions are not allowed through direct proposals by the people through initiative is a practical one, namely, there is no one to draft such extensive changes, since 6.3 million people cannot conceivably come up with a single extensive document through a direct proposal from each of them. Someone would have to draft it and that is not authorized as it would not be a direct proposal from the people. Such indirect proposals can only take the form of proposals from Congress as a Constituent Assembly under Article XVII, or a Constitutional Convention created under the same provision. Furthermore, there is a need for such deliberative bodies for revisions because their proceedings and debates are duly and officially recorded, so that future cases of interpretations can be properly aided by resort to the record of their proceedings.
Even a cursory reading of the proposed changes contained in the petition for initiative herein involved will show on its face that the proposed changes constitute a revision of the Constitution. The proposal is to change the system of government from that which is bicameral-presidential to one that is unicameral-parliamentary.
While purportedly only Articles VI, VII, and XVIII are involved, the fact is, as the petition and text of the proposed changes themselves state, every provision of the Constitution will have to be examined to see if they conform to the nature of a unicameral-parliamentary form of government and changed accordingly if they do not so conform to it. For example, Article VIII on Judicial Department cannot stand as is, in a parliamentary system, for under such a system, the Parliament is supreme, and thus the Court's power to declare its act a grave abuse of discretion and thus void would be an anomaly.
Now, who is to do such examination and who is to do such changes and how should the changes be worded? The proposed initiative does not say who nor how.
Not only, therefore, is the proposed initiative, on this score, a prohibited revision but it also suffers from being incomplete and insufficient on its very face.
It, therefore, in that form, cannot pass muster the very limits contained in providing for the power under the Constitution.
Neither does it comply with Republic Act No. 6735, which states in Section 10 that not more than one subject shall be proposed as an amendment or amendments to the Constitution. The petition herein would propose at the very least two subjects - a unicameral legislature and a parliamentary form of government. Again, for this clear and patent violation of the very act that provides for the exercise of the power, the proposed initiative cannot lie.
This does not mean, however, that all is lost for petitioners.
For the proposed changes can be separated and are, in my view, separable in nature - a unicameral legislature is one; a parliamentary form of government is another. The first is a mere amendment and contains only one subject matter. The second is clearly a revision that affects every article and every provision in the Constitution to an extent not even the proponents could at present fully articulate. Petitioners Lambino, et al. thus go about proposing changes the nature and extent of which they do not as yet know exactly what.
The proposal, therefore, contained in the petition for initiative, regarding a change in the legislature from a bicameral or two-chamber body to that of a unicameral or one-chamber body, is sustainable. The text of the changes needed to carry it out are perfunctory and ministerial in nature. Once it is limited to this proposal, the changes are simply one of deletion and insertions, the wordings of which are practically automatic and non-discretionary.
As an example, I attach to this opinion an Appendix "A" showing how the Constitution would read if we were to change Congress from one consisting of the Senate and the House of Representatives to one consisting only of the House of Representatives. It only affects Article VI on the Legislative Department, some provisions on Article VII on the Executive Department, as well as Article XI on the Accountability of Public Officers, and Article XVIII on Transitory Provisions. These are mere amendments, substantial ones indeed but still only amendments, and they address only one subject matter.
Such proposal, moreover, complies with the intention and rationale behind the present initiative, which is to provide for simplicity and economy in government and reduce the stalemates that often prevent needed legislation.
For the nonce, therefore, I vote to DISMISS the petition, without prejudice to the filing of an appropriate initiative to propose amendments to the Constitution to change Congress into a unicameral body. This is not say that I favor such a change. Rather, such a proposal would come within the purview of an initiative allowed under Article XVII of the Constitution and its implementing Republic Act, and should, therefore, be submitted to our people in a plebiscite for them to decide in their sovereign capacity. After all is said and done, this is what democracy under the rule of law is about.
1 G.R. No. 127325, March 19, 1997 and June 10, 1997.
2 100 Phil. 501 (1956).
APPENDIX "A"
THE 1987
CONSTITUTION OF THE REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES
ARTICLE VI
THE LEGISLATIVE DEPARTMENT
Section 1. The legislative power shall be vested in the Congress of the Philippines which shall consist of a House of Representatives, except to the extent reserved to the people by the provision on initiative and referendum.
x x x
[Sec. 2. Deleted]
[Sec. 3. Deleted]
[Sec. 4. Deleted]
Section 5. (1) The House of Representatives shall be composed of not more than two hundred and fifty members, unless otherwise fixed by law, who shall be elected from legislative districts apportioned among the provinces, cities, and the Metropolitan Manila area in accordance with the number of their respective inhabitants, and on the basis of a uniform and progressive ratio, and those who, as provided by law, shall be elected through a party-list system of registered national, regional, and sectoral parties or organizations, and the senators whose term has not expired, until their term expires.
x x x
Sec. 8. Unless otherwise provided by law, the regular election of the Members of the House of Representatives shall be held on the second Monday of May.
Sec. 9. In case of vacancy in the House of Representatives, a special election may be called to fill such vacancy in the manner prescribed by law, but the Member of the House of Representatives thus elected shall serve only for the unexpired term.
Sec. 10. The salaries of Members of the House of Representatives shall be determined by law. No increase in said compensation shall take effect until after the expiration of the full term of all the Members of the House of Representatives approving such increase.
Sec. 11. A Member of the House of Representatives shall, in all offenses punishable by not more than six years imprisonment, be privileged from arrest while the Congress is in session. No Member shall be questioned nor be held liable in any other place for any speech or debate in the Congress or in any committee thereof.
Sec. 12. All Members of the House of Representatives shall, upon assumption of office, make a full disclosure of their financial and business interests. They shall notify the House concerned of a potential conflict of interest that may arise from the filing of a proposed legislation of which they are authors.
Sec. 13. No Member of the House of Representatives may hold any other office or employment in the Government, or any subdivision, agency, or instrumentality thereof, including government-owned or controlled corporations or their subsidiaries, during his term without forfeiting his seat. Neither shall he be appointed to any office which may have been created or the emoluments thereof increased during the term for which he was elected.
Sec. 14. No Member of the House of Representatives may personally appear as counsel before any court of justice or before the Electoral Tribunal, or quasi-judicial and other administrative bodies. Neither shall he, directly or indirectly, be interested financially in any contract with, or in any franchise or special privilege granted by the Government, or any subdivision, agency, or instrumentality thereof, including any government-owned or controlled corporation, or its subsidiary, during his term of office. He shall not intervene in any matter before any office of the Government for his pecuniary benefit or where he may be called upon to act on account of his office.
x x x
Sec. 16. (1). The House of Representatives shall elect its Speaker by a majority vote of all its Members. THE House shall choose such other officers as it may deem necessary.
(2) A majority of THE House shall constitute a quorum to do business, but a smaller number may adjourn from day to day and may compel the attendance of absent Members in such manner, and under such penalties, as THE House may provide.
(3) THE House may determine the rules of its proceedings, punish its Members for disorderly behavior, and, with the concurrence of two-thirds of all its Members, suspend or expel a Member. A penalty of suspension, when imposed, shall not exceed sixty days.
(4) THE House shall keep a Journal of its proceedings, and from time to time publish the same, excepting such parts as may, in its judgment, affect national security; and the yeas amd nays on any question shall, at the request of one-fifth of the Members present, be entered in the Journal.
THE House shall also keep a Record of its proceedings.
[Subsec. (5) deleted]
x x x
Sec. 17. The House of Representatives shall have an Electoral Tribunal which shall be the sole judge of all contests relating to the election, returns, and qualifications of its Members. THE Electoral Tribunal shall be composed of nine Members, three of whom shall be Justices of the Supreme Court to be designated by the Chief Justice, and the remaining six shall be Members of the House of Representatives, who shall be chosen on the basis of proportional representation from the political parties. and the parties or organizations registered under the party-list system represented therein. The senior Justice in the Electoral Tribunal shall be its Chairman.
Sec. 18. There shall be a Commission on Appointments consisting of the Speaker of the House, as
ex officio Chairman, and TWENTY-FOUR (24) Members of the House of Representatives, elected by THE House on the basis of proportional representation from the political parties and parties or organizations registered under the party-list system represented therein. The chairman of the Commission shall not vote, except in case of a tie. The Commission shall act on all appointments submitted to it within thirty session days of the Congress from their submission. The Commission shall rule by a majority vote of all the Members.
Sec. 19. The Electoral Tribunal and the Commission on Appointments shall be constituted within thirty days after the House of Representatives shall have been organized with the election of the Speaker. The Commission on Appointments shall meet only while the Congress is in session, at the call of its Chairman or a majority of all its Members, to discharge such powers and functions as are herein conferred upon it.
x x x
Sec. 21. The House of Representatives or any of its respective committees may conduct inquiries in aid of legislation in accordance with its duly published rules of procedure. The rights of persons appearing in, or affected by, such inquiries shall be respected.
Sec. 22. The heads of departments may, upon their own initiative, with the consent of the President, or upon the request of THE House, as the rules of THE House shall provide, appear before and be heard by such House on any matter pertaining to their departments. Written questions shall be submitted to the Speaker of the House of Representatives at least three days before their scheduled appearance. Interpellations shall not be limited to written questions, but may cover matters related thereto. When the security of the State or the public interest so requires and the President so states in writing, the appearance shall be conducted in executive session.
Sec. 23. (1) The Congress, by a vote of two-thirds, shall have the sole power to declare the existence of a state of war.
...
[Sec. 24 deleted]
...
Sec. 25. (5) No law shall be passed authorizing any transfer of appropriations; however, the President, the Speaker of the House of Representatives, the Chief Justice of the Supreme Court, and the heads of Constitutional Commissions may, by law, be authorized to augment any item in the general appropriations law for their respective offices from savings in other items of their respective appropriations.
x x x
(2) No bill passed by THE House shall become a law unless it has passed three readings on separate days, and printed copies thereof in its final form have been distributed to its Members three days before its passage, except when the President certifies to the necessity of its immediate enactment to meet a public calamity or emergency. Upon the last reading of a bill, no amendment thereto shall be allowed, and the vote thereon shall be taken immediately thereafter, and the
yeas and
nays entered in the Journal.
x x x
Sec. 27. (1) Every bill passed by the Congress shall, before it becomes a law, be presented to the President. If he approves the same he shall sign it; otherwise, he shall veto it and return the same with his objections to the House OF REPRESENTATIVES, which shall enter the objections at large in its Journal and proceed to reconsider it. If, after such reconsideration, two-thirds of all the Members of THE House shall agree to pass the bill, it shall become a law. In all such cases, the votes of THE House shall be determined by
yeas or
nays, and the names of the Members voting for or against shall be entered in its Journal. The President shall communicate his veto of any bill to the House OF REPRESENTATIVES within thirty days after the date of receipt thereof, otherwise, it shall become a law as if he had signed it.
x x x
ARTICLE VII
EXECUTIVE DEPARTMENT
...
Sec. 4. The returns of every election for President and Vice-President, duly certified by the board of canvassers of each province or city, shall be transmitted to the Congress, directed to the SPEAKER OF THE HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES. Upon receipt of the certificates of canvass, the SPEAKER OF THE HOUSE shall, not later than thirty days after the day of the election, open all the certificates in the presence of the House of Representatives in public session, and the Congress, upon determination of the authenticity and due execution thereof in the manner provided by law, canvass the votes.
x x x
Sec. 7. Where no President and Vice-President shall have been chosen or shall have qualified, or where both shall have died or become permanently disabled, the Speaker of the House of Representatives, shall act as President until a President or a Vice-President shall have been chosen and qualified.
x x x
Sec. 8. In case of death, permanent disability, removal from office, or resignation of the President, the Vice-President shall become the President to serve the unexpired term. In case of death, permanent disability, removal from office, or resignation of both the President and Vice-President, the Speaker of the House of Representatives, shall then act as President until the President or Vice-President shall have been elected and qualified.
x x x
Sec. 9. Whenever there is a vacancy in the Office of the Vice-President during the term for which he was elected, the President shall nominate a Vice-President from among the Members of the House of Representatives who shall assume office upon confirmation by a majority vote of all the Members of THE House.
x x x
Sec. 11. Whenever the President transmits to the Speaker of the House of Representatives his written declaration that he is unable to discharge the powers and duties of his office, and until he transmits to them a written declaration to the contrary, such powers and duties shall be discharged by the Vice-President as Acting President.
Whenever a majority of all the Members of the Cabinet transmit to the Speaker of the House of Representatives their written declaration that the President is unable to discharge the powers and duties of his office, the Vice-President shall immediately assume the powers and duties of the office as Acting President.
Thereafter, when the President transmits to the Speaker of the House of Representatives his written declaration that no inability exists, he shall reassume the powers and duties of his office. Meanwhile, should a majority of all the Members of the Cabinet transmit within five days to the Speaker of the House of Representatives, their written declaration that the President is unable to discharge the powers and duties of his office, the Congress shall decide the issue. For that purpose, the Congress shall convene, if it is not in session, within forty-eight hours, in accordance with its rules and without need of call.
x x x
Sec. 18. The President shall be the Commander-in-Chief of all armed forces of the Philippines and whenever it becomes necessary, he may call out such armed forces to prevent or suppress lawless violence, invasion or rebellion. In case of invasion or rebellion, when the public safety requires it, he may, for a period not exceeding sixty days, suspend the privilege of the writ of
habeas corpus or place the Philippines or any part thereof under martial law. Within forty-eight hours from the proclamation of martial law or the suspension of the privilege of the writ of
habeas corpus, the President shall submit a report in person or in writing to the Congress. The Congress, by a vote of at least a majority of all its Members in regular or special session, may revoke such proclamation or suspension, which revocation shall not be set aside by the President. Upon the initiative of the President, the Congress may, in the same manner, extend such proclamation or suspension for a period to be determined by the Congress, if the invasion or rebellion shall persist and public safety requires it.
x x x
Sec. 21. No treaty or international agreement shall be valid and effective unless concurred in by at least two-thirds of all the Members of the HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES.
x x x
ARTICLE XI
ACCOUNTABILITY OF PUBLIC OFFICERS
x x x
Sec. 3. (4) In case the verified complaint or resolution of impeachment is filed by at least one-third of all the Members of the House, the same shall constitute the Articles of Impeachment, and trial shall forthwith proceed.
x x x
(6) The HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES shall have the sole power to try and decide all cases of impeachment. When sitting for that purpose, the MEMBERS shall be on oath or affirmation. When the President of the Philippines is on trial, the Chief Justice of the Supreme Court shall preside, but shall not vote. No person shall be convicted without the concurrence of two-thirds of all the Members.
x x x
ARTICLE XVIII
TRANSITORY PROVISIONS
x x x
Sec. 2. The Members of the House of Representatives, and the local officials first elected under this Constitution shall serve until noon of June 30, 1992.
x x x
Sec. 4. All existing treaties or international agreements which have not been ratified shall not be renewed or extended without the concurrence of at least two-thirds of all the Members of the HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES.
x x x
Sec. 17. Until the Congress provides otherwise, the President shall receive an annual salary of three hundred thousand pesos; the Vice-President, the Speaker of the House of Representatives, and the Chief Justice of the Supreme Court, two hundred forty thousand pesos each; Members of the House of Representatives, the Associate Justices of the Supreme Court, and the Chairmen of the Constitutional Commissions, two hundred four thousand pesos each; and the Members of the Constitutional Commissions, one hundred eighty thousand pesos each.
x x x
Sec. 25. After the expiration in 1991 of the Agreement between the Republic of the Philippines and the United States of America concerning military bases, foreign military bases, troops, or facilities shall not be allowed in the Philippines except under a treaty duly concurred in by the HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES and, when the Congress so requires; ratified by a majority of the votes cast by the people in a national referendum held for that purpose, and recognized as a treaty by the other contracting State. ...
SEPARATE OPINION
TINGA,
J:
I join in full the opinion of Senior Associate Justice Puno. Its enviable sang-froid, inimitable lucidity, and luminous scholarship are all so characteristic of the author that it is hardly a waste of pen and ink to write separately if only to express my deep admiration for his disquisition. It is compelling because it derives from the fundamental democratic ordinance that sovereignty resides in the people, and it seeks to effectuate that principle through the actual empowerment of the sovereign people. Justice Puno's opinion will in the short term engender reactions on its impact on present attempts to amend the Constitution, but once the political passion of the times have been shorn, it will endure as an unequivocal message to the
taongbayan that they are to be trusted to chart the course of their future.
Nothing that I inscribe will improve on Justice Puno's opinion. I only write separately to highlight a few other points which also inform my vote to grant the petitions.
I.
I agree with Justice Puno that
Santiago v. COMELEC1 and
PIRMA v. COMELEC2 had not acquired value as precedent and should be reversed in any case. I add that the Court has long been mindful of the rule that it necessitates a majority, and not merely a plurality, in order that a decision can stand as precedent. That principle has informed the members of this Court as they deliberated and voted upon contentious petitions, even if this consideration is not ultimately reflected on the final draft released for promulgation.
The curious twist to
Santiago and
PIRMA is that for all the denigration heaped upon Rep. Act No. 6735 in those cases, the Court did not invalidate any provision of the statute. All the Court said then was that the law was "inadequate". Since this "inadequate" law was not annulled by the Court, or repealed by Congress, it remained part of the statute books.
3I maintain that even if Rep. Act No. 6735 is truly "inadequate", the Court in
Santiago should not have simply let the insufficiency stand given that it was not minded to invalidate the law itself. Article 9 of the Civil Code provides that "[n]o judge or court shall decline to render judgment by reason of the silence, obscurity or insufficiency of the laws."
4 As explained by the Court recently in
Reyes v. Lim,
5 "[Article 9] calls for the application of equity, which[, in the revered Justice Cardozo's words,] `fills the open spaces in the law.'"
6 Certainly, any court that refuses to rule on an action premised on Rep. Act No. 6735 on the ground that the law is "inadequate" would have been found in grave abuse of discretion. The previous failure by the Court to "fill the open spaces" in
Santiago further highlights that decision's status as an unfortunate aberration.
I am mindful of the need to respect
stare decisis, to the point of having recently decried a majority ruling that was clearly minded to reverse several precedents but refused to explicitly say so.
7 Yet the principle is not immutable.
8 The passionate words of Chief Justice Panganiban in
OsmeAa v. COMELEC9 bear quoting:
Before I close, a word about stare decisis. In the present case, the Court is maintaining the ad ban to be consistent with its previous holding in NPC vs. Comelec. Thus, respondent urges reverence for the stability of judicial doctrines. I submit, however, that more important than consistency and stability are the verity, integrity and correctness of jurisprudence. As Dean Roscoe Pound explains, "Law must be stable but it cannot stand still." Verily, it must correct itself and move in cadence with the march of the electronic age. Error and illogic should not be perpetuated. After all, the Supreme Court, in many cases, has deviated from stare decisis and reversed previous doctrines and decisions.[
10] It should do no less in the present case.
11Santiago established a tenet that the Supreme Court may affirm a law as constitutional, yet declare its provisions as inadequate to accomplish the legislative purpose, then barred the enforcement of the law. That ruling is erroneous, illogical, and should not be perpetuated.
II.
Following Justice Puno's clear demonstration why
Santiago should not be respected as precedent, I agree that the COMELEC's failure to take cognizance of the petitions as mandated by Rep. Act No. 6735 constitutes grave abuse of discretion correctible through the petitions before this Court.
The Court has consistently held in cases such as
Abes v. COMELEC12,
Sanchez v. COMELEC13, and
Sambarani v. COMELEC14 that "the functions of the COMELEC under the Constitution are essentially executive and administrative in nature".
15 More pertinently, in
Buac v. COMELEC16, the Court held that the jurisdiction of the COMELEC relative to the enforcement and administration of a law relative to a plebiscite fell under the jurisdiction of the poll body under its constitutional mandate "to enforce and administer all laws and regulations relative to the conduct of a ... plebiscite".
17Rep. Act No. 6735 is a law relative to the conduct of a plebiscite. The primary task of the COMELEC under Rep. Act No. 6735 is to enforce and administer the said law, functions that are essentially executive and administrative in nature. Even the subsequent duty of the COMELEC of determining the sufficiency of the petitions after they have been filed is administrative in character. By any measure, the COMELEC's failure to perform its executive and administrative functions under Rep. Act No. 6735 constitutes grave abuse of discretion.
III.
It has been argued that the subject petitions for initiative are barred under Republic Act No. 6735 as they allegedly embrace more than one subject. Section 10 of Rep. Act No. 6735 classifies as a "prohibited measure," a petition submitted to the electorate that embraces more than one subject.
18 On this point, reliance is apparently placed on the array of provisions which are to be affected by the amendments proposed in the initiative petition.
Section 10 of Rep. Act No. 6735 is a reflection of the long-enshrined constitutional principle that the laws passed by Congress "shall embrace only one subject which shall be expressed in the title thereof".
19 The one-subject requirement under the Constitution is satisfied if all the parts of the statute are related, and are germane to the subject matter expressed in the title, or as long as they are not inconsistent with or foreign to the general subject and title.
20 An act having a single general subject, indicated in the title, may contain any number of provisions, no matter how diverse they may be, so long as they are not inconsistent with or foreign to the general subject, and may be considered in furtherance of such subject by providing for the method and means of carrying out the general object.
21The precedents governing the one-subject, one-title rule under the Constitution should apply as well in the interpretation of Section 10 of Rep. Act No. 6735. For as long as it can be established that an initiative petition embraces a single general subject, the petition may be allowed no matter the number of constitutional provisions proposed for amendment if the amendments are germane to the subject of the petition.
Both the Sigaw ng Bayan and the Lambino initiative petitions expressly propose the changing of the form of government from bicameral-presidential to unicameral-parliamentary. Such a proposal may strike as comprehensive, necessitating as it will the reorganization of the executive and legislative branches of government, nevertheless it ineluctably encompasses only a single general subject still.
The 1987 Constitution (or any constitution for that matter) is susceptible to division into several general spheres. To cite the broadest of these spheres by way of example, Article III enumerates the guaranteed rights of the people under the Bill of Rights; Articles VI, VII and VIII provide for the organizational structure of government; while Articles II, XII, XIII & XIV, XV and XVI enunciate policy principles of the State. What would clearly be prohibited under Section 10 of Rep. Act No. 6735 is an initiative petition that seeks to amend provisions which do not belong to the same sphere. For example, had a single initiative petition sought not only to change the form of government from presidential to parliamentary but also to amend the Bill of Rights, said petition would arguably have been barred under Section 10, as that petition ostensibly embraces more than one subject, with each subject bearing no functional relation to the other. But that is not the case with the present initiative petitions.
Neither can it be argued that the initiative petitions embrace more than one subject since the proposed amendments seek to affect two separate branches of government. The very purpose of the initiative petitions is to fuse the powers of the executive and legislative branches of government; hence, the amendments intended to effect such general intent necessarily affects the two branches. If it required that to propose a shift in government from presidential to parliamentary, the amendments to Article VII (Executive Branch) have to be segregated to a different petition from that which would propose amendments to Article VI (Legislative Branch), then the result would be two initiative petitions Aaa both subject to separate authentications, consideration and even plebiscites, all to effect one general proposition. This scenario, which entertains the possibility that one petition would ultimately fail while the other succeeds, could thus allow for the risk that the executive branch could be abolished without transferring executive power to the legislative branch. An absurd result, indeed.
I am not even entirely comfortable with the theoretical underpinnings of Section 10. The Constitution indubitably grants the people the right to seek amendment of the charter through initiative, and mandates Congress to "provide for the implementation of the exercise of this right." In doing so, Congress may not restrict the right to initiative on grounds that are not provided for in the Constitution. If for example the implementing law also provides that certain provisions of the Constitution may not be amended through initiative, that prohibition should not be sustained. Congress is tasked with the implementation, and not the restriction of the right to initiative.
The one-subject requirement under Section 10 is not provided for as a bar to amendment under the Constitution. Arguments can be supplied for the merit of such a requirement, since it would afford a measure of orderliness when the vital question of amending the Constitution arises. The one-subject requirement does allow the voters focus when deliberating whether or not to vote for the amendments. These factors of desirability nonetheless fail to detract from the fact that the one-subject requirement imposes an additional restriction on the right to initiative not contemplated by the Constitution. Short of invalidating the requirement, a better course of action would be to insist upon its liberal interpretation. After all, the Court has consistently adhered to a liberal interpretation of the one-subject, one-title rule.
22 There is no cause to adopt a stricter interpretative rule with regard to the one-subject rule under Section 10 of Rep. Act No. 6735
IV.
During the hearing on the petitions, the argument was raised that provisions of the Constitution amended through initiative would not have the benefit of a reference source from the record of a deliberative body such as Congress or a constitutional convention. It was submitted that this consideration influenced the Constitutional Commission as it drafted Section 2, Article XVII, which expressly provided that only amendments, and not revisions, may be the subject of initiative petitions.
This argument clearly proceeds from a premise that accords supreme value to the record of deliberations of a constitutional convention or commission in the interpretation of the charter. Yet if the absence of a record of deliberations stands as so serious a flaw as to invalidate or constrict processes which change a constitution or its provisions, then the entire initiative process authorized by the Constitution should be scarlet-marked as well.
Even if this position can be given any weight in the consideration of these petitions, I would like to point out that resort to the records of deliberations is only one of many aids to constitutional construction. For one, it should be abhorred if the provision under study is itself clear, plain, and free from ambiguity. As the Court held in
Civil Liberties Union v. Executive Secretary:23While it is permissible in this jurisdiction to consult the debates and proceedings of the constitutional convention in order to arrive at the reason and purpose of the resulting Constitution, resort thereto may be had only when other guides fail as said proceedings are powerless to vary the terms of the Constitution when the meaning is clear. Debates in the constitutional convention "are of value as showing the views of the individual members, and as indicating the reasons for their votes, but they give us no light as to the views of the large majority who did not talk . . . We think it safer to construe the constitution from what appears upon its face."
24Even if there is need to refer to extrinsic sources in aid of constitutional interpretation, the constitutional record does not provide the exclusive or definitive answer on how to interpret the provision. The intent of a constitutional convention is not controlling by itself, and while the historical discussion on the floor of the constitutional convention is valuable, it is not necessarily decisive. The Court has even held in
Vera v. Avelino25 that "the proceedings of the [constitutional] convention are less conclusive of the proper construction of the fundamental law than are legislative proceedings of the proper construction of a statute, since in the latter case it is the intent of the legislature that courts seek, while in the former courts are endeavoring to arrive at the intent of the people through the discussions and deliberations of their representatives."
26 The proper interpretation of a constitution depends more on how it was understood by the people adopting it than the framers' understanding thereof.
27If there is fear in the absence of a constitutional record as guide for interpretation of any amendments adopted via initiative, such absence would not preclude the courts from interpreting such amendments in a manner consistent with how courts generally construe the Constitution. For example, reliance will be placed on the other provisions of the Constitution to arrive at a harmonized and holistic constitutional framework. The constitutional record is hardly the Rosetta Stone that unlocks the meaning of the Constitution.
V.
I fully agree with Justice Puno that all issues relating to the sufficiency of the initiative petitions should be remanded to the COMELEC. Rep. Act No. 6735 clearly reposes on the COMELEC the task of determining the sufficiency of the petitions, including the ascertainment of whether twelve percent (12%) of all registered voters, including three percent (3%) of registered voters in every legislative district have indeed signed the initiative petitions.
28 It should be remembered that the COMELEC had dismissed the initiative petitions outright, and had yet to undertake the determination of sufficiency as required by law.
It has been suggested to the end of leading the Court to stifle the initiative petitions that the Court may at this juncture pronounce the initiative petitions as insufficient. The derivation of the factual predicates leading to the suggestion is uncertain, considering that the trier of facts, the COMELEC in this instance, has yet to undertake the necessary determination. Still, the premise has been floated that petitioners have made sufficient admissions before this Court that purportedly established the petitions are insufficient.
That premise is highly dubitable. Yet the more fundamental question that we should ask, I submit, is whether it serves well on the Court to usurp trier of facts even before the latter exercises its functions? If the Court, at this stage, were to declare the petitions as insufficient, it would be akin to the Court pronouncing an accused as guilty even before the lower court trial had began.
Matugas v. COMELEC29 inveighs against the propriety of the Court uncharacteristically assuming the role of trier of facts, and resolving factual questions not previously adjudicated by the lower courts or tribunals:
[P]etitioner in this case cannot "enervate" the COMELEC's findings by introducing new evidence before this Court, which in any case is not a trier of facts, and then ask it to substitute its own judgment and discretion for that of the COMELEC.
The rule in appellate procedure is that a factual question may not be raised for the first time on appeal, and documents forming no part of the proofs before the appellate court will not be considered in disposing of the issues of an action. This is true whether the decision elevated for review originated from a regular court or an administrative agency or quasi-judicial body, and whether it was rendered in a civil case, a special proceeding, or a criminal case. Piecemeal presentation of evidence is simply not in accord with orderly justice.
30Any present determination by the Court on the sufficiency of the petitions constitutes in effect a trial
de novo, the Justices of the Supreme Court virtually descending to the level of trial court judges. This is an unbecoming recourse, and it simply is not done.
VI.
The worst position this Court could find itself in is to acquiesce to a plea that it make the choice whether to amend the Constitution or not. This is a matter which should not be left to fifteen magistrates who have not been elected by the people to make the choice for them.
A vote to grant the petitions is not a vote to amend the 1987 Constitution. It is merely a vote to allow the people to directly exercise that option. In fact, the position of Justice Puno which I share would not even guarantee that the Lambino and Sigaw ng Bayan initiative petitions would be submitted to the people in a referendum. The COMELEC will still have to determine the sufficiency of the petition. Among the questions which still have to be determined by the poll body in considering the sufficiency of the petitions is whether twelve percent (12%) of all registered voters nationwide, including three percent (3%) of registered voters in every legislative district, have indeed signed the initiative petitions.
31And even should the COMELEC find the initiative petitions sufficient, the matter of whether the Constitution should be amended would still depend on the choice of the electorate. The oppositors are clearly queasy about some of the amendments proposed, or the imputed motives behind the amendments. A referendum, should the COMELEC find the petitions as sufficient, would allow them to convey their uneasiness to the public at large, as well as for the proponents of the amendment to defend their proposal. The campaign period alone would allow the public to be involved in the significant deliberation on the course our nation should take, with the ensuing net benefit of a more informed, more politically aware populace. And of course, the choice on whether the Constitution should be amended would lie directly with the people. The initiative process involves participatory democracy at its most elemental; wherein the consequential debate would not be confined to the august halls of Congress or the hallowed chambers of this Court, as it would spill over to the public squares and town halls, the academic yards and the Internet blogosphere, the dining areas in the homes of the affluent and the impoverished alike.
The prospect of informed and widespread discussion on constitutional change engaged in by a people who are actually empowered in having a say whether these changes should be enacted, gives fruition to the original vision of pure democracy, as formulated in Athens two and a half millennia ago. The great hero of Athenian democracy, Pericles, was recorded as saying in his famed Funeral Oration, "
We differ from other states in regarding the man who keeps aloof from public life not as `private' but as useless; we decide or debate, carefully and in person all matters of policy, and we hold, not that words and deeds go ill together, but that acts are foredoomed to failure when undertaken undiscussed."
32Unfortunately, given the highly politicized charge of the times, it has been peddled that an act or vote that assists the initiative process is one for the willful extinction of democracy or democratic institutions. Such a consideration should of course properly play its course in the public debates and deliberations attendant to the initiative process. Yet as a result of the harum-scarum, the temptation lies heavy for a member of this Court perturbed with the prospect of constitutional change to relieve those anxieties by simply voting to enjoin any legal procedure that initiates the amendment or revision of the fundamental law, even at the expense of the people's will or what the Constitution allows. A vote so oriented takes the conservative path of least resistance, even as it may gain the admiration of those who do not want to see the Constitution amended.
Still, the biases we should enforce as magistrates are those of the Constitution and the elements of democracy on which our rule of law is founded. Direct democracy, as embodied in the initiative process, is but a culmination of the evolution over the centuries of democratic rights of choice and self-governance. The reemergence of the Athenian democratic ideal after centuries of tyrannical rules arrived very slowly, the benefits parceled out at first only to favored classes. The Magna Carta granted limited rights to self-determination and self-governance only to a few English nobles; the American Constitution was originally intended to give a meaningful voice only to free men, mostly Caucasian, who met the property-holding requirements set by the states for voting. Yet even the very idea of popular voting, limited as it may have already been within the first few years of the American Union, met resistance from no less a revered figure as Alexander Hamilton, to whom the progressive historian Howard Zinn attributes these disconcerting words:
The voice of the people has been said to be the voice of God; and however generally this maxim has been quoted and believed, it is not true in fact. The people are turbulent and changing; they seldom judge or determine right. Give therefore to the first class a distinct permanent share in the government... Can a democratic assembly who annually revolve in the mass of the people be supposed steadily to pursue the public good? Nothing but a permanent body can check the imprudence of democracy...
33This utterly paternalistic and bigoted view has not survived into the present age of modern democracy where a person's poverty, color, or gender no longer impedes the exercise of full democratic rights. Yet a democracy that merely guarantees its citizens the right to live their lives freely is incomplete if there is no corresponding allowance for a means by which the people have a direct choice in determining their country's direction. Initiative as a mode of amending a constitution may seem incompatible with representative democracy, yet it embodies an even purer form of democracy. Initiative, which our 1987 Constitution saw fit to grant to the people, is a progressive measure that is but a continuation of the line of evolution of the democratic ideal.
By allowing the sovereign people to directly propose and enact constitutional amendments, the initiative process should be acknowledged as the purest implement of democratic rule under law. This right granted to over sixty million Filipinos cannot be denied by the votes of less than eight magistrates for reasons that bear no cogitation on the Constitution.
I VOTE to GRANT the petitions.
1] G.R. No. 127325, 19 March 1997, 270 SCRA 106.
2] G.R. No. 129754, 23 September 1997.
3] Petitioner Aumentado aptly refers to the comment of the late Senator Raul Roco that the
Santiago ruling "created a third specie of invalid laws, a mongrel type of constitutional but inadequate and, therefore, invalid law." Memorandum for Aumentado, p. 54.
4 See CIVIL CODE, Art. 9.
5] 456 Phil. 1 (2003).
6] Id., at 10; citing I ARTURO M. TOLENTINO, CIVIL CODE OF THE PHILIPPINES 43 (1990) and JUSTICE BENJAMIN N. CARDOZO, THE NATURE OF THE JUDICIAL PROCESS 113 (1921).
7] See Dissenting Opinion,
Manila International Airport Authority v. City of ParaAaque, G.R. No. 155650, 20 July 2006. In my
ponencia in
Globe Telecom v. NTC, G.R. No. 143964, 26 July 2004, 435 SCRA 110, I further observed that while an administrative agency was not enslaved to obey its own precedent, it was "essential, for the sake of clarity and intellectual honesty, that if an administrative agency decides inconsistently with previous action, that it explain thoroughly why a different result is warranted, or if need be, why the previous standards should no longer apply or should be overturned." Id., at 144. Happily, Justice Puno's present opinion expressly elucidates why
Santiago should be reversed.
8] As Justice Frankfurter once wrote: "We recognize that
stare decisis embodies an important social policy. It represents an element of continuity in law, and is rooted in the psychologic need to satisfy reasonable expectations. But
stare decisis is a principle of policy and not a mechanical formula of adherence to the latest decision, however recent and questionable, when such adherence involves collision with a prior doctrine more embracing in its scope, intrinsically sounder, and verified by experience... This Court, unlike the House of Lords, has from the beginning rejected a doctrine of disability at self-correction."
Helvering v. Hallock, 309 U.S. 106, 119-121 (1940).
9] 351 Phil. 692 (1998).
10 As Chief Justice Panganiban then cited: "For instance, Ebralinag vs. Davision Superintendent of Schools of Cebu, 219 SCRA 256, March 1, 1993, reversed the Court's 34-year-old doctrine laid down in Gerona vs. Secretary of Education, 106 Phil 2, August 12, 1959, and upheld the right of Jehovah's Witnesses "to refuse to salute the Philippine flag on account of their religious beliefs." Similarly, Olaguer vs. Military Commission, 150 SCRA 144, May 22, 1987, abandoned the 12-year-old ruling in Aquino Jr. vs. Military Commission, 63 SCRA 546, May 9, 1975, which recognized the jurisdiction of military tribunals to try civilians for offenses allegedly committed during martial law. The Court likewise reversed itself in EPZA vs. Dulay, 149 SCRA 305, April 29, 1987, when it vacated its earlier ruling in National Housing Authority vs. Reyes, 123 SCRA 245, June 29, 1983, on the validity of certain presidential decrees regarding the determination of just compensation. In the much earlier case of Philippine Trust Co. vs. Mitchell, 59 Phil. 30, December 8, 1933, the Court revoked its holding in Involuntary Insolvency of Mariano Velasco & Co., 55 Phil 353, November 29, 1930, regarding the relation of the insolvency law with the then Code of Civil Procedure and with the Civil Code. Just recently, the Court, in Kilosbayan vs. Morato, 246 SCRA 540, July 17, 1995, also abandoned the earlier grant of standing to petitioner-organization in Kilosbayan vs. Guingona, 232 SCRA 110, May 5, 1994." Id., at 780.
11 Ibid.
12 129 Phil. 507, 516 (1967).
13 G.R. Nos. L-78461, L-79146, & L-79212, 12 August 1987, 153 SCRA 67, 75.
14] G.R. No. 160427, 15 September 2004, 438 SCRA 319, 326.
15] Ibid.
16 G.R. No. 155855, 26 January 2004, 421 SCRA 92.
17 Id., at 104. Relatedly, the Court held that "[c]ontests which do not involve the election, returns and qualifications of elected officials are not subjected to the exercise of the judicial or quasi-judicial powers of courts or administrative agencies". Ibid.
18 See
e.g., Memorandum of Oppositors-Intervenors Senators Pimentel, Jr., et. al., pp. 19-22; Memorandum for Intervenor Senate of the Philippines, pp. 34-35.
19 See 1987 CONST., Art. VI, Sec. 26(1). See also Section 19
1. 1987 CONST, Art. VIII.
20 See
e.g.,
Sumulong v. COMELEC, 73 Phil. 288, 291 (1941);
Cordero v. Hon. Jose Cabatuando, et al., 116 Phil. 736, 741 (1962).
21 See
Tio v. VRB, G.R. No. L-75697, 18 June 1987, 151 SCRA 208, 214-215; citing
Public Service Co., Recktenwald, 290 Ill. 314, 8 A.L.R. 466, 470. See also
FariAas v. Executive Secretary, G.R. Nos. 147387 & 152161, 10 December 2003, 417 SCRA 503, 519.
22 "As a policy, this Court has adopted a liberal construction of the one title - one subject rule."
Tatad v. Secretary of Department of Energy, 346 Phil. 321, 359 (1997).
23 Civil Liberties Union v. Executive Secretary, G.R. Nos. 83896 & 83815; 22 February 1991, 194 SCRA 317.
24 Id. at 337. I have previously expressed my own doubts in relying on the constitutional or legislative deliberations as a definitive source of construction. "It is easy to selectively cite passages, sometimes out of their proper context, in order to assert a misleading interpretation. The effect can be dangerous. Minority or solitary views, anecdotal ruminations, or even the occasional crude witticisms, may improperly acquire the mantle of legislative intent by the sole virtue of their publication in the authoritative congressional record. Hence, resort to legislative deliberations is allowable when the statute is crafted in such a manner as to leave room for doubt on the real intent of the legislature."
Southern Cross Cement Corporation v. Phil. Cement Manufacturers, G.R. No. G.R. No. 158540, 8 July 2004, 434 SCRA 65, 95.
25 77 Phil. 192 (1946).
26 Id. at 215.
27 Civil Liberties Union v. Executive Secretary,
supra note 23, at 338; citing
Household Finance Corporation v. Shaffner, 203 S.W. 2d 734, 356 Mo. 808.
28 See Sections 5(b) & 8, Rep. Act No. 6735. See also 1987 CONST., Sec. 2, Art. XVI.
29 G.R. No. 151944, January 20, 2004, 420 SCRA 365.
30 Id., at 377. Emphasis supplied.
31] See Sections 5(b) & 8, Rep. Act No. 6735. See also 1987 CONST., Sec. 2, Art. XVI.
32] From the "Funeral Oration" by Pericles, as recorded by Thucydides in the History of the Peloponnesian War.
33] H. Zinn, A PEOPLE'S HISTORY OF THE UNITED STATES (1980 ed.), at 95.
DISSENTING OPINION
CHICO-NAZARIO,
J.:
"The people made the constitution, and the people can unmake it. It is the creature of their will, and lives only by their will. But this supreme and irresistible power to make or unmake, resides only in the whole body of the people; not in any subdivision of them."-- Marshall, C.J., Cohens v. Virginia (1821, US) 6 Wheat 264, 389, 5 L ed. 257, 287.
I express my concurrence in the discussions and conclusions presented in the persuasive and erudite dissent of Justice Reynato S. Puno. However, I make some additional observations in connection with my concurrence.
While it is but proper to accord great respect and reverence to the Philippine Constitution of 1987 for being the supreme law of the land, we should not lose sight of the truth that there is an ultimate authority to which the Constitution is also subordinate -
the will of the people. No less than its very first paragraph, the Preamble,1 expressly recognizes that the Constitution came to be because it was ordained and promulgated by the sovereign Filipino people. It is a principle reiterated yet again in Article II, Section 1, of the Constitution, which explicitly declares that "[t]he Philippines is a democratic and republican State. Sovereignty resides in the people and all government authority emanates from them." Thus, the resolution of the issues and controversies raised by the instant Petition should be guided accordingly by the foregoing principle.
If the Constitution is the expression of the will of the sovereign people, then, in the event that the people change their will, so must the Constitution be revised or amended to reflect such change. Resultantly, the right to revise or amend the Constitution inherently resides in the sovereign people whose will it is supposed to express and embody. The Constitution itself, under Article XVII, provides for the means by which the revision or amendment of the Constitution may be proposed and ratified.
Under Section 1 of the said Article, proposals to amend or revise the Constitution may be made (a) by Congress, upon a vote of three-fourths of all its Members, or (b) by constitutional convention. The Congress and the constitutional convention possess the power to propose amendments to, or revisions of, the Constitution not simply because the Constitution so provides, but because the sovereign people had chosen to delegate their inherent right to make such proposals to their representatives either through Congress or through a constitutional convention.
On the other hand, the sovereign people, well-inspired and greatly empowered by the People Power Revolution of 1986, reserved to themselves the right to directly propose amendments to the Constitution through initiative, to wit -
SEC. 2. Amendments to this Constitution may likewise be directly proposed by the people through initiative upon a petition of at least twelve per centum of the total number of registered voters, of which every legislative district must be represented by at least three per centum of the registered voters therein. No amendment under this section shall be authorized within five years following the ratification of this Constitution nor oftener than once every five years thereafter.
The Congress shall provide for the implementation of the exercise of this right.2
The afore-quoted section does not confer on the Filipino people the right to amend the Constitution because, as previously discussed, such right is inherent in them. The section only reduces into writing this right to initiate amendments to the Constitution where they collectively and willfully agreed in the manner by which they shall exercise this right: (a) through the filing of a petition; (b) supported by at least twelve percent (12%) of the total number of registered voters nationwide; (c) with each legislative district represented by at least three percent (3%) of the registered voters therein; (d) subject to the limitation that no such petition may be filed within five years after the ratification of the Constitution, and not oftener than once every five years thereafter; and (e) a delegation to Congress of the authority to provide the formal requirements and other details for the implementation of the right.
It is my earnest opinion that the right of the sovereign people to directly propose amendments to the Constitution through initiative is more superior than the power they delegated to Congress or to a constitutional convention to amend or revise the Constitution. The initiative process gives the sovereign people the voice to express their collective will, and when the people speak, we must be ready to listen. Article XVII, Section 2 of the Constitution recognizes and guarantees the sovereign people's right to initiative, rather than limits it. The enabling law which Congress has been tasked to enact must give life to the said provision and make the exercise of the right to initiative possible, not regulate, limit, or restrict it in any way that would render the people's option of resorting to initiative to amend the Constitution more stringent, difficult, and less feasible, as compared to the other constitutional means to amend or revise the Constitution. In fact, it is worth recalling that under Article VI, Section 1 of the Constitution, the legislative power of Congress is limited to the extent reserved to the people by the provisions on initiative and referendum.
It is with this frame of mind that I review the issues raised in the instant Petitions, and which has led me to the conclusions, in support of the dissent of Justice Puno, that (a) The Commission on Election (COMELEC) had indeed committed grave abuse of discretion in summarily dismissing the petition for initiative to amend the Constitution filed by herein petitioners Raul L. Lambino and Erico B. Aumentado; (b) The Court should revisit the pronouncements it made in Santiago v. Commission on Elections;3 (c) It is the sovereign people's inherent right to propose changes to the Constitution, regardless of whether they constitute merely amendments or a total revision thereof; and (d) The COMELEC should take cognizance of Lambino and Aumentado's petition for initiative and, in the exercise of its jurisdiction, determine the factual issues raised by the oppositors before this Court.
I
The COMELEC had indeed committed grave abuse of discretion when it summarily dismissed Lambino and Aumentado's petition for initiative entirely on the basis of the
Santiago case which, allegedly, permanently enjoined it from entertaining or taking cognizance of any petition for initiative to amend the Constitution in the absence of a sufficient law.
After a careful reading, however, of the
Santiago case, I believe in earnest that the permanent injunction actually issued by this Court against the COMELEC pertains only to the petition for initiative filed by Jesus S. Delfin, and not to all subsequent petitions for initiative to amend the Constitution.
The Conclusion
4 in the majority opinion in the
Santiago case reads -
CONCLUSION
This petition must then be granted, and the COMELEC should be permanently enjoined from entertaining or taking cognizance of any petition for initiative on amendments to the Constitution until a sufficient law shall have been validly enacted to provide for the implementation of the system.
We feel, however, that the system of initiative to propose amendments to the Constitution should no longer be kept in the cold; it should be given flesh and blood, energy and strength. Congress should not tarry any longer in complying with the constitutional mandate to provide for the implementation of the right of the people under that system.
WHEREFORE, judgment is hereby rendered
a) GRANTING the instant petition;
b) DECLARING R.A. No. 6735 inadequate to cover the system of initiative on amendments to the Constitution, and to have failed to provide sufficient standard for subordinate legislation;
c) DECLARING void those parts of Resolution No. 2300 of the Commission on Elections prescribing rules and regulations on the conduct of initiative or amendments to the Constitution; and
d) ORDERING the Commission on Elections to forthwith DISMISS the DELFIN petition (UND-96-037).
The Temporary Restraining Order issued on 18 December 1996 is made permanent as against the Commission on Elections, but is LIFTED as against private respondents.
Resolution on the matter of contempt is hereby reserved.
It is clear from the
fallo, as it is reproduced above, that the Court made permanent the Temporary Restraining Order (TRO) it issued on 18 December 1996 against the COMELEC. The said TRO enjoined the COMELEC from proceeding with the Delfin Petition, and Alberto and Carmen Pedrosa from conducting a signature drive for people's initiative.
5 It was this restraining order, more particularly the portion thereof referring to the Delfin Petition, which was expressly made permanent by the Court. It would seem to me that the COMELEC and all other oppositors to Lambino and Aumentado's petition for initiative gave unwarranted significance and weight to the first paragraph of the Conclusion in the
Santiago case. The first and second paragraphs of the Conclusion, preceding the dispositive portion, merely express the opinion of the
ponente; while the definite orders of the Court for implementation are found in the dispositive portion.
We have previously held that -
The dispositive portion or the
fallo is what actually constitutes the resolution of the court and which is the subject of execution, although the other parts of the decision may be resorted to in order to determine the
ratio decidendi for such a resolution. Where there is conflict between the dispositive part and the opinion of the court contained in the text of the decision, the former must prevail over the latter on the theory that the dispositive portion is the final order while the opinion is merely a statement ordering nothing. Hence execution must conform more particularly to that ordained or decreed in the dispositive portion of the decision.
6Is there a conflict between the first paragraph of the Conclusion and the dispositive portion of the
Santiago case? Apparently, there is. The first paragraph of the Conclusion states that the COMELEC should be permanently enjoined from entertaining or taking cognizance of
any petition for initiative on amendments to the Constitution until the enactment of a valid law. On the other hand, the fallo only makes permanent the TRO7 against COMELEC enjoining it from proceeding with the Delfin Petition. While the permanent injunction contemplated in the Conclusion encompasses all petitions for initiative on amendments to the Constitution, the fallo is expressly limited to the Delfin Petition. To resolve the conflict, the final order of the Court as it is stated in the dispositive portion or the fallo should be controlling.
Neither can the COMELEC dismiss Lambino and Aumentado's petition for initiative on the basis of this Court's Resolution, dated 23 September 1997, in the case of People's Initiative for Reform, Modernization and Action (PIRMA) v. The Commission on Elections, et al.8 The Court therein found that the COMELEC did not commit grave abuse of discretion in dismissing the PIRMA Petition for initiative to amend the Constitution for it only complied with the Decision in the Santiago case.
It is only proper that the Santiago case should also bar the PIRMA Petition on the basis of res judicata because PIRMA participated in the proceedings of the said case, and had knowledge of and, thus, must be bound by the judgment of the Court therein. As explained by former Chief Justice Hilario G. Davide, Jr. in his separate opinion to the Resolution in the PIRMA case -
First, it is barred by res judicata. No one aware of the pleadings filed here and in Santiago v. COMELEC (G.R. No. 127325, 19 March 1997) may plead ignorance of the fact that the former is substantially identical to the latter, except for the reversal of the roles played by the principal parties and inclusion of additional, yet not indispensable, parties in the present petition. But plainly, the same issues and reliefs are raised and prayed for in both cases.
The principal petitioner here is the PEOPLE'S INITIATIVE FOR REFORM, MODERNIZATION, AND ACTION (PIRMA) and Spouses ALBERTO PEDROSA and CARMEN PEDROSA. PIRMA is self-described as "a non-stock, non-profit organization duly organized and existing under Philippine laws with office address at Suite 403, Fedman Suites, 199 Salcedo Street, Legaspi Village, Makati City," with "ALBERTO PEDROSA and CARMEN PEDROSA" as among its "officers." In Santiago, the PEDROSAS were made respondents as founding members of PIRMA which, as alleged in the body of the petition therein, "proposes to undertake the signature drive for a people's initiative to amend the Constitution." In Santiago then, the PEDROSAS were sued in their capacity as founding members of PIRMA.
The decision in Santiago specifically declared that PIRMA was duly represented at the hearing of the Delfin petition in the COMELEC. In short, PIRMA was intervenor-petitioner therein. Delfin alleged in his petition that he was a founding member of the Movement for People's Initiative, and under footnote no. 6 of the decision, it was noted that said movement was "[l]ater identified as the People's Initiative for Reforms, Modernization and Action, or PIRMA for brevity." In their Comment to the petition in Santiago, the PEDROSA'S did not deny that they were founding members of PIRMA, and by their arguments, demonstrated beyond a shadow of a doubt that they had joined Delfin or his cause.
No amount of semantics may then shield herein petitioners PIRMA and the PEDROSAS, as well as the others joining them, from the operation of the principle of res judicata, which needs no further elaboration.9
While the Santiago case bars the PIRMA case because of res judicata, the same cannot be said to the Petition at bar. Res judicata is an absolute bar to a subsequent action for the same cause; and its requisites are: (a) the former judgment or order must be final; (b) the judgment or order must be one on the merits; (c) it must have been rendered by a court having jurisdiction over the subject matter and parties; and (d) there must be between the first and second actions, identity of parties, of subject matter and of causes of action.10
Even though it is conceded that the first three requisites are present herein, the last has not been complied with. Undoubtedly, the Santiago case and the present Petition involve different parties, subject matter, and causes of action, and the former should not bar the latter.
In the Santiago case, the petition for initiative to amend the Constitution was filed by Delfin alone. His petition does not qualify as the initiatory pleading over which the COMELEC can acquire jurisdiction, being unsupported by the required number of registered voters, and actually imposing upon the COMELEC the task of gathering the voters' signatures. In the case before us, the petition for initiative to amend the Constitution was filed by Lambino and Aumentado, on behalf of the 6.3 million registered voters who affixed their signatures on the signature sheets attached thereto. Their petition prays that the COMELEC issue an Order -
- Finding the petition to be sufficient pursuant to Section 4, Article XVII of the 1987 Constitution;
- Directing the publication of the petition in Filipino and English at least twice in newspapers of general and local circulation; and
- Calling a plebiscite to be held not earlier than sixty nor later than ninety days after the Certification by the COMELEC of the sufficiency of the petition, to allow the Filipino people to express their sovereign will on the proposition.
Although both cases involve the right of the people to initiate amendments to the Constitution, the personalities concerned and the other factual circumstances attendant in the two cases differ. Also dissimilar are the particular prayer and reliefs sought by the parties from the COMELEC, as well as from this Court.
For these reasons, I find that the COMELEC acted with grave abuse of discretion when it summarily dismissed the petition for initiative filed by Lambino and Aumentado. It behooves the COMELEC to accord due course to a petition which on its face complies with the rudiments of the law. COMELEC was openly negligent in summarily dismissing the Lambino and Aumentado petition. The haste by which the instant Petition was struck down is characteristic of bad faith, which, to my mind, is a patent and gross evasion of COMELEC's positive duty. It has so obviously copped out of its duty and responsibility to determine the sufficiency thereof and sought protection and justification for its craven decision in the supposed permanent injunction issued against it by the Court in the Santiago case. The COMELEC had seemingly expanded the scope and application of the said permanent injunction, reading into it more than what it actually states, which is surprising, considering that the Chairman and majority of the members of COMELEC are lawyers who should be able to understand and appreciate, more than a lay person, the legal consequences and intricacies of the pronouncements made by the Court in the Santiago case and the permanent injunction issued therein.
No less than the Constitution itself, under the second paragraph of Article XVII, Section 4, imposes upon the COMELEC the mandate to set a date for plebiscite after a positive determination of the sufficiency of a petition for initiative on amendments to the Constitution, viz -
SEC. 4. x x x
Any amendment under Section 2 hereof shall be valid when ratified by a majority of the votes cast in a plebiscite which shall be held not earlier than sixty days nor later than ninety days after the certification by the Commission on Elections of the sufficiency of the petition.
As a rule, the word "shall" commonly denotes an imperative obligation and is inconsistent with the idea of discretion, and that the presumption is that the word "shall" when used, is mandatory.11 Under the above-quoted constitutional provision, it is the mandatory or imperative obligation of the COMELEC to (a) determine the sufficiency of the petition for initiative on amendments to the Constitution and issue a certification on its findings; and (b) in case such petition is found to be sufficient, to set the date for the plebiscite on the proposed amendments not earlier than 60 days nor later than 90 days after its certification.
The COMELEC should not be allowed to shun its constitutional mandate under the second paragraph of Article XVII, Section 4, through the summary dismissal of the petition for initiative filed by Lambino and Aumentado, when such petition is supported by 6.3 million signatures of registered voters. Should all of these signatures be authentic and representative of the required percentages of registered voters for every legislative district and the whole nation, then the initiative is a true and legitimate expression of the will of the people to amend the Constitution, and COMELEC had caused them grave injustice by silencing their voice based on a patently inapplicable permanent injunction.
II
We should likewise take the opportunity to revisit the pronouncements made by the Court in its Decision in the
Santiago case, especially as regards the supposed insufficiency or inadequacy of Republic Act No. 6735 as the enabling law for the implementation of the people's right to initiative on amendments to the Constitution.
The declaration of the Court that Republic Act No. 6735 is insufficient or inadequate actually gave rise to more questions rather than answers, due to the fact that there has never been a judicial precedent wherein the Court invalidated a law for insufficiency or inadequacy. The confusion over such a declaration thereby impelled former Chief Justice Davide, Jr., the
ponente in the
Santiago case, to provide the following clarification in his separate opinion to the Resolution in the
PIRMA case, thus -
Simply put,
Santiago did, in reality, declare as unconstitutional that portion of R.A. No. 6735 relating to Constitutional initiatives for failure to comply with the "completeness and sufficient standard tests" with respect to permissible delegation of legislative power or subordinate legislation. However petitioners attempt to twist the language in
Santiago, the conclusion is inevitable; the portion of R.A. No. 6735 was held to be unconstitutional.
It is important to note, however, that while the Decision in the
Santiago case pronounced repeatedly that Republic Act No. 6735 was insufficient and inadequate, there is no categorical declaration therein that the said statute was unconstitutional. The express finding that Republic Act No. 6735 is unconstitutional can only be found in the separate opinion of former Chief Justice Davide to the Resolution in the
PIRMA case, which was not concurred in by the other members of the Court.
Even assuming
arguendo that the declaration in the
Santiago case, that Republic Act No. 6735 is insufficient and inadequate, is already tantamount to a declaration that the statute is unconstitutional, it was rendered in violation of established rules in statutory construction, which state that -
[A]ll presumptions are indulged in favor of constitutionality; one who attacks a statute, alleging unconstitutionality must prove its invalidity beyond a reasonable doubt (
Victoriano v. Elizalde Rope Workers' Union, 59 SCRA 54 [19741). In fact, this Court does not decide questions of a constitutional nature unless that question is properly raised and presented in appropriate cases and is necessary to a determination of the case, i.e., the issue of constitutionality must be lis mota presented (
Tropical Homes v. National Housing Authority, 152 SCRA 540 [1987]).
First, the Court, in the
Santiago case, could have very well avoided the issue of constitutionality of Republic Act No. 6735 by ordering the COMELEC to dismiss the Delfin petition for the simple reason that it does not constitute an initiatory pleading over which the COMELEC could acquire jurisdiction. And second, the unconstitutionality of Republic Act No. 6735 has not been adequately shown. It was by and large merely inferred or deduced from the way Republic Act No. 6735 was worded and the provisions thereof arranged and organized by Congress. The individual opinions rendered by several Justices in the
Santiago case reveal the other side to the argument, adopting the more liberal interpretation that would allow the Court to sustain the constitutionality of Republic Act No. 6735. It would seem that the majority in the
Santiago case failed to heed the rule that all presumptions should be resolved in favor of the constitutionality of the statute.
The Court, acting
en banc on the Petition at bar, can revisit its Decision in the
Santiago case and again open to judicial review the constitutionality of Republic Act No. 6735; in which case, I shall cast my vote in favor of its constitutionality, having satisfied the completeness and sufficiency of standards tests for the valid delegation of legislative power. I fully agree in the conclusion made by Justice Puno on this matter in his dissenting opinion
12 in the
Santiago case, that reads -
R.A. No. 6735 sufficiently states the policy and the standards to guide the COMELEC in promulgating the law's implementing rules and regulations of the law. As aforestated, Section 2 spells out the policy of the law;
viz: "The power of the people under a system of initiative and referendum to directly propose, enact, approve or reject, in whole or in part, the Constitution, laws, ordinances, or resolutions passed by any legislative body upon compliance with the requirements of this Act is hereby affirmed, recognized and guaranteed." Spread out all over R.A. No. 6735 are the standards to canalize the delegated power to the COMELEC to promulgate rules and regulations from overflowing. Thus, the law states the number of signatures necessary to start a people's initiative, directs how initiative proceeding is commenced, what the COMELEC should do upon filing of the petition for initiative, how a proposition is approved, when a plebiscite may be held, when the amendment takes effect, and what matters may not be the subject of any initiative. By any measure, these standards are adequate.
III
The dissent of Justice Puno has already a well-presented discourse on the difference between an "amendment" and a "revision" of the Constitution. Allow me also to articulate my additional thoughts on the matter.
Oppositors to Lambino and Aumentado's petition for initiative argue that the proposed changes therein to the provisions of the Constitution already amount to a revision thereof, which is not allowed to be done through people's initiative; Article XVII, Section 2 of the Constitution on people's initiative refers only to proposals for amendments to the Constitution. They assert the traditional distinction between an amendment and a revision, with amendment referring to isolated or piecemeal change only, while revision as a revamp or rewriting of the whole instrument.
13However, as pointed out by Justice Puno in his dissent, there is no quantitative or qualitative test that can establish with definiteness the distinction between an amendment and a revision, or between a substantial and simple change of the Constitution.
The changes proposed to the Constitution by Lambino and Aumentado's petition for initiative basically affect only Article VI on the Legislative Department and Article VII on the Executive Department. While the proposed changes will drastically alter the constitution of our government by vesting both legislative and executive powers in a unicameral Parliament, with the President as the Head of State and the Prime Minister exercising the executive power; they would not essentially affect the other 16 Articles of the Constitution. The 100 or so changes counted by the oppositors to the other provisions of the Constitution are constituted mostly of the nominal substitution of one word for the other, such as Parliament for Congress, or Prime Minister for President. As eloquently pointed out in the dissent of Justice Puno, the changes proposed to transform our form of government from bicameral-presidential to unicameral-parliamentary, would not affect the fundamental nature of our state as a democratic and republican state. It will still be a representative government where officials continue to be accountable to the people and the people maintain control over the government through the election of members of the Parliament.
Furthermore, should the people themselves wish to change a substantial portion or even the whole of the Constitution, what or who is to stop them? Article XVII, Section 2 of the Constitution which, by the way it is worded, refers only to their right to initiative on amendments of the Constitution? The delegates to the Constitutional Convention who, according to their deliberations, purposely limited Article XVII, Section 2 of the Constitution to amendments? This Court which has the jurisdiction to interpret the provision? Bearing in mind my earlier declaration that the will of the sovereign people is supreme, there is nothing or no one that can preclude them from initiating changes to the Constitution if they choose to do so. To reiterate, the Constitution is supposed to be the expression and embodiment of the people's will, and should the people's will clamor for a revision of the Constitution, it is their will which should prevail. Even the fact that the people ratified the 1987 Constitution, including Article XVII, Section 2 thereof, as it is worded, should not prevent the exercise by the sovereign people of their inherent right to change the Constitution, even if such change would be tantamount to a substantial amendment or revision thereof, for their actual exercise of the said right should be a clear renunciation of the limitation which the said provision imposes upon it. It is the inherent right of the people as sovereign to change the Constitution, regardless of the extent thereof.
IV
Lastly, I fail to see the injustice in allowing the COMELEC to give due course to and take cognizance of Lambino and Aumentado's petition for initiative to amend the Constitution. I reiterate that it would be a greater evil if one such petition which is ostensibly supported by the required number of registered voters all over the country, be summarily dismissed.
Giving due course and taking cognizance of the petition would not necessarily mean that the same would be found sufficient and set for plebiscite. The COMELEC still faces the task of reviewing the petition to determine whether it complies with the requirements for a valid exercise of the right to initiative. Questions raised by the oppositors to the petition, such as those on the authenticity of the registered voters' signatures or compliance with the requisite number of registered voters for every legislative district, are already factual in nature and require the reception and evaluation of evidence of the parties. Such questions are best presented and resolved before the COMELEC since this Court is not a trier of facts.
In view of the foregoing, I am of the position that the Resolution of the COMELEC dated 31 August 2006 denying due course to the Petition for Initiative filed by Lambino and Aumentado be reversed and set aside for having been issued in grave abuse of discretion, amounting to lack of jurisdiction, and that the Petition be remanded to the COMELEC for further proceedings.
In short, I vote to GRANT the petition for Initiative of Lambino and Aumentado.
1 The full text of the Preamble reads:
We, the sovereign Filipino people, imploring the aid of Almighty God, in order to build a just and humane society and establish a Government that shall embody our ideals and aspirations, promote the common good, conserve and develop our patrimony, and secure to ourselves and our posterity the blessings of independence and democracy under the rule of law and a regime of truth, justice, freedom, love, equality, and peace, do ordain and promulgate this Constitution.
2 Article XVII, Constitution.
3 G.R. No. 127325, 19 March 1997, 270 SCRA 106.
4 Id. at 157.
5 Id. at 124.
6 Olac v. Rivera, G.R. No. 84256, 2 September 1992, 213 SCRA 321, 328-329;
See also the more recent cases of
Republic v. Nolasco, G.R. No. 155108, 27 April 2005, 457 SCRA 400;
and
PH Credit Corporation v. Court of Appeals, 421 Phil. 821 (2001).
7 Supra note 2 at 124.
8 G.R. No. 129754.
9 Separate Opinion of former Chief Justice Hilario G. Davide, Jr. to the Resolution, dated 23 September 1997, in G.R. No. 129754,
PIRMA v. COMELEC, pp. 2-3.
10 Mirpuri v. Court of Appeals, 376 Phil. 628, 650 (1999).
11 Pioneer Texturizing Corporation v. NLRC, G.R. No. 118651, 16 October 1997.
12 Santiago v. Comelec, supra note 2 at 170-171.
13 Isagani A. Cruz,
Philippine Political Law, 1996 ed., p. 352.
S E P A R A T E O P I N I O N
VELASCO, JR., J.:
Introduction
The fate of every democracy, of every government based on the Sovereignty of the people, depends on the choices it makes between these opposite principles: absolute power on the one hand, and on the other the restraints of legality and the authority of tradition.
--John Acton
In this thorny matter of the people's initiative, I concur with the erudite and highly persuasive opinion of Justice Reynato S. Puno upholding the people's initiative and raise some points of my own.
The issue of the people's power to propose amendments to the Constitution was once discussed in the landmark case of
Santiago v. COMELEC.
1 Almost a decade later, the issue is once again before the Court, and I firmly believe it is time to reevaluate the pronouncements made in that case.
The issue of Charter Change is one that has sharply divided the nation, and its proponents and opponents will understandably take all measures to advance their position and defeat that of their opponents. The wisdom or folly of Charter Change does not concern the Court. The only thing that the Court must review is the validity of the present step taken by the proponents of Charter Change, which is the People's Initiative, as set down in Article XVII, Sec. 2 of the 1987 Constitution:
Amendments to this Constitution may likewise be directly proposed by the people through initiative upon a petition of at least twelve
per centum of the total number of registered voters, of which every legislative district must be represented by at least three
per centum of the registered voters therein. No amendment under this section shall be authorized within five years following the ratification of this Constitution nor oftener than once every five years thereafter.
The Congress shall provide for the implementation of the exercise of this right.
In the
Santiago case, the Court discussed whether the second paragraph of that section had been fulfilled. It determined that Congress had not provided for the implementation of the exercise of the people's initiative, when it held that Republic Act No. 6735, or "The Initiative and Referendum Act," was "inadequate to cover the system of initiative on amendments to the Constitution, and to have failed to provide sufficient standard for subordinate legislation."
2With all due respect to those Justices who made that declaration, I must disagree.
Republic Act No. 6735 is the proper law
for proposing constitutional amendments
and it should not have been considered
inadequate.
The decision in
Santiago focused on what it perceived to be fatal flaws in the drafting of the law, in the failings of the way the law was structured, to come to the conclusion that the law was inadequate. The Court itself recognized the legislators' intent, but disregarded this intent. The law was found wanting. The Court then saw the inclusion of the Constitution in RA 6735 as an afterthought. However, it was included, and it should not be excluded by the Court via a strained analysis of the law. The difficult construction of the law should not serve to frustrate the intent of the framers of the 1987 Constitution: to give the people the power to propose amendments as they saw fit. It is a basic precept in statutory construction that the intent of the legislature is the controlling factor in the interpretation of a statute.
3 The intent of the legislature was clear, and yet RA 6735 was declared inadequate. It was not specifically struck down or declared unconstitutional, merely incomplete. The Court focused on what RA 6735 was not, and lost sight of what RA 6735 was.
It is my view that the reading of RA 6735 in
Santiago should have been more flexible. It is also a basic precept of statutory construction that statutes should be construed not so much according to the letter that
killeth but in line with the purpose for which they have been enacted.
4 The reading of the law should not have been with the view of its defeat, but with the goal of upholding it, especially with its avowed noble purpose.
Congress has done its part in empowering the people themselves to propose amendments to the Constitution, in accordance with the Constitution itself. It should not be the Supreme Court that stifles the people, and lets their cries for change go unheard, especially when the Constitution itself grants them that power.
The court's ruling in the
Santiago case
does not bar the present petition because
the
fallo in the
Santiago case is limited to
the Delfin petition.
The
Santiago case involved a petition for prohibition filed by Miriam Defensor-Santiago, et al., against the COMELEC, et al., which sought to prevent the COMELEC from entertaining the "Petition to Amend the Constitution, to Lift Term Limits of Elective Officials, by People's Initiative" filed by Atty. Jesus Delfin. In the body of the judgment, the Court made the following conclusion, viz:
This petition must then be granted and the COMELEC should be permanently enjoined from entertaining or taking cognizance of any petition or initiative on amendments on the Constitution until a sufficient law shall have been validly enacted to provide for the implementation of the system (emphasis supplied).
We feel, however, that the system of initiative to propose amendments to the Constitution should no longer be kept in the cold; it should be given flesh and blood, energy and strength. Congress should not tarry any longer in complying with the constitutional mandate to provide for the implementation of the right of the people under that system.
In the said case, the Court's
fallo states as follows:
WHEREFORE, judgment is hereby rendered
a) GRANTING the instant petition;
b) DECLARING R. A. 6735 inadequate to cover the system of initiative on amendments to the Constitution, and to have failed to provide sufficient standard for subordinate legislation;
c) DECLARING void those parts of Resolutions No. 2300 of the Commission on Elections prescribing rules and regulations on the conduct of initiative or amendments to the Constitution; and
d) ORDERING the Commission on Elections to forthwith DISMISS the DELFIN petition (UND-96-037).
The Temporary Restraining Order issued on 18 December 1996 is made permanent as against the Commission on Elections, but is LIFTED against private respondents.
Resolution on the matter of contempt is hereby reserved.
SO ORDERED.
The question now is if the ruling in
Santiago is decisive in this case. It is elementary that when there is conflict between the dispositive portion or
fallo of the decision and the opinion of the court contained in the text or body of the judgment, the former prevails over the latter. An order of execution is based on the disposition, not on the body, of the decision.
5 The dispositive portion is its decisive resolution; thus, it is the subject of execution. The other parts of the decision may be resorted to in order to determine the
ratio decidendi for the disposition. Where there is conflict between the dispositive part and the opinion of the court contained in the text or body of the decision, the former must prevail over the latter on the theory that the dispositive portion is the final order, while the opinion is merely a statement ordering nothing. Hence, the execution must conform with that which is ordained or decreed in the dispositive portion of the decision.
6A judgment must be distinguished from an opinion. The latter is an informal expression of the views of the court and cannot prevail against its final order or decision. While the two may be combined in one instrument, the opinion forms no part of the judgment. So there is a distinction between the findings and conclusions of a court and its Judgment. While they may constitute its decision and amount to the rendition of a judgment, they are not the judgment itself. It is not infrequent that the grounds of a decision fail to reflect the exact views of the court, especially those of concurring justices in a collegiate court. We often encounter in judicial decisions lapses, findings, loose statements and generalities which do not bear on the issues or are apparently opposed to the otherwise sound and considered result reached by the court as expressed in the dispositive part, so called, of the decision.
7Applying the foregoing argument to the
Santiago case, it immediately becomes apparent that the disposition in the latter case categorically made permanent the December 18, 1996 Temporary Restraining Order issued against the COMELEC in the Delfin petition but did NOT formally incorporate therein any directive PERMANENTLY enjoining the COMELEC "from entertaining or taking cognizance of any petition for initiative on amendments." Undeniably, the perpetual proscription against the COMELEC from assuming jurisdiction over any other petition on Charter Change through a People's Initiative is just a conclusion and cannot bind the poll body, for such unending ban would trench on its constitutional power to enforce and administer all laws and regulations relative to the conduct of an election,
plebiscite initiative, referendum and recall under Section 2, Article IX of the Constitution. RA 6735 gave the COMELEC the jurisdiction to determine the sufficiency of the petition on the initiative under Section 8, Rule 11 and the form of the petition under Section 3, Rule I; hence, it cannot be barred from entertaining any such petition.
In sum, the COMELEC still retains its jurisdiction to take cognizance of any petition on initiative under RA 6735 and it can rule on the petition and its action can only be passed upon by the Court when the same is elevated through a petition for certiorari. COMELEC cannot be barred from acting on said petitions since jurisdiction is conferred by law (RA 6735) and said law has not been declared unconstitutional and hence still valid though considered inadequate in the
Santiago case.
Respondents, however, claim that the Court in the subsequent case of
PIRMA v. Commission on Elections8 confirmed the statement of the Court in the
Santiago case that the COMELEC was "permanently enjoined from entertaining or taking cognizance of any petition for initiative on amendments." Much reliance is placed on the ruling contained in a Minute Resolution which reads:
The Court ruled, first, by a unanimous vote, that no grave abuse of Discretion could be attributed to the public respondent COMELEC in Dismissing the petition filed by PIRMA therein, it appearing that it only Complied with the DISPOSITIONS in the Decision of this Court in G.R. No. 127325, promulgated on March 19, 1997, and its Resolution of June 10, 1997.
Take note that the Court specifically referred to "dispositions" in the March 19, 1997 Decision. To reiterate, the dispositions in the Santiago case decision refer specifically to the December 18, 1996 TRO being made permanent against the COMELEC but do not pertain to a permanent injunction against any other petition for initiative on amendment. Thus, what was confirmed or even affirmed in the Minute Resolution in the PIRMA case pertains solely to the December 18, 1996 TRO which became permanent, the declaration of the inadequacy of RA 6735, and the annulment of certain parts of Resolution No. 2300 but certainly not the alleged perpetual injunction against the initiative petition. Thus, the resolution in the PIRMA case cannot be considered res judicata to the Lambino petition.
Amendment or Revision
One last matter to be considered is whether the petition may be allowed under RA 6735, since only amendments to the Constitution may be the subject of a people's initiative.
The Lambino petition cannot be considered an act of revising the Constitution; it is merely an attempt to amend it. The term amendment has to be liberally construed so as to effectuate the people's efforts to amend the Constitution.
As an eminent constitutionalist, Dean Vicente G. Sinco,9 explained:
Strictly speaking, the act of revising a constitution involves alterations of different portions of the entire document. It may result in the rewriting either of the whole constitution, or the greater portion of it, or perhaps only some of its important provisions. But whatever results the revision may produce, the factor that characterizes it as an act of revision is the original intention and plan authorized to be carried out. That intention and plan must contemplate a consideration of all the provisions of the constitution to determine which one should be altered or suppressed or whether the whole document should be replaced with an entirely new one.
The act of amending a constitution, on the other hand, envisages a change of only a few specific provisions. The intention of an act to amend is not to consider the advisability of changing the entire constitution or of considering that possibility. The intention rather is to improve specific parts of the existing constitution or to add to it provisions deemed essential on account of changed conditions or to suppress portions of it that seem obsolete, or dangerous, or misleading in their effect.
In this case, the Lambino petition is not concerned with rewriting the entire Constitution. It was never its intention to revise the whole Constitution. It merely concerns itself with amending a few provisions in our fundamental charter.
When there are gray areas in legislation, especially in matters that pertain to the sovereign people's political rights, courts must lean more towards a more liberal interpretation favoring the people's right to exercise their sovereign power.
Conclusion
Sovereignty residing in the people is the highest form of sovereignty and thus deserves the highest respect even from the courts. It is not something that can be overruled, set aside, ignored or stomped over by whatever amount of technicalities, blurred or vague provisions of the law.
As I find RA 6735 to be adequate as the implementing law for the People's Initiative, I vote to grant the petition in G.R. No. 174153 and dismiss the petition in G.R. No. 174299. The Amended Petition for Initiative filed by petitioners Raul L. Lambino and Erico B. Aumentado should be remanded to the COMELEC for determination whether or not the petition is sufficient under RA 6735, and if the petition is sufficient, to schedule and hold the necessary plebiscite as required by RA 6735.
It is time to let the people's voice be heard once again as it was twenty years ago. And should this voice demand a change in the Constitution, the Supreme Court should not be one to stand in its way.
1 G.R. No. 127535, March 19, 1997, 270 SCRA 106.
2 Id.
3 Commission on Audit of the Province of Cebu v. Province of Cebu, G.R. No. 141386, November 29, 2001, 371 SCRA 196, 202.
4 United Harbor Pilots' Association of the Philippines, Inc. v. Association of International Shipping Lines, Inc., G.R. No. 133763, November 13, 2002, 391 SCRA 522, 533.
5 PH Credit Corporation v. Court of Appeals and Carlos M. Farrales, G. R. No. 109648, November 22, 2001, 370 SCRA 155, 166-167.
6 Id.
7 Florentino v. Rivera, et al., G. R. No. 167968, January 23, 2006, 479 SCRA 522, 529.
8 G.R. No. 129754, September 23, 1997.
9 V. Sinco, Philippine Political Law, Principles and Concept, 46 (1962).