G.R. No. L-23305 - Lagman vs. City of Manila

Case Summary (G.R. No. L-23305)

Facts

The Public Service Commission granted petitioner a certificate of public convenience to operate 15 vehicles along a specified route between Bocaue (Bulacan) and Paranaque (Rizal), passing through specified Manila streets. Petitioner began operating 12 passenger buses pursuant to that certificate.
On June 17, 1964, the Municipal Board of Manila enacted Ordinance No. 4986 pursuant to Section 18(hh) of the City charter, approved by the Mayor on July 13, 1964, and enforced beginning August 17, 1964. The ordinance restricted entry points, routes, and shuttle arrangements for provincial passenger buses and jeepneys and provided penal sanctions for violations.
When enforcement began, petitioner was prevented from operating his buses within Manila except for two shuttle buses.

Ordinance No. 4986: Relevant Provisions

Ordinance No. 4986 (Rerouting Traffic On Roads and Streets Within The City of Manila) (a) defined “provincial passenger buses” as those with routes originating from or going to points beyond immediate suburbs; (b) prescribed entry points and routes through Manila during specified hours; (c) authorized a “flexible shuttle bus service” with strict limits (one shuttle per ten authorized units maximum) and defined loading/unloading points; and (d) imposed fines or imprisonment for violations.

Petitioner’s Claims

Petitioner asserted multiple grounds for invalidating the ordinance or its enforcement:

The Manila streets through which he was authorized to operate are national roads, and regulation of national roads and traffic is vested in the Director of Public Works (Commonwealth Act No. 548), subject to approval by the Secretary of Public Works and Communications; the ordinance was enacted without participation or approval of those executive officials and therefore usurped their functions.
Section 18(hh) of Republic Act No. 409 did not authorize enactment of an ordinance that effectively amends or modifies a certificate of public convenience; only the Public Service Commission can amend such certificates after notice and hearing (Section 16(m) of the Public Service Act).
Enforcement of the ordinance is arbitrary, oppressive, and unreasonable and effectively destroys petitioner’s business by excluding him from key streets.
Even if the ordinance were valid, only the Public Service Commission could require public services to comply with it (Section 17(j) of the Public Service Act), and the ordinance was being implemented without the Commission’s sanction.
Additionally, petitioner argued his buses merely “pass through” the city and thus fall under the saving clause of Section 18(hh).

Respondent’s Defenses

The City of Manila defended Ordinance No. 4986 on these main points:

Section 18(hh) of the Manila charter constitutes an explicit delegation of police power to regulate and prohibit entrance of provincial public utility vehicles and thus is paramount to and superior even to the administrative powers claimed under Commonwealth Act No. 548 and the Public Service Act.
Commonwealth Act No. 548 has been repealed by Section 27 of Republic Act No. 917, or, in any event, Republic Act No. 409 is a later special law that prevails over any conflicting general statute.
The Public Service Act does not deprive the City of Manila of its authority to regulate streets or license occupancy thereof; rather, the Public Service Commission’s powers are supplementary, and Section 17(j) evidences that the Commission may require compliance but is not the exclusive enforcer.
Petitioner’s admission that his buses pick up passengers within the city meant they do not merely “pass through,” so petitioner cannot rely on the saving clause.

Issues Presented

Whether Republic Act No. 409 (the Manila charter) and Ordinance No. 4986 are invalid as an unlawful usurpation of powers vested in the Director of Public Works by Commonwealth Act No. 548.
Whether Ordinance No. 4986 unlawfully amends or interferes with petitioner’s certificate of public convenience issued by the Public Service Commission and thus violates Section 16(m) of the Public Service Act.
Whether enforcement of Ordinance No. 4986 is arbitrary, oppressive, or unreasonable as to petitioner.
Whether petitioner’s operations are protected by the saving clause for vehicles “passing thru the city.”

Court’s Analysis — Special Law Prevails over General Acts

The Court held that Republic Act No. 409, as a special and later enactment, takes precedence over earlier general statutes such as Commonwealth Act No. 548 and the Public Service Act (Commonwealth Act No. 146). The Court applied the well-settled rule that to the extent a special law is repugnant to or inconsistent with a prior general law, the special law controls and operates as an exception to the general law. The Court also observed that Commonwealth Act No. 548 did not grant an exclusive power to the Director of Public Works to regulate national roads in a manner that would preclude local legislative action in Manila under its charter.

Court’s Analysis — Public Service Commission’s Powers Are Not Exclusive Over Municipal Regulatory Power

The Court rejected petitioner’s contention that Section 16(m) of the Public Service Act confers an exclusive right upon the Public Service Commission to amend or modify certificates of public convenience in a way that would supersede municipal authority over streets. The Court reasoned that the Public Service Commission’s power to amend or revoke certificates after notice and hearing does not equate to a power to superintend or suspend municipal regulation of streets or to prevent a municipality from licensing or prohibiting occupancy of its streets. The Court relied on Section 17(j) of the Public Service Act to conclude that the Commission’s authority to require compliance with municipal ordinances is supplementary rather than exclusive; the Commission may demand compliance but is not the sole organ for enforcing municipal regulation. Th

Case Syllabus (G.R. No. L-23305)

Procedural History

Petition for declaratory relief filed by petitioner Benedicto C. Lagman on August 6, 1964, seeking declaration of rights under Ordinance No. 4986 (the so-called "provincial bus ban") and praying for writs of preliminary and permanent injunctions to restrain enforcement.
Initial resolution of the Supreme Court dated August 11, 1964 dismissed the petition without prejudice to action, if any, in the lower court.
Petitioner filed a motion for reconsideration and a supplemental petition converting the action into one for prohibition, alleging actual enforcement of the ordinance effective August 17, 1964.
The Supreme Court reconsidered, gave due course to the petition for prohibition and required respondents to answer; the Court did not issue the writ of preliminary injunction prayed for.
Respondents answered and filed memoranda and reply memoranda; the case was submitted for decision.
Decision rendered June 30, 1966, by Justice Reyes, J.B.L.; petition for prohibition dismissed with costs against petitioner.

Factual Background

Petitioner was granted a certificate of public convenience by the Public Service Commission (decision dated March 20, 1963 in FSC Case No. 61-7383) to operate fifteen (15) auto trucks with fixed routes and regular termini for passengers and freight on the Bocaue (Bulacan)–Paranaque (Rizal) line via specified intermediate points; within Manila the line passed through Rizal Avenue, Plaza Goiti, McArthur Bridge, Plaza Lawton, P. Burgos, Taft Avenue and Taft Avenue Extension.
Pursuant to the certificate, petitioner (doing business as "Marco Transit") began operating twelve (12) passenger buses along the authorized line.
On June 17, 1964 the Municipal Board of the City of Manila enacted Ordinance No. 4986, entitled "An Ordinance Rerouting Traffic On Roads and Streets Within The City of Manila, and For Other Purposes."
The City Mayor approved Ordinance No. 4986 on July 13, 1964 and it became effective upon approval.
Ordinance No. 4986 contained definitions (including definition of "provincial passenger buses" and "provincial passenger jeepneys") and prescribed limited entry points and routes for provincial passenger buses and jeepneys, operating hours for entry (6:30 A.M. to 8:30 P.M. daily except Sundays and holidays), and provisions for "Flexible Shuttle Bus Service" with limitations and identification sticker requirements.
On August 17, 1964 the Mayor, through police agencies, began enforcing the ordinance and prevented petitioner from operating his buses within Manila except for two (2) "shuttle" buses.

Relevant Ordinance Provisions (Ordinance No. 4986)

Section 1: Purpose stated as a temporary measure to relieve traffic congestion and to promote public welfare and convenience.
Rule I (Definitions): Defines "provincial passenger buses" and "provincial passenger jeepneys" as those whose route lines are from or going to points beyond specified suburban cities (beyond Pasay City, Makati, Mandaluyong, San Juan, Quezon City, Caloocan City and Navotas).
Rule II (Entry Points and Routes): Prescribes specific permitted entry points and routes for provincial buses and jeepneys from various directions, and restricts entry to specified routes and times.
Rule III (Flexible Shuttle Bus Service): Allows provincial bus operators shuttle buses from entry control points under conditions:
- Allocation proportional to authorized units, determined by the Chief, Traffic Control Bureau, with a maximum allocation of one shuttle bus for every ten authorized units or fraction thereof.
- Shuttle buses must bear identification stickers furnished by the Chief, Traffic Control Bureau.
- Shuttle buses are prohibited from loading/unloading along the way; only designated loading/unloading points are permitted (examples given: J. Abad Santos corner Rizal Avenue for north; Harrison Boulevard between Dakota & Taft Avenue for south).
General Provisions, Section 4: Prescribes punishment for violation—fine of not less than P20.00 nor nore than P20 .00, or imprisonment for not less than five (5) days nor more than six (6) months, or both, in the discretion of the court.

Petitioner’s Contentions

Ordinance No. 4986 is unconstitutional, illegal, ultra vires and null and void as it conflicts with national statutes and administrative authority.
Commonwealth Act No. 548 vests regulation and control over the use of and traffic on national roads and streets in the Director of Public Works, subject to approval of the Secretary of Public Works and Communications; the ordinance was not proposed to nor approved by these executive officials, thus it usurps their functions.
The ordinance effectively amends or modifies petitioner’s certificate of public convenience, a power vested solely in the Public Service Commission (Section 16(m), Public Service Act) which must follow the procedure of notice and hearing; respondents did not follow that procedure.
Enforcement of the ordinance is arbitrary, oppressive and unreasonable because the city streets from which petitioner was prevented to operate are the "cream" of his business.
Even if the ordinance were valid, only the Public Service Commission can require compliance with its provisions under Section 17(j) of the Public Service Act; implementation without the Commission’s sanction or appr