G.R. No. L-23305 - Lagman vs. City of Manila

Petitioner Benedicto C. Lagman, doing business under the firm name “Marco Transit,” operated public utility passenger buses.
He was granted a certificate of public convenience by the Public Service Commission (dated March 20, 1963, FSC Case No. 61-7383) authorizing the operation of fifteen (15) auto trucks on a fixed route between Bocaue (Bulacan) and Paranaque (Rizal) via multiple points including Paranaque and Baclaran.
Based on this certificate, Lagman operated twelve (12) passenger buses along the authorized line passing through specified streets in Manila.

The City of Manila, through its Municipal Board, enacted Ordinance No. 4986 on 13 July 1964 pursuant to its charter provision under Section 18, paragraph (hh) of Republic Act No. 409.

The ordinance was meant to address critical traffic congestion in the city.
It defined “provincial passenger buses” and “provincial passenger jeepneys” based on their route or origin-destination outside major Metro Manila cities.

Specific rules were set regarding entry points, routes, and operating times for provincial buses, allowing them to enter Manila only through designated entry routes from 6:30 A.M. to 8:30 P.M. on specified days.
The ordinance also provided for a “flexible shuttle bus service” to accommodate commuter needs without disrupting traffic control measures.
Enforcement of the ordinance commenced on 17 August 1964 by the Manila police agencies, which resulted in Lagman being prevented from operating his buses on all but two “shuttle buses” along the authorized routes within the city.

The provincial bus ban ordinance was unconstitutional, illegal, ultra vires, and null and void.
The routes where his buses were authorized to operate were national roads or streets, and regulation of these falls under Commonwealth Act No. 548, which vest regulatory functions in the Director of Public Works (subject to the approval of the Secretary of Public Works and Communications).
The ordinance was enacted without the necessary proposal or approval by the executive officials mandated by Commonwealth Act No. 548.
The modification or amendment of a certificate of public convenience, which is exclusively within the power of the Public Service Commission under Section 16(m) of the Public Service Act, was unlawfully bypassed by the city ordinance.
The enforcement of the ordinance was arbitrary, oppressive, and unreasonable since it impacted the prime routes of his business.
Even if the ordinance were considered valid, only the Public Service Commission should have the power to require compliance with its provisions pursuant to Section 17(j) of the Public Service Act.

He further contended that his buses merely “pass through” the city and thus should fall under the saving clause of Section 18 (hh) of Republic Act No. 409, protecting his right to operate without interference.

Its ordinance was an exercise of the explicit police power granted under its charter to “establish and regulate” public vehicles within the city.
Republic Act No. 409, being a special law of later enactment, prevails over Commonwealth Act No. 548 and the Public Service Act.
The provisions of Commonwealth Act No. 548 have effectively been repealed by Section 27 of Republic Act No. 917, reinforcing the city’s regulatory power.
The ordinance did not conflict with the Public Service Commission’s authority since Section 17(j) of the Public Service Act does not preclude municipal ordinances from regulating local traffic, but rather complements the commission’s enforcement powers.
Since Lagman’s buses operate by picking up passengers within the city, they do not simply “pass through” but engage in local business, thus falling within the city’s regulatory ambit.

Whether Ordinance No. 4986 is unconstitutional, illegal, ultra vires, or null and void.
Whether the ordinance usurps the exclusive regulatory powers of the Public Service Commission regarding modifications or amendments to the certificate of public convenience.

Whether the City of Manila has the power to enact and enforce ordinances regulating provincial public utility vehicles under its charter (Republic Act No. 409) despite conflicting provisions in Commonwealth Act No. 548 and the Public Service Act.
Whether the enforcement of said ordinance by local authorities interferes unduly with the operational rights granted to Lagman under his certificate of public convenience.

Whether Lagman’s operation of buses that pick up passengers within the city qualifies as merely “passing through” or constitutes local business, thereby affecting the applicability of the saving clause of Section 18 (hh) of Republic Act No. 409.