Title
IN RE: Buscayno vs. Military Commissions
Case
G.R. No. L-58284
Decision Date
Nov 19, 1981
Civilians Buscayno and Sison, charged with subversion and rebellion, challenged military tribunal jurisdiction and habeas corpus suspension; Supreme Court upheld convictions, citing waived rights and ongoing offenses.

Case Summary (G.R. No. L-58284)

Buscayno’s arrest, military commission proceedings, and initial habeas petitions

Buscayno was arrested August 26, 1976 and detained at Camp Crame. He sent a letter (Sept. 7, 1976) indicating refusal to appear and waiving counsel in certain proceedings. He was arraigned, pleaded not guilty, initially waived presentation of defense evidence, and was later represented by counsel (Juan T. David, appearance July 18, 1977). Military Commission No. 2, after prosecution presentation and Buscayno’s failure to present evidence, deemed the case submitted (November 25, 1977) and convicted, imposing death by firing squad. The President ordered a reopening on November 29, 1977. Buscayno filed a habeas corpus petition and prohibition in this Court (October 25, 1977) but this Court earlier dismissed a related petition (L-47185, January 15, 1981). Military Commission proceedings were revisited in 1981 (reconvened March 27, 1981), with postponements and further rulings; on May 4, 1981 the Commission reaffirmed its 1977 conviction and death penalty.

Charges and procedural posture of the Sison spouses

Jose Ma. Sison and Juliet de Lima-Sison were arrested November 10, 1977 pursuant to orders of the Secretary of National Defense. They and numerous co-accused were charged with rebellion (Special Military Commission No. 1, amended charge sheet Nov. 8, 1977) and with subversion before other military commissions (Juliet Sison earlier charged in 1972 before Military Commission No. 6; Jose Ma. Sison charged in 1978 before Military Commission No. 25). Charge sheets allege organizing, leading, fomenting indoctrination, agitation and the taking up of arms in furtherance of efforts to overthrow the government.

The omnibus petition filed October 2, 1981 and reliefs sought

The petitioners filed an omnibus petition for habeas corpus, prohibition and mandamus challenging the May 4, 1981 decision of Military Commission No. 2 (conviction and death sentence of Buscayno), alleging denial of the constitutional right to present evidence; seeking dismissal of the rebellion and subversion charges on double jeopardy grounds; seeking injunctions to stop Military Commissions Nos. 1, 6, and 25 from further proceedings; requesting release and bail; and asking for temporary restraining orders against perpetuation of testimony and review actions.

Supreme Court’s disposition on habeas corpus, detention and bail

The Court held petitioners were not illegally deprived of liberty and denied relief. It relied on Proclamation No. 2045 (Jan. 17, 1981), which terminated martial law but expressly preserved the suspension of the privilege of the writ of habeas corpus as to persons detained for rebellion, subversion and related offenses and provided for the phased dissolution of military tribunals only upon final determination of certain cases. Because Proclamation No. 2045 explicitly continued the suspension of the privilege of the writ for persons like the petitioners, the Court found they were not entitled to bail and thus denied the habeas corpus claims and bail requests (the Court cited Lansang v. Garcia as authority for the proposition that suspension of the privilege of the writ precludes bail).

Limitations on this Court’s review of military commission proceedings

The Court reiterated that it ordinarily cannot review interlocutory rulings and proceedings of military commissions directly; under the National Security Code (PD 1498) the Court’s review is generally limited to decisions of the Court of Military Appeals in cases appealed from military commissions. Consequently, factual or procedural complaints about the conduct of trials before military commissions (e.g., denial of opportunity to present evidence) should first be addressed by the reviewing military authority rather than this Court in the first instance.

Ruling on the alleged repeal of the Anti-Subversion Law (RA 1700) by PD 885

Petitioner Juliet Sison argued that her criminal liability under RA 1700 was extinguished by PD 885 (Revised Anti-Subversion Law). The Court rejected that contention: PD 885 expressly superseded RA 1700 but included a transitory/saving clause (section 7) providing that acts committed in violation of the former law prior to PD 885 remain prosecutable under the former law and pending cases are not barred. This saving provision was noted as reenacted in PD 1498; thus subversion prosecutions under RA 1700 were not extinguished by PD 885.

Ruling on the double jeopardy claim

The Court analyzed the constitutional and procedural prerequisites for double jeopardy (drawing from section 9, Rule 117, Rules of Court and existing case law): for jeopardy to attach, a valid complaint/information must be filed in a court of competent jurisdiction and the case must have been terminated by conviction, acquittal or dismissal without the accused’s consent. The Court found that none of the petitioners’ cases had been finally terminated; therefore jeopardy had not attached and the double jeopardy defense could not be invoked. The Court explained that subversion and rebellion are distinct offenses—subversion is a crime against national security (membership and leadership in subversive organizations), while rebellion is a crime against public order involving public uprising and taking up of arms—and that the overt acts alleged in the respective charges differ in time and substance. Reliance was placed on prior decisions (e.g., Bulaong, People v. Liwanag) to support the conclusion that the plea of double jeopardy was premature and without merit given the procedural posture.

Final disposition

The Court dismissed the petition, lifted any restraining order, and imposed no costs.

Concurring and dissenting opinion of Chief Justice Fernando — scope of review and bail issue

Chief Justice Fernando concurred in the result but expressed reservations and separate views: he disagreed with the majority’s construal of the Court’s power to review military tribunal actuations and urged reexamination of the doctrine that suspension of the privilege of the writ of habeas corpus necessarily suspends the right to bail; he considered the p

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